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ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE last three decades have witnessed the development of volu-
minous legislation in both the United States and Canada, which
introduced environmentally protective regulatory and administra-
tive regimes at the federal,1 state2 and provincial 3 levels. Notwith-
standing the emergence of such sophisticated administrative
regimes, certain jurisdictions have enacted legislation designed to
encourage citizen access to the courts4 and to aid the development
of a common law of environmental protection.5 Two examples in-
clude legislation that Michigan enacted in the 1970s6 and Ontario
enacted in the 1990s. 7 Citizen-oriented legislation has focused on
1. See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-76 7 1q (1994); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6939b (1994). At the federal level in the United
States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), was established in the early
1970s to administer various pieces of federal pollution control legislation. The
United States has promulgated numerous and extensive rules and regulations
under its pollution control laws. Other areas of federal environmental law admin-
istered by EPA include pesticides, toxic substances, solid waste disposal and related
areas which have their own extensive body of rules and regulations. Besides EPA,
there are federal departments and agencies specifically designed to oversee the
management and protection of natural resources, endangered species, public and
forest lands and wetlands. The Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of
the Interior are two such departments. At the federal level in Canada, the Depart-
ment of the Environment was created in the early 1970s to regulate selected as-
pects of the environment. See Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C., ch.
22 (1988) (Can.) (detailing Canadian federal environmental regulation); Fisheries
Act, R.S.C., ch. F-14 (1985) (Can.).
2. See, e.g., Missouri Clean Water Law, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 644.136 (West 1997)
(creating pollution control agency to regulate various facets of environment).
Similarly, each state in the United States has created an agency to oversee environ-
mental and pollution regulation.
3. See, e.g., Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O., ch. 0.40 (1990) (Can.) (reg-
ulating water pollution). The government in each Canadian province has estab-
lished ministries of the environment and natural resources to regulate these
matters.
4. See, e.g., Anna Dwyer, OEBR Improves Public Access to the Courts, LAw TIMES
(Toronto), Feb. 7-13, 1994, at 16 (discussing citizen suit legislative provision);
Craig Mclnnes, Environmental Rights Bill Now Law, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb.
16, 1994, at A3 (noting that due to passage of Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights
(OEBR) "individuals can now use Ontario courts to fight polluters").
5. See Rep. Thomas J. Anderson, Michigan Passes Landmark Environmental Law,
(July 2, 1970) (press release) (stating at time of passage of Michigan Environmen-
tal Protection Act (MEPA) that statute should "permit courts to develop a common
law of environmental quality, much as courts have developed a right to privacy");
see also Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Mich. 1975)
(holding that legislature left to courts important task of "developing a common
law of environmental quality [under MEPA]").
6. See Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA), MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 324.1701 to 324.1706 (West 1997).
7. See Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights (OEBR), S.O., ch. 28 (1993)
(Can.).
1998]
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establishing, or seeking to establish, certain "environmental
rights."8 These rights encompass the following: (1) the right to a
healthy environment; (2) the right to participate in environmental
decisions; (3) the right to hold governments accountable for activi-
ties detrimental to the environment; and (4) the right of public
access to the courts to ensure environmental protection. 9
Although these initiatives are hardly new, they point to funda-
mental and continuing dissatisfaction with the administrative and
regulatory process as the exclusive source for implementing the
public interest in environmentally-sound decision-making. 10 The
initiatives further evince a concern with leaving all environmental
management decisions to the government and indicate a signifi-
8. SeeJoseph L. Sax, The Search for Environmental Rights, 6J. LAND USE & ENvrTL.
L. 93 (1990) (attempting to identify source of fundamental environmental rights
and articulating their content). Professor Joseph L. Sax, chief architect of MEPA,
believes there are important links between certain environmental claims of right
and baseline democratic values. See id. According to Professor Sax, the demo-
cratic values that contribute to articulating environmental rights and responsibili-
ties are: (1) an open process of decision-making; (2) recognition of the intrinsic
value of each individual; and (3) patrimonial or governmental responsibility as a
public duty. See id. From these values, Professor Sax derives three precepts as the
source of basic environmental rights: (1) fully informed open decision-making
based upon free choice; (2) protection of all at a baseline reflecting respect for
every member of society; and (3) a commitment not to impoverish the earth and
narrow the possibilities of the future. See id.
9. See, e.g., OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 2 (1993) (Can.).
10. SeeJosEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT at xvii (1970) (explaining
need for administrative regulation of environment). Professor Sax states:
We are a peculiar people. Though committed to the idea of democracy,
as private citizens we have withdrawn from the governmental process and
sent in our place a surrogate to implement the public interest. This sub-
stitute-the administrative agency-stands between the people and those
whose daily business is the devouring of natural environments for private
gain.
Id. Similar observations were made in Ontario during the same period. SeeJ. A.
Kennedy, Foreword to the First Edition of DAVID ESTRIN & JOHN SWAIGEN, ENVIRON-
MENT ON TRIAL at xvii (3d ed. 1993) (1974) (explaining need for administrative
regulation of environment). Kennedy notes:
[T] he bureaucratic agency or department-is charged with looking after
that elusive, ever-changing thing called the public interest, but so often
the bureaucracy seems to impede desired action .... The administrative
agency... for example, the Ontario Ministry of the Environment ... is
admittedly an essential element in our society. Someone must take the
initiative for planning, must set standards, supervise the granting of per-
mits and see that regulations are enforced. Yet, all too often, the citizen
has been left out of the decision-making ... process. In many cases, the
citizen is actually forbidden to take part.
Id.
11. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at xvii (discussing implications of leaving all
environmental management decisions to government). Kennedy articulates that
the perception in Ontario from the late 1960s onward, concerning the spotty rec-
ord of government enforcement of environmental laws, eventually caused citizens
4
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cant and continuing interest in reasserting citizen involvement in
the democratic process.12 In an era signified by government at-
tempts to dramatically shrink the size of the public sector,13 a par-
tial privatizing enforcement of environmental law through citizen
suits becomes all the more important as a supplement to or substi-
tute for government action or inaction. 14 Moreover, citizen-initi-
ated lawsuits demonstrate the judiciary's capacity to assist in the
to rely on the judicial system to protect the environment. See id.; see also SAx, supra
note 10, at 108-24, 157 (highlighting reasons for permitting courts to develop and
explore environmental rights arena). Writing in the early 1970s, Professor Sax
focused on a role for the courts in environmental protection. He did so because
courts were not as amenable to political pressures as agencies, could supplement
the administrative process and could serve as a catalyst of the legislative process
without usurping legislative functions. But seeJeanette L. Austin, The Rise of Citizen-
Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General,
81 Nw. U. L. REV. 220, 223 (1987) (explaining that citizen suits invite judicial law-
making and place courts in uncomfortable position of having to define content of
regulatory requirements). Austin speculated that increased opportunity for judi-
cial lawmaking will cause inconsistent enforcement, loss of administrative control
over regulatory programs and the impairment of governmental ability to develop
and maintain cooperative relationships with the regulated industry. See id.
12. See Joseph L. Sax, Legal Redress of Environmental Disruption, ARCH. F., May
1970, at 51 (noting that public has turned to courts to protect environment). Sax
explained that litigation represents an attempt to bring concerned citizens into the
decision-making process by opening a forum in which there is relative equality of
access and in which the issues are considered on their merits. See id.; see also SAX,
supra note 10, at 60 (characterizing enforcement of public rights as application of
democratic theory to allocation of natural resources).
13. See, e.g., Kathleen Cooper, Ontario Environmental Protections Swept Away,
GREAT LAKEs UNITED, Winter 1996-97, at 1, 6 (noting that 13 of Ontario's environ-
mental laws have been weakened, dismantled or eliminated since Progressive Con-
servative government came to power in 1995); Jean Greig, No Question, It's
Deregulation, ONTARio ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORK NEWS, Dec. 1996, at 1, 3; Brian
McAndrew, Environment Rules to Be Cut by 50%, TORONTO STAR, July 24, 1996, at A2;
Brian McAndrew, Ontario to Sink Pollution Law, TORONTO STAR, July 26, 1996, at A5
(noting that business organizations representing dozens of Ontario's largest min-
ing, chemical and pulp and paper "high pollution" companies, upon invitation of
new Progressive Conservative government, urged dismantling of province's strin-
gent framework of environmental laws); Brian McAndrew, Minister on Endangered
List: Brenda Elliot Sits in the Environment Minister's Chair at Queen's Park but Critics Say
the Only Impression She Has Left Is on the Cushion, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 20, 1996, at C6
(noting that $60 million-dollar cut from Ontario Ministry of Environment and En-
ergy's 1995 $330 million-dollar budget represented reduction of 18%); Martin Mit-
telstaedt, Industries Urge Ontario to Ease Pollution Laws, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto),
May 21, 1996, at Bi; Ken Traynor, Deregulation-A Disturbing Continental Trend, IN-
TERVENOR, Mar./Apr. 1996, at 2 (noting that "dramatic assault on environmental
regulation now being carried out by Ontario's Progressive Conservative govern-
ment since being elected in June 1995 represents a common and disturbing"
North American trend); Editorial, Polluted Public Policy, TORONTO STAR, May 26,
1996, at E2.
14. See Peter H. Lerner, The Efficiency of Citizen Suits, 2 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUT-
LOOK 4 (1995) (noting that it may be appropriate to recognize that enforcement of
environmental laws is too important to leave to "exclusive province" of government
in light of public's growing questioning of government's ability to solve problems).
1998] 353
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development of critical environmental policy.15
What is remarkable, however, is how the interest in defending
the environment through an assertion of fundamental environmen-
tal rights has persevered over time. This notion, which may have
reached its zenith in the United States in the 1970s with the passage
of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA),16 found its
15. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, [1976] 6 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,588 (D.D.C. June 9, 1976) (involving United States citizen
suit which resulted in EPA's establishment of priority pollutant program under
Clean Water Act); Canadian Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. Minister of Env't, [1989] 3
C.E.L.R. 287 (F.C.T.D.), affd [1989] 4 C.E.L.R. 1 (F.C.A.) (Can.); Friends of the
Oldman River Soc'y v. Canada, [1992] 7 C.E.L.R. 1 (S.C.C.) (Can.) (affirming stat-
utory validity and obligation of federal government to comply with its environmen-
tal assessment and review process).
16. MEPA, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 324.1701 to 324.1706 (West 1997). See
A New Right to Sue Polluters, TIME, Aug. 24, 1970, at 37 (noting that MEPA puts every
Michigan citizen on an equal footing with state's attorney general in environmen-
tal cases); Editorial, Environment Goes to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1970, at 30 (not-
ing that MEPA pointed way toward similar initiatives at federal and state level).
MEPA achieves three key reforms: (1) allows any private citizen to sue on behalf of
general population for public nuisance whether or not nuisance affects that per-
son personally; (2) does not require Michigan courts to defer to governmental
decisions; and (3) shifts the burden of proof to the defendant once the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case. MEPA, MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 324.1701 to
324.1706 (West 1997).
A number of states have adopted environmental legislation employing lan-
guage similar to that found in MEPA. See, e.g., Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act (MERA), MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01 to 116B.13 (West 1997); Connecticut
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to 22a-20
(West 1997); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § 7A (West 1997); South Dakota Envi-
ronmental Protection Act (SDEPA), S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 34A-10-1 to 34A-10-15
(Michie 1997); New Jersey Environmental Rights Act (NJERA), NJ. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:35A-1 to 2A:35A-8 (West 1997); Indiana Environmental Protection Act
(IEPA), IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-30-1 to 13-30-12 (West 1997); Florida Environmental
Protection Act (FEPA), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 1997). But see Lerner,
supra note 14, at 10 (indicating that experience among MEPA-influenced environ-
mental rights statutes has been mixed).
Where standing rules have been unclear, some courts have been slow to adopt
the broad legislative intention of allowing anyone to sue. See id. (referring to state
of Connecticut). Where standing rules have been clear, other states have retained
other limitations, thereby preventing the statute from being used frequently. See
id. (referring to state of Indiana which additionally requires exhaustion of all avail-
able administrative remedies). Conversely, courts interpreting environmental
rights legislation containing an exhaustive list of definitions have recognized very
broad standing rights. See id. (referring to state of Minnesota which has largely
avoided disputes on this issue).
According to Lerner, states have been inconsistent in their determination of
what types of polluting activities are actionable under their respective environmen-
tal rights statutes. See id. For example, some state statutes authorizing actions
against unreasonable damage to the "public trust" in those state's resources, have
been interpreted by courts to allow actions for protection of air and water but not
for other resources. See id. (referring to state of Connecticut which has found
damage to natural resources to be reasonable). On the other hand, courts have
allowed citizen suits protecting a broad range of resources where the state statute
6
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transnational expression and more modest articulation in Canada
in the 1990s with the passage of laws such as Ontario's Environmen-
tal Bill of Rights (OEBR).17 To this day, environmental rights legis-
lation continues to be considered in the legislatures of various
jurisdictions in the United StatesI8 and Canada.1 9
The Michigan experience has been the impetus for the devel-
opment of slightly modified environmental rights legislation in sev-
eral Canadian jurisdictions. In Ontario, for example, the
legislature enacted OEBR, a law emulating MEPA but reflecting
substantial changes. OEBR modified MEPA's substantive rights re-
gime20 to a predominantly administrative rights regime, by address-
ing such matters as notice and comment opportunities,
provides an extensive definition of "natural resources" and does not require a find-
ing of unreasonableness. See id. (referring to state of Minnesota).
Lerner further explained that some court holdings have conflicted with the
broad remedial purposes of citizen suit laws. See id. (referring to state of Massachu-
setts which required that damage to natural resources be significant and arise from
violation of statute). Similarly, where states have permitted citizen suits for both
statutory violations and damage to the public trust, the courts have allowed citizen
suits only for the former, but not the latter. See id. (referring to state of New
Jersey).
17. OEBR, S.O., ch. 28 (1993) (Can.). See Paul Morden, Environmental Bill
Allows Citizens to Take Action, SARmA OBSERVER, Jan. 3, 1994, at 1; Lynne Olver,
Environmental Bill Called "Tool Box"for Citizens, SAULT STAR, Feb. 19, 1994, at B4
(noting that OEBR should make it easier for citizens to take action against persons
causing pollution because it allows residents to bring suit against alleged polluters
suspected of breaking environmental law and damaging public resources). MEPA
had the greatest impact on Ontario legislators, lawyers and the public during the
1970s and 1980s. A number of provinces and territories have adopted environ-
mental legislation similar to MEPA and earlier versions of OEBR introduced as
private members' bills during the 1980s. See, e.g., Quebec Environmental Quality
Act, R.S.Q., ch. Q-2 (1993) (Can.) (outlining statutory scheme similar to Environ-
mental Bill of Rights); Northwest Territories Environmental Rights Act, S.N.W.T.,
ch. 38 (1990) (Can.) (same); Yukon Territories Environmental Act, S.Y.T., ch. 5
(1991) (Can.) (same).
18. See Lerner, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that New York State Assembly
passed an environmental citizen suit bill in 1995 which was being considered by
the New York State Senate).
19. See PAUL MULDOON & RiCHARD LINDGREN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF
RIGHTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 25-26 (1995) (explaining that provinces of Saskatche-
wan and British Columbia introduced draft bills on environmental rights, but
neither legislature has yet passed such bill).
20. See Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 220 N.W.2d 416,
427-28 (Mich. 1974) (holding that MEPA provides both separate procedural route
for protection of environmental quality as well as source of supplementary substan-
tive environmental law). The Michigan Supreme Court explained that MEPA is
designed to accomplish two distinct results: (1) provide a procedural cause of ac-
tion for protection of Michigan's natural resources; and (2) establish substantive
environmental rights and impose substantive environmental duties and functions
upon those engaging in pollution, impairment or destruction of air, water or other
natural resources or the public trust therein. See id.; see alsoJoseph L. Sax & Roger
L. Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70
1998]
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administrative appeals and procedural rights. 21 Both political and
economic factors contributed to these changes. 22 As they are cur-
rently structured, MEPA and OEBR represent the polar extremes of
approaches or paradigms of environmental rights law. Understand-
ing the strengths and weaknesses of each can assist not only Michi-
gan and Ontario in any future reforms, but also other jurisdictions
considering the enactment of environmental rights legislation.
This Article explores the extent to which the Ontario approach
in OEBR differs from MEPA, the Michigan approach, and explains
whether those differences constitute a positive or negative depar-
ture from the Michigan law. Part II reviews the origins and sources
of environmental rights theory and the initiatives in Michigan and
Ontario. 23 Part III discusses MEPA's key substantive provisions and
surveys the case law that has interpreted the statute for over twenty-
five years. 24 Part IV examines the evolution of OEBR's develop-
MICH. L. REv. 1004, 1005, 1054-64 (1972) (noting that MEPA "recognizes and
makes enforceable a new substantive right" to environmental quality).
21. OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, §§ 2(a)-(c) (1993) (Can.). OEBR has three essential
purposes: (1) increase public participation in the environmental decision-making
process; (2) increase government accountability; and (3) increase public access to
the courts. See id.; see also MULDOON & LINDGREN, supra note 19, at 3, 46 (detailing
three essential purposes). The components of the first purpose include: (1) notice
and comment opportunities in relation to new statutes, regulations, policies and
instruments (e.g., licenses, permits or approvals); (2) opportunities to request gov-
ernmental review of existing statutes, regulations, policies or instruments or to re-
quest that new statutes, regulations or policies be developed where none exist; and
(3) limited opportunities for appeals of instruments to an administrative tribunal
and in some cases, review in the courts. See id. The first purpose, the public partic-
ipation regime, has been called the "core" and the "heart" of OEBR, designed to
reform the role of the public in the administrative process of environmental pro-
tection in the province. See id. The components of the second purpose include:
(1) a requirement that certain ministries of the Ontario government develop state-
ments of environmental values (e.g., an action plan); and (2) establishment of an
Environmental Commissioner to oversee, monitor and report to the Ontario legis-
lature on implementation of, and compliance with, OEBR. See id. The compo-
nents of the third purpose include: (1) opportunities to request governmental
investigation of alleged statutory, regulatory or instrumental violations; (2) estab-
lishment of a new cause of action where there has been a violation of an environ-
mental law that has caused a significant harm to a public resource; and (3)
modification of the bar to allow standing in public nuisance cases. See id. One
commentator suggested that OEBR turned the courts into the forum of last resort.
See Michael Cochrane, Overview of the Environmental Bill of Rights: Address Before the
Canadian Bar Association on the Subject of Environmental Bill of Rights (June 10, 1994),
in ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 6 (1994) (describing
OEBR as a regime with reliance on both political and judicial accountability).
22. For further discussion of the political and economic factors contributing
to the new focus in OEBR, see infra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the origin of environmental rights theory, see infra
notes 28-70 and accompanying text.
24. For explication of MEPA's substantive provisions, see infra notes 83-168
and accompanying text.
[Vol. IX: p. 349
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ment.25 Throughout this Article, a comparative analysis of MEPA
and OEBR is conducted. 26 Ultimately, Part V concludes that OEBR
is largely a "rights law" in name only because its administrative and
procedural rights regime is highly dependent on agency
discretion. 27
II. ORIGINS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS INITIATIVES
The origins of environmental rights initiatives in both Michi-
gan and Ontario reflect parallel and diverging paths. The parallels
arise from a similarity in judge-made law concerning common law
obstacles to sue, such as public nuisance. According to Michigan
and. Ontario common law, only the Attorney General may sue for
public resource interferences unless there is a showing of harm dif-
ferent in kind from the public at large.28 The diverging paths are a
result of Canada's lag in regulatory reformation. The United States
25. For a discussion of OEBR's development, see infra notes 169-209 and ac-
companying text.
26. For a comparative analysis of MEPA and OEBR, see infra notes 338-39 and
accompanying text.
27. In sum, the author believes that OEBR's substantive rights regime is too
narrow in scope to achieve its proclaimed goals of encouraging the public's right
to participate in environmental decisions, holding the government accountable
and gaining access to the courts. Although OEBR is clearly a step forward, the
statute represents neither the end of Ontario's search for public environmental
enforcement nor the beginning of the end. It merely represents the end of the
beginning.
28. See, e.g., White Lake Improvement Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 177 N.W.2d
473, 476 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (articulating common law standing principles). In
City of Whitehall, a conservation association filed a motion requesting that the Mich-
igan Court of Appeals "overrule the universally accepted doctrine that only one
who suffers harm different in kind from that suffered by the public generally may
maintain an action for the abatement of a public nuisance." Id. In rejecting the
request, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that "no case has been cited where a
court has, even for a clearly publicly motivated group, made an exception to the
'different in kind' standing requirement which for so long has been a feature of
the law of public nuisance." Id. See also Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d
715, 720-21 (Mich. 1992) (evidencing that Michigan public nuisance common law
remains largely same today); Cloverleaf Car Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 540
N.W.2d 297, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that private citizen may bring
action in public nuisance only upon suffering harm different from that suffered by
general public). Canadian common law is similar to Michigan common law. See,
e.g., Hickey v. Elec. Reduction Co. of Can., Ltd., [1971] 21 D.L.R.3d 368, 369
(Nfld. S.C.) (explicating limitation on citizen suit standing); Fillion v. N.B. Int'l
Paper Co., [1934] 3 D.L.R. 22, 26 (N.B.C.A.) (holding that in order to succeed in
public nuisance action, plaintiffs must establish that injury inflicted upon them by
defendant is particular, direct and substantial, over and above injury inflicted
upon public in general). The Fillion court emphasizes that where plaintiffs injury
is common to all and is no greater than that of other members of the public, only
the Attorney General may sue in public nuisance to vindicate that right. Fillion, 3
D.L.R. at 26.
1998] 357
9
Castrilli: Environmental Rights Statutes in the United States and Canada: Co
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
358 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JOuRNAL [Vol. IX: p. 349
advanced its federal and state laws in the 1970s in such areas as
access to information, public participation in rule-making and re-
quirements to conduct environmental impact studies. 29 Similar de-
velopments, however, took form much more slowly at the Canadian
federal and provincial levels.30
A. Michigan
In the 1960s and early 1970s, a variety of factors and forces
converged in Michigan and the United States, which led to the en-
actment of MEPA, including: (1) the increased evidence of environ-
mental damage from industrial and technological activities;3 1 (2)
the inability of government to prevent such damage and actions of
some agencies in initiating or perpetuating environmental
29. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994); Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994); National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335 (1994).
30. See, e.g., Access to Information Act, R.S.C., ch. A-i (1985) (Can.) (reflect-
ing information access legislation was not enacted at Canadian federal level until
early 1980s); Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O., ch.
F.31 (1990) (Can.) (reflecting information access legislation was not enacted in
Ontario until late 1980s); OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, §§ 3-48 (1993) (Can.) (reflecting
legislation requiring public participation in environmental rule or rule-making
process was not enacted in Ontario until 1990s); Environmental Assessment Act,
R.S.O., ch. E.18 (1990) (Can.) (reflecting legislation requiring environmental im-
pact studies was not enacted in Ontario until mid-1970s and was not fully enforcea-
ble until mid-1980s); Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C., ch. 37 (1992)
(Can.) (reflecting that although ad hoc procedures were applied throughout
1970s and 1980s, federal legislation requiring environmental impact studies was
not in effect until 1995). See alsoJOSEPH F. CASTRILLI & MARK WINFIELD, THE ONTA-
RIO REGULATION AND POLICY-MAKING PROCESS IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT: EXILOR-
ING THE PosSIBILITIES FOR REFORM (Oct. 1996) (report prepared for the
Environmental Commissioner of Ontario) (on file with author) (explaining Can-
ada's lag in ensuring public participation in rule-making process under environ-
mental regulatory schemes).
Unlike Michigan, Canadian environmental reform encompassed a wider no-
tion than just a role for citizens in the courts; it extended a role to citizens in the
administrative process as well. MEPA's and OEBR's different starting points con-
tributed significantly to the different paths environmental rights eventually took in
each jurisdiction. Notwithstanding their differences, the enactment and interpre-
tation of MEPA significantly influenced the environmental rights debate in
Ontario.
31. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLICY 4 (1992) (noting that number of vivid events in 1960s highlighted
growing public awareness of environmental problems). Percival lists the following
events that reflected the growing public environmental awareness: (1) 1962 publi-
cation of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, which exposed the bioaccumulative charac-
ter of DDT; (2) 1963 federal government proposal to dam the Colorado River in
order to flood part of the Grand Canyon; (3) the mid-1960s discovery of methyl
mercury in swordfish; (4) studies in California linking automobile exhaust to ur-
ban smog; (5) the contribution of supersonic transport to noise pollution and
ozone depletion; and (6) the 1969 oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, Califor-
nia drenching both the shoreline and seabirds with oil. See id.
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problems; 32 and (3) the rise of local, regional and national environ-
mental organizations responding to immediate environmental cri-
ses and seeking long-term legal and institutional solutions.33 The
immediate catalyst for the development of MEPA stemmed from a
1968 lawsuit.3 4 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Michigan De-
partment of Agriculture, the plaintiff environmental organization
sought to enjoin the defendant agency from spraying the pesticide
dieldrin on state farm areas for the purpose of eradicating the Japa-
nese beetle.3 5 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the agency
had not exceeded its discretion and could, therefore, spray the pes-
ticide on 4600 acres of small watersheds draining into Lake Michi-
32. See SAX, supra note 10, at 103, 240-42 (discussing events surrounding 1969
Santa Barbara oil spill). According to Professor Sax, the conduct of the Depart-
ment of the Interior revealed the pressures that administrative agencies are often
under in attempting to balance the competing interests of environmental protec-
tion and resource development. See id. The Department of Interior faced pres-
sures from all directions. It needed to assure local government officials and
citizens that an oil spill could never occur, and also to calm the fears of the oil
industry which had already invested millions of exploratory dollars into the pro-
ject. See id. Moreover, the Department faced pressure from the Budget Bureau to
have a maximum leasing program to provide more money to meet the President's
need to balance the national budget. See id.
33. See PERCIVAL, supra note 31, at 4 (noting that in 1960s and early 1970s
traditional conservation and preservationist groups, such as Wilderness Society,
were joined by new organizations, such as Environmental Defense Fund, which
focused on problems including pesticides and toxic substances); Joseph L. Sax,
Environment in the Courtroom, SATURDAY REVIEW, Oct. 3, 1970, at 56 (noting that
small Michigan conservation organization asked author to draft model environ-
mental law that eventually became MEPA). The United States' long-standing inter-
est in preservation of nature articulated in the 19th century writings of various
authors such as Emerson and Thoreau, and more contemporary authors, such as
Leopold, further colored the environmental regulatory movement. See, e.g., RALPH
WALDO EMERSON, NATURE (Stephen E. Whicher ed., Riverside 1960) (1836) (re-
flecting literary appreciation of nature and laying foreground to environmental
preservation movement); ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (Ballantine
Books 1970) (1949) (same); HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN (Signet Classic 1960)
(1854) (same). In addition, there was an emerging legal interest in examining the
philosophical basis for recognizing new judicially enforceable rights arising in part
from popular movements of the period such as poverty and civil rights. See, e.g.,
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY (1977). See also SAX, supra note 10, at 96 (noting considerable literature in
1960s asserting that these and other areas constitute fundamental rights); Law-
rence G. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indi-
gent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969) (asserting indigence as basis for legal right).
34. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Agricul-
ture, 162 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968). See alsoJohn A. Watts, Michigan Envi-
ronmental Protection Act, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 358, 359 (1970) (suggesting that
this 1968 suit is directly responsible for enactment of environmental citizen suit
legislation); James M. Olson, The MEPA: An Experiment That Works, 64 MICH. B.J.
181, 185-86 (1985) (same).
35. 164 N.W.2d at 164.
1998] 359
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gan.36 For the plaintiffs, this decision illustrated the problem of
judicial deference to the determinations of administrative
agencies.37
Several groups involved in the dieldrin lawsuit sought the
assistance of then University of Michigan Law School Professor, Jo-
seph L. Sax, to draft legislative proposals giving citizens a better
chance of succeeding in environmental legal proceedings.38 Pro-
fessor Sax drafted a bill which the Michigan legislature eventually
36. See id. (holding that agency's decision to use pesticides to eradicate insects
and protect agricultural crops was not abuse of discretion since it was within
agency's wisdom and judgement).
37. See Watts, supra note 34, at 360 (describing problem predicted to prevent
legal system from fully protecting environment).
38. See id. (detailing history of MEPA); Olson, supra note 34, at 185-86 (same);
Joseph F. DiMento, Environmental Hope or Hysteria of Dilettante Earth Savers? A Return
to the Debate Over MEPA, 63 MICH. B.J. 348, 349 (1984) (explaining that Professor
Sax had long been studying problem of using legal system to protect environ-
ment). In the course of his study, Professor Sax developed numerous theories as
to why the legal and regulatory system was failing. According to Sax, individual
citizens need to be able to sue in public nuisance for damage to public resources.
See Sax, supra note 33, at 55 (noting that although harm to environment touches
every member of community, no individual may sue for such widespread public
nuisances as air and water pollution, dissemination of pesticides or destruction of
valuable natural resources). Sax states: "For the great bulk of environmental
problems there is no recognized public right to redress and even the most merito-
rious cases continue to founder on the rock of the sixteenth century public nui-
sance law." Id.
Sax also emphasized the undue reliance on, and judicial deference to, the
discretion of administrative agencies as the central environmental decision-making
institution. See SAX, supra note 10, at 53, 63, 125-26, 147-48 (noting that despite
fact that administrative agencies are created to promote and protect public inter-
est, elements that characterize administrative agencies, such as narrow technical
expertise, managerial orientation, historical association with particular regulated
interests and budget concerns, tend to lock agencies into insider perspective that is
often at odds with interests of public in environmental protection). Sax explains
that courts have been restricted by traditional notions of the limited scope ofjudi-
cial review of administrative action and feel that "special deference must be paid to
administrative expertise when they are in fact, usually only giving the courts' impri-
matur to administrative politics." Id.
Sax, likewise, felt that reformers misplaced their expectations; he disagreed
with the proposition that modified agency procedures would bring significant im-
provement in protection of the environment. See id. at 63-82 (explaining typical
reform proposals). According to Sax, reform proposals usually consist of the fol-
lowing: (1) a requirement that agencies undertake more careful and elaborate
studies before they approve projects; (2) enlargement of public participation, such
as better notice proposals, more public hearings and greater public access to offi-
cial documents and reports; and (3) agency reorganization, better coordination
between agencies, or establishment of new bodies. See id. Sax further noted the
lack of overall government accountability as trustee for the public on environmen-
tal issues. See Sax, supra note 33, at 57 (comparing old Roman public trust doctrine
to contemporary concerns about environment). Finally, Sax identified as a prob-
lem the exclusion or withdrawal of citizens from the process of determining what
constitutes the public interest in environmental quality. See SAX, supra note 10, at
56, 58 (noting that administrative process tends to produce elaborate structure of
12
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adopted almost entirely from his original draft. 39 The bill's central
feature was the notion that private citizens could activate the judici-
ary to protect natural resources and the environment. According
to Professor Sax, the purposes of his bill were as follows: (1) to rec-
ognize the public right to a "decent environment" as an enforcea-
ble legal right; (2) to make this right enforceable by private citizens
suing as members of the public; and (3) to set the stage for the
development of a common law of environmental quality.40
Broad and diverse support for the bill in Michigan demon-
strated widespread public dissatisfaction with the existing legal and
regulatory regime. 41 This dissatisfaction centered on the view that
administrative agencies, as the primary source for implementing
the public interest in environmental protection, were too closely
associated with the regulated interests and activities to effectively
balance opposing priorities.42 Moreover, citizens were viewed as
unlikely to obtain adequate relief from the agencies or courts be-
cause the agencies viewed them as meddlesome interlopers. 43 In
light of these concerns, Professor Sax's bill tapped a strong current
of public support in Michigan by identifying underlying obstacles to
public intervention in the process of environmental protection. At
the same time, the bill proposed a solution to the problem. Per-
haps more significantly, MEPA has influenced the development of
similar initiatives in other states and countries, including several ju-
risdictions in Canada.44
administrative middlemen which has dulled public's sensitivity to claim that citi-
zens as members of public have rights).
39. See Watts, supra note 34, at 360-69 (discussing history of MEPA); DiMento,
supra note 38, at 349 (same); Olson, supra note 34, at 185-86 (same).
40. See SAx, supra note 10, at 248 (articulating purposes of his reform bill).
41. See Watts, supra note 34, at 360-69 (noting that those supporting bill in-
cluded variety of national, regional and local environmental conservation organi-
zations, some state agencies, state attorneys general, and both democrats and
republicans); DiMento, supra note 38, at 349-50 (identifying League of Women
Voters, Parent-Teachers Association and United Auto Workers as MEPA
supporters).
42. See Susan Pearce, Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, 4 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 121, 121-22 (1970) (discussing factors leading to enactment of
MEPA).
43. See SAx, supra note 10, at 50 (noting that inability of citizens to obtain
adequate relief from courts stems from judicial deference to agency
determinations).
44. For a list of state statutes emulating MEPA, see supra note 16. See also
GERRY M. BATES, ENviRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 368 (3d ed. 1992) (noting
MEPA's inspiration on legislative provisions in state of New South Wales, Austra-
lia); Kenneth M. Murchison, Environmental Law in Australia and the United States: A
Comparative Overview, 22 B.C. ENVTL. Aer. L. REv. 503, 554 (same). The New South
Wales law allows any person to enforce its environmental assessment requirements.
1998]
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B. Ontario
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ontario faced a host of con-
cerns including pesticides, industrial chemical contamination, in-
discriminate highway development, contamination of the Great
Lakes, mismanagement of public forests and park lands, destruc-
tion of wetlands and other natural areas, and air pollution. 45 Each
By eliminating standing as a barrier to obtaining judicial review, this provision per-
mits environmental groups to act as overseers of government implementation of
environmental policy. See Murchison, supra, at 554.
45. See CROSS-MISSION TASK FORCE, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHINCAL ASPECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINANTS PROBLEM, A9-A1O
(1972) (on file with author) (acknowledging that pesticide DDT seriously affected
reproduction of carnivorous birds in Canada, such as peregrine falcon); see also
Warner TROYER, No SAFE PLACE 13-20 (1977) (discussing industrial mercury con-
tamination); Editorial, Mercury Poisoning-Who Should Pay?, TORONTO STAR, May 21,
1973, at A8 (comparing exposure of native people to methyl mercury in northwest
Ontario with similar poisoning of fishermen in Minamata, Japan); Mercury Level
Unsafe, Ban Lake Erie Fishing, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), April 1, 1970, at I (dis-
cussing mercury contamination in Great Lakes); Farrell Crook, More Fishing Curbs
Announced Because of Mercury, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), May 2, 1970, at 3 (same);
Stan Oziewicz, Dropping of Dow Suit Defended by Minister, GLOBE AND MAIL (To-
ronto),June 10, 1978, at 5 (same); see also C. C. Lax, The Toronto Lead Smelter Contro-
versy, in ECOLOGY VERSUS POLITICS IN CANADA (William Leiss ed., 1979) (discussing
lead contamination in Toronto schools beginning as early as 1965, and noting
official findings of inadequate regulatory standards and enforcement, sparking
decade and half- long effort to correct); Alden Baker, Cabinet Decides to Halt
Spadina, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), June 4, 1971, at 1 (discussing debate over
environmental effects of proposed $140 million Toronto expressway which ended
after Ontario Cabinet withdrew funding); Editorial, People Before Things, GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), June 4, 1971, at 6 (same); INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION ON
POLLUTION OF LAKE ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE
ST. LAWRENCE RIVER 81-82 (1970) (on file with author) (discussing contamination
of Great Lakes from phosphate detergents and urging both U.S. and Canadian
governments to reduce phosphorus content of detergents and to take other ac-
tions designed to reduce phosphorous input to lakes in order to reverse eutrophi-
cation of waters); J. F. FLOWERS & F.C. ROBINSON, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, PROPOSED POLICY FOR CONTROLLING THE SIZE OF CLEARCUTS IN NORTH-
ERN FOREST REGIONS OF ONTARIO (1976) (on file with author) (discussing misman-
agement of public forests, uncontrolled clear-cutting in northern Ontario Crown
forests, frequent difficulty in ensuring proper forest regeneration); see also Green v.
Ontario, [1972] 34 D.L.R.3d 20 (Ont. H.C.) (discussing mismanagement of public
lands). Despite an extensive developing system of provincial parks in Ontario, re-
source extraction, including mining and logging formed a part of the system. The
Green court concluded that Ontario's provincial parks law imposes no public trust
on the government to protect such lands from resource exploitation. See id. The
ruling was made notwithstanding Ontario's 99-year lease to a cement company to
extract sand from lands immediately adjacent to the provincial park. See id. (disre-
garding fact that park's origination was to prevent destruction of ecological value
of park's own sand dune system). The court further held that members of the
public do not have standing to sue where a park is being exploited, because stand-
ing only inures in the Ontario Attorney General for public nuisances. See id.
See also ELIZABETH A. SNELL, ENVIRONMENT CANADA, WORKING PAPER No. 48,
WETLAND DISTRIBUTION AND CONVERSION IN SOUTHERN ONTARIO 32-33 (1987) (on
file with author) (discussing destruction of wetlands); Gov'T OF CANADA, GREEN
14
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of these concerns and a myriad of other environmental problems
generated public reliance on the government for solutions. As in
the United States, Canada's federal and provincial governments re-
sponded to these concerns by establishing new institutions and in-
vesting existing institutions with new powers to protect the
environment. The legislature granted broad authority to these in-
stitutions, but imposed few mandatory obligations to act.46 The re-
sult was public dissatisfaction with both the government's and the
public's limited role in the management and protection of the envi-
ronment and natural resources of the province.47
During this period, environmental pressure groups also sought
a greater say in environmental protection efforts.48 In the early
1970s, the introduction of an environmental protection bill in the
PLAN 79 (1991) (on file with author) (same). Before European settlement, wet-
lands covered over 2.4 million hectares of southern Ontario. By the 1970s and
1980s, however, only about 60% of this total remained, with agricultural drainage
accounting for a majority of the province's losses. See SNELL, supra. Wetlands pro-
vide recharge areas for surface and groundwater, filter pollutants, and are a source
of habitat for wildlife and waterfowl, including many rare, threatened and endan-
gered species. See id. Destruction of wetland areas in southern Ontario continued
to accelerate so that by the early 1990s, estimates of the remaining stock were in
the 30% range. See Gov'T OF CANADA, supra.
See also Editorial, Acid-threatened Lakes, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), July 27,
1971, at 6 (discussing air pollution from sulphur oxides); SCIENCE COUNCIL OF CAN-
ADA, REPORT No. 16, IT Is NOT Too LATE-YET 14 (1972) (on file with author)
(same). The sulphur dioxide emitted by the International Nickel Company
smelter at Sudbury, Ontario in the 1970s constituted 10% of all sulphur dioxide
produced in North America. See SCIENCE COUNCIL OF CANADA, supra. The sulphur
dioxide, once emitted, mixed with water vapor to form acid rain and killed lakes
for 50 miles around Sudbury. See id.
46. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Act, S.O., ch. 86 (1971) (Can.) (grant-
ing authority to new Ontario Ministry of Environment to issue various stop, con-
trol, remedial, preventive and removal orders); Re Canadian Metal Co. v.
McFarlane, [1973] 1 O.R.2d 577 (Ont. H.C.) (discussing authority of Ministry of
Environment). Ontario used its stop order power to immediately halt lead emis-
sions from a battery crushing operation in Toronto. See McFarlane, 1 O.R.2d at
577. The order was quashed on the grounds that the ministry director had failed
to actjudicially and had abused discretion by not having relevant evidence that the
plant constituted an "immediate danger to human health" as required by statute.
Id.
47. See David Estrin, Annual Survey of Canadian Law-Part 2: Environment, 7 OT-
TAwA L. REv. 397, 405 (1975); John Swaigen, Annual Survey of Canadian Law-Envi-
ronmental Law 1975-1980, 12 OTTAWA L. REv. 439 (1980) (noting that in early
1970s, governments began taking staff from various government agencies and inte-
grating them into new departments or ministries of environment); Walter Pitman,
Pollution Victims Can't Enforce the Laws, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 2, 1973, at 8 (noting
that initial public assumption that pollution problems would be solved by creation
of a department of environment at both federal and provincial levels turned out to
be incorrect, as governments were not acting and citizens were being excluded
from process).
48. See Estrin, supra note 47, at 397 (noting parallel development of environ-
mental pressure groups in United States and Canada); Swaigen, supra note 47, at
1998]
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Ontario legislature served as the catalyzing agent for the formation
of several environmental law groups. Ontario entitled its bill the
Environmental Protection Act, characterizing it as both the center-
piece of reform and an "Environmental Bill of Rights. '49 Analogiz-
ing the bill to an "Environmental Bill of Goods," the pressure
groups roundly criticized the bill for failing to contain many of
MEPA's elements. 50 Essentially, the groups argued that the bill
gave the public no independent right of action where the govern-
ment was not prepared to act. While the new regulatory regime
looked powerful on paper, it proved ineffective in practice. The
pressure groups were particularly concerned with the grant of ad-
ministrative discretion which could have the potential effect of lock-
ing the public out of the process. 51 Notwithstanding such criticism,
the provincial government managed to convince the 1971 Ontario
legislature to enact the Environmental Protection Act with only mi-
nor amendments from the original draft.5 2
The passage of the Environmental Protection Act sparked a de-
bate over environmental law reform in Ontario that was to last for
over two decades. The debate ultimately ended with the passage of
OEBR in 1993. Although unsuccessful in amending the Environ-
mental Protection Act, the pressure groups proposed a number of
environmental law reforms in the early 1970s. Because of the in-
fancy of environmental legislation in the province at that time,
those proposed reforms not only encompassed substantive and pro-
cedural law reform of the type found in MEPA, but also sought to
remedy a host of administrative law deficiencies that excluded the
public from the environmental decision-making process. Like the
Ontario government, the environmental pressure groups called
446 (noting rise of Canadian Environmental Law Association and West Coast Envi-
ronmental Law Association).
49. See CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW RESEARCH FOUNDATION, CRITIQUE OF
PROPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Acr-BILL 94 1 (1971) (on file with author);
Broad Pollution Law Proposed, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), July 1, 1971, at 1.
50. See CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAw RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 49,
at 1-6 (noting that Ontario government's proposed bill failed to provide any new
private rights of action against polluters); David Estrin, Premier Davis Sold Us a Bill of
Goods on Pollution, TORONTO STAR, May 5, 1972, at 8 (observing that bill granted
government broad authority to protect environment but imposed few duties on
officials to do so).
51. See Estrin, supra note 50, at 8.
52. See Environmental Protection Act, S.O., ch. 86 (1971) (Can.) (reflecting
original act). The Environmental Protection Act has been amended many times
since 1971 but has never been changed to reflect the original criticisms aimed at it
by the various environmental pressure groups concerning too much governmental
discretion and too little public involvement. See Environmental Protection Act,
R.S.O., ch. E-19 (1990) (reflecting revised act).
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their package of reforms an "Environmental Bill of Rights. ''5 3 Over
53. See, e.g., DAVID ESTRIN, CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
NEEDED: AN ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS (1973) (discussing pressure group
reform proposals); Clifford Lax, An Environmental Bill of Rights Will Clear the Air,
TORONTO STAR, April 17, 1973, at 9 (same). In contrast to the Environmental Pro-
tection Act, the pressure groups proposals included: (1) a declaration of the pub-
lic's right to a healthy and attractive environment; (2) establishment of a public
trust in the environment; (3) standing before courts and administrative tribunals;
(4) a requirement of environmental impact studies; (5) access to information; (6)
public participation in setting environmental standards; (7) an environmental
ombudsman; (8) class actions; (9) the right to defend the environment at a reason-
able cost; (10) restrictions on agency discretion and a corresponding expansion of
judicial review of administrative action; and (11) placing the burden of proof on a
polluter to demonstrate that there is no feasible alternative to his conduct. See
Swaigen, supra note 47, at 456 (detailing pressure groups proposals); ESTRIN, supra,
at 6 (same).
The content of a right to a healthy and attractive environment appeared to
vary, ranging from a civil right equal in status to that of private property, to a civil
liberty equivalent to that of freedom of speech or religion. The difference be-
tween the two conceptually was that the former appeared to constitute a positive
entitlement to a particular result, whereas the latter implied freedom from envi-
ronmental disruption. See id. In practice, both notions were intended to be en-
forceable in the courts. See id.
The second proposal, lifted directly out of MEPA, called for the treatment of
natural resources as being subject to a public trust whereby the government would
have a duty to protect these resources on behalf of the public. See Swaigen, supra
note 47, at 456. The government would not be free to authorize development or
pollution of such common resources unless it could be established that the action
furthered the public interest. See id. Traditionally, the legislature and the courts
restricted the right to use courts and tribunals to those individuals with property
interests at stake. The third reform proposal aimed to remove the barriers to
standing in public nuisance actions as well as to implied and express statutory re-
strictions. See id. at 458-61. Swaigen noted that the fourth proposal was more of a
"look before you leap" reform derived largely from American experience under
NEPA. Id. at 450-55.
Access to both government and private sector information about environmen-
tal damage was viewed as the key to the success of many of the proposals. See id. at
458. The sixth reform proposal required that citizens be given the right to partici-
pate in setting standards of environmental quality, and the right to demand that
such standards be reviewed periodically. See id. at 457-58. Whether viewed as one
person or an environmental council, the focus of the seventh reform proposal was
to advise on policy, demand review of environment ministry decisions, report peri-
odically on the state of the provincial environment and act as a watchdog for envi-
ronmental abuse. See id. at 461-63 (explaining that seventh reform proposal was
viewed as part of process of making government agencies more accountable to
public while maintaining legislative authority). The eighth reform proposal al-
lowed citizens to sue on behalf of other similarly aggrieved citizens for damages
resulting from environmental destruction. See id. at 463-64. The ninth proposal
provided relief from the normal Ontario civil rule that unsuccessful litigants pay a
portion of the costs to the successful litigants. The proposal also granted authority
to administrative tribunals to give sufficient funds to members of the public who
want to appear before them to hire legal and technical assistance to prepare cases.
See id. at 466-68 (recognizing that it would not be effective to create rights or pro-
vide access to information and decision-makers unless public could afford to en-
force such rights). Because provincial legislation contains clauses that give
government agencies unfettered discretion to make major decisions based on the
agencies' view of the public interest, courts are limited as to the scope of review of
17
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time, the Ontario legislature enacted some of the pressure group's
proposals, including: (1) standing before certain administrative
tribunals; (2) environmental impact studies; (3) access to informa-
tion; (4) class actions; and (5) funding to intervene before adminis-
trative tribunals to protect the environment. 54 The bulk of the
reform proposals, however, were not considered seriously by the
Ontario government until the development of OEBR by the New
Democratic Party (NDP) in the 1990s.
Because of the delay in enacting an environmental rights bill
for over two decades, the intensity of the debate in Ontario was, in
some ways, stronger and more vigorous than in Michigan. 55 During
this long gestation period, jurisdictions in Canada observed the ex-
perience of states with MEPA-type laws. 56 A rich literature devel-
oped in Canada concerning the role of the courts in environmental
policy which drew on the writings of Sax, Dworkin and others.57
agency action. The tenth reform proposal restricted agencies with more non-dis-
cretionary duties and authorized judicial review to ensure conformance with its
guidelines. See id. at 461-62. Where existing or prospective industrial activity dam-
ages or may damage the environment, the view implicit in the eleventh reform
proposal is that the proponent of such activity is in the better position to carry the
burden of proof. This final proposal, however, placed an initial showing on the
plaintiff. See id. (explaining that eleventh reform proposal stemmed from MEPA).
54. See Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. C.6 (1992) (Can.); Intervenor Funder
Project Act, R.S.O., ch. 1.13 (1990) (Can.) (authorizing three-year pilot project).
The Intervenor Funding Project Act required applicants for approvals of certain
types of development projects to fund their opposition who could not otherwise
afford to intervene in administrative proceedings. Funding was not authorized for
civil proceedings. See W. A. BOGART & MARCIA VALIANTE, ACCESS AND IMPACT: AN
EVALUATION OF THE INTERVENOR FUNDING PROJECT ACT, ONTARIO MINISTRIES OF
THE ATToRNEY GENERAL, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 239 (1992) (on file with
author) (discussing 1992 study recommending that provincial ministries maintain
requirement that intervenor funding be paid for by proponents of development
projects). The report resulted in the extension of the law by the NDP government
to 1996. SeeJoseph F. Castrilli, Survey Supports Intervenor Funding Law, But Future in
Doubt, ENVIRONEWS, Nov. 1995, at 12; Kathleen Griffin, Death of Intervenor Funding
Expected to Have a "Chilling Effect" on Environmental Litigation, LAW TIMES (Toronto),
June 17-23, 1996, at 13-14 (observing sunset of law in April 1996 by newly elected
Progressive Conservative government as part of its deregulation program); Rick
Lindgren, Harris Government Kills Intervenor Funding Law, INTERVENOR, Mar./Apr.
1996, at 1; Ministry of the Attorney General, Extension of Intervenor Funding Project Act
Announced (March 25, 1992) (news release on file with author).
55. See Paul Muldoon, The Fight for an Environmental Bill of Rights; Legislating
Public Involvement in Environmental Decision Making, ALTERNATIVES, Apr./May 1988,
at 32.
56. See Orlando E. Delogu, Citizen Suits to Protect the Environment; The U.S. Expe-
rience May Suggest a Canadian Model, 41 U. N. B. L.J. 124, 125-30 (1992). For a list of
states with MEPA-type laws, see supra note 16.
57. See, e.g., D. Paul Emond, Co-operation in Nature: A New Foundation for Envi-
ronmental Law, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 323 (1984); P.S. Elder, Legal Rights for Nature
- The WrongAnswer to the Right(s) Question, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 285 (1984) (focus-
ing on why there was continuing search for environmental rights, what tangible
18
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Furthermore, as in the United States, the debate in Canada focused
on whether environmental rights should be procedural rights, 58 ad-
ministrative rights, 59  substantive rights, 60  constitutionally-en-
trenched rights, 6' group rights, 62 non-human rights, 63 or some
effects were on environment, what basis of claim of rights was, what judicially en-
forceable rights were intended to do, what practical effect of recognizing rights
would be, whether recognition of rights would answer public concerns about envi-
ronmental degradation); John Livingston, Rightness or Rights?, 22 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 309 (1984) (same); John Swaigen & Richard E. Woods, A Substantive Right to
Environmental Quality, in ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS IN CANADA 195, 197-205 (John
Swaigen ed., 1981) (noting that rights holder is not mere supplicant of state and
that right must be interest recognized and protected by law, respect for which is
legal duty and disregard of which is actionable wrong).
58. See, e.g., Elaine L. Hughes, Civil Rights to Environmental Quality, in ENviRON-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY 409, 411-22 (Elaine L. Hughes et al. eds., 1993) (noting
that proposals for procedural environmental rights often focused on overcoming
some obstacles to environmental litigation found at common law, such as barrier
to standing to sue in public nuisance).
59. See, e.g., David Estrin, Vital Reforms Needed to Save Environment, TORONTO
STAR, April 8, 1972, at 13 (arguing that citizens required minimum rights of partic-
ipation in administrative forum because of dominant role legislatures assigned to
administrative agencies in environmental protection efforts). Administrative
rights include: notice of proposed projects, environmental impact studies, adminis-
trative hearings and public involvement in setting environmental standards. See id.
An additional administrative right was financial assistance for those who could not
otherwise afford to intervene in administrative proceedings to defend the environ-
ment. See Raj Anand & Ian Scott, Financing Public Participation in Environmental
Decision-Making, 60 CAN. B. REV. 81 (1982); Joseph F. Castrilli, et al., An Environ-
mental Impact Assessment Statute for Ontario, in ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 319, 329-30, 354-55 (P. S. Elder ed., 1975); Support for Envi-
ronment Fight Urged, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 30, 1973, at A6.
60. See Swaigen & Woods, supra note 57, at 196, 204 (viewing substantive right
as one which ensures advocates of environmental quality, establishes environmen-
tal quality as value equivalent to property rights, and fetters governmental discre-
tion to permit environmentally harmful activities). The right need not be absolute
in order to be substantive, but it must have the same prima facie weight as a prop-
erty right and it must be enforceable in the courts. See id.
61. See, e.g., Dale Gibson, Constitutional Entrenchment of Environmental Rights, in
LE DROIT A LA QUALITE DE L'ENVIRONMENT 287 (N. Duple ed. 1988) (noting that
statutory bills of rights are too easily amended or repealed, and their provisions are
too easily construed narrowly by courts intent on deferring to legislature or admin-
istrative agency). Some proposals called for entrenching environmental rights in
the Canadian Constitution. See id.
62. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Native Fishing Rights and Environmental Protec-
tion in North America and New Zealand: A Comparative Analysis of Profits A Prendre and
Habitat Servitudes, 8 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1, 23-24 (1989) (describing group rights as
emerging environmental rights in Canada). Although the group rights of aborigi-
nal peoples, such as hunting, fishing and trapping, do not expressly include envi-
ronmental rights, they may nonetheless provide for a degree of environmental
protection, particularly where wilderness preservation may be necessary to secure
these rights. See id. Group rights may themselves be raised to the level of constitu-
tional rights in Canada to the extent that the Canadian Constitution recognizes
and affirms "the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1, § 35. See also Randy
Kapashesit & Murray Klippenstein, Aboriginal Group Rights and Environmental Protec-
1998]
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other combination thereof. While some of this debate generated
more heat than light on the subject, it gave Canadian provinces the
opportunity to learn from the experience of MEPA, and to develop
more sophisticated and effective laws over time.
C. Arguments Against Enacting Rights Legislation
During the environmental debates, business and industry ar-
gued against the enactment of environmental rights legislation.
Some suggested that courts were neither competent to hear techni-
cally complex environmental cases traditionally determined by spe-
cialized administrative agencies, nor politically accountable. 64
Others felt that environmental rights laws would spawn a flood of
frivolous litigation and drive industry away by creating undue delay,
uncertainty and increasing costs. 65 Likewise, opponents, particu-
larly in the 1990s, urged that environmental rights laws were unnec-
essary as a comprehensive administrative and regulatory regime,
since vigorous enforcement and public participation were already
in existence. 66 As a result, supporters of environmental rights laws
responded to the following issues: (1) judicial competence; (2) ju-
tion, 36 McGiu L.J. 925, 955 (1991) (discussing group rights of aboriginal
peoples).
63. See Elder, supra note 57, at 285 (explaining that granting of legal rights to
environment itself has been debated in Canada as means of averting as well as
extending human dominance of nature); Emond, supra note 57, at 332-33 (same);
Livingston, supra note 57, at 309 (same).
64. See Watts, supra note 34, at 365 (noting arguments against enactment of
environmental rights legislation); Austin, supra note 11, at 223 (stating "citizen
suits invite judicial lawmaking"). Environmental rights legislation has not been
without its detractors in Michigan and Ontario. Concerns about such a legislative
approach have come not only from expected sources, such as business, industry,
and government agencies, but also from the academic and environmental commu-
nity. While the legislation eventually overcame opposing arguments, the debate in
Ontario significantly shaped the final content of the law.
65. See DiMento, supra note 38, at 349 (referring to MEPA and noting argu-
ments which suggest that environmental rights legislation could have a chilling
effect on new investment, eventually producing economic backlash); Joseph H.
Thibodeau, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: Panacea or Pandora's Box,
48 J. URB. L. 579, 597 (1971) (noting "[a]t best, [MEPA] may clog the circuit
courts in Michigan for some time; at worst, [MEPA] could throw them into chaotic
disrepair"); Watts, supra note 34, at 366 (discussing concerns of Michigan Cham-
ber of Commerce on frivolous litigation); Bill Frowns on Businesses Activities, Busi-
nesses Can Start Locking Their Doors, ENVIRONSCAN, Oct. 1993, at 1 (referring to
OEBR).
66. See, e.g., LeonardJ. Griffiths, The Environmental Bill of Rights: Address Before
the Canadian Institute on the Subject of the Environmental Bill of Rights, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAw AND REGULATION 12-15, 17 (1992).
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dicial accountability; (3) frivolous litigation; (4) undue delay; and
(5) legislative need.67
Certain members of the academic environmental community
asserted that a statutory bill of rights would be too narrowly con-
strued by the courts, and the purpose of the enactment would be
defeated since the success of such legislation is heavily dependent
on the judiciary.68 Other academics opined that neither recogni-
tion of rights for nature, nor process improvements would achieve
environmental protection goals in comparison to more cooperative
approaches. 69 Neither argument recognized the fact that giving cit-
izens an entitlement to go to court to protect the environment
could prevent or abate environmental harm when agencies did not
act. Furthermore, judicially enforceable environmental rights
could also encourage government agencies to enforce the law more
effectively, induce agencies and the regulated community to negoti-
ate with citizens on a more equal footing and strengthen the demo-
67. See SAx, supra note 10, at 149-51, 212-30 (noting that courts are called
upon frequently to decide technically complex cases in such areas as medical mal-
practice, product safety and industrial accidents, in which evidence of experts is
crucial). Sax supplied many examples of the ability of courts to cope with the
merits of environmental cases, and explained that it is not ordinarily the technical
judgment of administrators that is at issue, but rather their legal or policy judg-
ment. See id. (combating judicial competence criticism); see also id. at 115-20 (not-
ing that courts are fully capable of controlling their own process to avoid abuse;
Daniel K Slone, The Michigan Environmental Protection Act: Bringing Citizen-Initiated
Environmental Suits into the 1980s, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 271, 272-76 (1985) (noting that
case statistics indicated that Michigan court system had not been flooded with
MEPA suits as of 1982); see alsoJeffrey K. Haynes, Michigan's Environmental Protection
Act in its Sixth Year: Substantive Environmental Law from Citizen Suits, 53J. URB. L. 589,
593 n. 13 (1976) (noting "MEPA cases constitute[d] less than .02 of 1 percent of
all civil cases" initiated in Michigan circuit courts between 1970 and 1975 and fur-
ther noting that investor confidence had not been shaken, nor jobs lost, plants
closed or industry driven from Michigan as result of MEPA lawsuits); Joseph L.
Sax, Environmental Action: A Passing Fad?, NAT. HisT., June-July 1976, at 10, 12, 16,
21 (noting that arguments alleging MEPA's detrimental impact on industry in or-
der to justify amendments to statute were without merit). Despite the existence of
greater environmental enforcement and public participation before administrative
tribunals in the 1990s, there were still many gaps in environmental law in Ontario,
such as standing to sue in public nuisance, entitlement to notice and comment
and regulation-making initiatives and related concerns. See MULDOON & LIN-
DGREN, supra note 19, at 6-7.
68. See Gibson, supra note 61, at 287 (arguing against environmental rights
legislation); Daniel P. Lynch, Note, The Michigan Environmental Protection Act
(MEPA): Developing a Common Law Threshold of Harm for the Prima Facie Case, 69 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 55, 57 (1991) (noting that Michigan Court of Appeals uses
narrow approach when prima facie case has been made under MEPA, requiring
higher threshold of harm than statute, MEPA legislative history, or early decided
cases would have suggested).
69. See Emond, supra note 57, at 348.
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cratic character of environmental decision-making by opening up
the process to greater public scrutiny and involvement.70
III. MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT: SUBSTANTIVE-
PROCEDURAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REFORM
MEPA was the first environmental statute in the United States
to depart significantly from a regime based largely on administra-
tive agency enforcement of environmental requirements.71 Any
member of the public may take the environmental initiative in en-
forcement through the courts because MEPA creates substantive
rights and establishes a procedural framework for bringing an envi-
ronmental lawsuit, which makes it easier for a citizen to enforce an
environmental interest in court. 72 The particulars of these substan-
tive and procedural reforms have been the subject of over twenty-
five years of judicial examination during which the scope and im-
pact of MEPA have been both expanded and contracted by the
courts.
70. See Adam Babich, Citizen Suits: The Teeth in Public Participation, 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,141 (Mar. 25, 1995) (noting that "citizen legislation en-
hance [s] the legitimacy of administrative decision-making"). The ambivalence of
various sectors about the recognition of environmental rights may explain the
preference for a hybrid approach relying on both political and judicial accounta-
bility, and the courts as forum of last resort. See Cochrane, supra note 21, at 6
(discussing hybrid approach followed by Ontario).
71. See Joseph L. Sax & Joseph F. DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three
Years'Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 1
(1974) (asserting that MEPA was "first statute to provide for citizen suits to protect
the environment from degradation by either public or private entities and to pro-
vide a broad scope for court adjudication").
72. See Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 220 N.W.2d 416,
427-28 (Mich. 1974) (drawing distinction between substantive and procedural
rights created under statute). There appears to be some overlap between substan-
tive and procedural rights. Where there is a right, in the normal course, there
should be a remedy. Having a legal interest in environmental protection should
translate into an entitlement to vindicate that interest in court, just as having a
property or contractual right entitles the holder of that right to go to court to
vindicate that interest. The division in the concepts between substantive and pro-
cedural entitlements in the environmental context appears to stem from the
problems litigants historically have confronted in the area of public nuisance. The
right to sue for public nuisance is more theoretical than actual due to the require-
ment to either demonstrate special damage or obtain consent of the Attorney Gen-
eral to sue. See SAx, supra note 10, at 58-59 (noting that clean air and water have
been treated as free goods in large part because no one has been entitled to assert
right in their maintenance). The development of a theory of public rights and its
enforcement has lagged behind concepts of private rights. See id. MEPA reforms
the law by stating that there is a right to environmental quality, and that any per-
son may enforce that right. See id.
22
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A. Purpose of MEPA
While MEPA does not contain a purpose section or a preamble
setting forth its goals and objectives, the statute does implement
provisions of Michigan's constitution which reflect concern for the
protection of its natural resources and environment.7 3 Both Profes-
sor Joseph L. Sax, chief architect of MEPA, and Representative
ThomasJ. Anderson, MEPA's main sponsor in the Michigan legisla-
ture, viewed MEPA as enlarging the role of the courts and permit-
ting the judiciary to develop a "common law of environmental
quality" in a manner similar to the development of the law of prop-
erty or contracts. 74 To the extent that courts have considered
MEPA's purpose, they have affirmed this view. For example, in Ray
v. Mason County Drain Commissioner,75 the Michigan Supreme Court
held that the legislature had set a standard of environmental quality
in MEPA. The court further explained that MEPA did not set out
an elaborate scheme of detailed provisions designed to cover every
conceivable type of environmental pollution and impairment. In-
stead, the legislature left to the courts "the important task of giving
substance to the standard by developing a common law of environ-
73. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. TV, § 52. The pertinent provision states:
The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state
are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of
health, safety and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall pro-
vide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the
state from pollution, impairment and destruction.
Id. See also SAX, supra note 10, at 248 (outlining chief purposes of MEPA: (1) recog-
nizing a public right to decent environment as enforceable legal ight; (2) making
that right enforceable by private citizens suing as members of public; and (3) set-
ting stage for development of common law of environmental quality). Although
the first two purposes sound equivalent, the distinction is that there is a right to
environmental quality and that any person may invoke that right. As to the third
purpose, Professor Sax noted:
[MEPA] purposely refrains from defining pollution, environmental qual-
ity, or the public trust. At this early stage in the development of environ-
mental law it is important to open the way to elucidation and
consideration of a wide range of problems, many of which are still uncer-
tain, rather than to create confining definitions. Use of the courts to
evolve a common law approach to environmental problems adds to the
arsenal of the public interest a significant weapon: the ability to meet
problems as they are identified and to formulate a solution appropriate
to the occasion.
Id. Professor Sax also articulated a fourth purpose: supplementing the administra-
tive process with judicial review when the regulatory regime is inadequate, in order
to promote remedial legislative action where necessary. See id. (noting that
problems recognized and information elicited through litigation can lead to legis-
lative reform).
74. Anderson, supra note 5, at 1; Sax & Conner, supra note 20, at 1005.
75. 224 N.W.2d 883 (Mich. 1975).
19981
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mental quality. '76 According to the Ray court, the "development of
a common law of environmental quality under MEPA is no differ-
ent from the development of the common law in other areas, such
as nuisance or torts," 77 and the court saw "no valid reason to block
the evolution of this new area of common law."78 Many subsequent
cases in Michigan and in other states with legislation similar to
MEPA have followed the Michigan Supreme Court's reasoning in
Ray.79 Likewise, federal courts that have had the opportunity to ex-
amine MEPA have agreed that MEPA created a "state environmen-
tal common law" that is independent of decisions by state or federal
agencies.80
Professor Sax and Representative Anderson's view of citizen
suits was sharply at odds with the views of Congress in developing
federal citizen suit provisions during the early 1970s. For example,
in explaining the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, Con-
gress stated that it "would not substitute a common law or court-
developed definition of water quality. '81 Congress did not want an
alleged violation of an effluent control limitation or standard to
lead to re-analysis of technological or other considerations at the
enforcement stage. Instead, Congress intended to have these mat-
ters settled in the administrative process leading to the establish-
ment of the effluent limitation or standard. As such, Congress
expected citizens bringing an action to meet an objective eviden-
76. Id. at 888.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 888 n.10,
79. See, e.g., Westervelt v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 263 N.W.2d 564, 574-65
(Mich. 1978) (holding no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Whit-
taker Gooding Co. v. Scio Township Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 323 N.W.2d 574, 575
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that MEPA was enacted with intention of allowing
courts to develop environmental common law); Paige v. Town Plan & Zoning
Comm'n of Town of Fairfield, 668 A.2d 340, 344-45 (Conn. 1995) (noting that
MEPA served as model for Connecticut's statute).
80. See Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1989) (discussing
MEPA challenge by Her Majesty, the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario, of
decision to approve municipal incinerator that would contribute to air pollution
problems and holding that MEPA was not preempted by federal Clean Air Act).
The court noted that MEPA creates a "state environmental common law that is
unaffected by federal law, and creates an independent state action that is unaf-
fected by anything that happens in the federal sphere of government." Id.
81. S. REP. No. 92414 (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FED-
ERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL Acr, 1971, at 3745 (1971) [hereinafter S. REP.
No. 92-414]; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) (authorizing any person to
commence civil action against any person alleged to be in violation of effluent
standards, limitations or orders under Act, or against Administrator of EPA for
failure to perform any non-discretionary duties under Act).
24
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tiary standard.82 MEPA differs from federal citizen suit laws be-
cause of its preference for judicial development of environmental
standards through the common law.
B. MEPA's Key Provisions
There are several key procedural and substantive reform as-
pects of MEPA. In terms of procedural reform, MEPA allows "any
person" to maintain an action "for declaratory and equitable relief
against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other
natural resources and the public trust in these resources from pol-
lution, impairment or destruction." 83 This liberal grant of standing
effectively permits anyone to sue anyone.84 The substantive right
created by MEPA entitles the plaintiff to succeed in an action upon
making a prima facie showing that the defendant has caused, or is
likely to cause, pollution, impairment or destruction to the environ-
ment. The plaintiff will prevail unless the defendant can rebut this
showing by submitting evidence to the contrary or by way of "af-
firmative defense that there is no feasible and prudent alternative
.. . that is consistent with the promotion of the public health,
safety, and welfare in light of the state's paramount concern for the
protection of its natural resources. ' 85 Where a defendant's chal-
lenged conduct is subject to an existing environmental standard
that the courts find deficient in light of MEPA's requirements, the
court can direct the agency to adopt a standard "approved and
specified by the court, ' 86 or remit the parties to appropriate admin-
82. See S. REP. No. 92414, supra note 81, at 3745. Presumably Congress also
did not want the citizen suit provision to be interpreted to preempt state common
law. See id.
83. MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.1701(1) (West 1997).
84. See Gary A. Trepod &John A. Yeager, The Michigan Environmental Protection
Act: Pervasive!, 64 MICH. B.J. 187, 187 (1985) (discussing MEPA standing
provision).
85. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1703(1).
86. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1701(2) (a)-(b) (authorizing court, where
"there is a standard for pollution or for an antipollution device or procedure fixed
by rule or otherwise by the state" to "[d]etermine the validity, applicability, and
reasonableness of the standard" and if court "finds a standard to be deficient" to
"direct the adoption of a standard approved and specified by the court"). See Lake-
land Property Owners Ass'n v. Township of Northfield, [1972] 2 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envd. L. Inst.) 20,331 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1972) (requiring publicly owned sewage
treatment plant to meet higher and additional waste water treatment standards,
redetermined and specified by court following hearing of technical evidence, than
had been imposed by Michigan Water Resources Commission); Wayne County
Dep't of Health, Air Pollution Control Div. v. Olsonite Corp., 263 N.W.2d 778, 793-
94 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding premature trial court's adoption of particular
odor units as standards governing odor emissions from paint manufacturer). The
Olsonite court explained that the guidelines adopted as standards "may be too lax,"
1998] 373
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istrative or other proceeding.8 7 At such a proceeding, however, an
agency may not authorize conduct which does, or is likely to pol-
lute, impair or destroy the air, water or other natural resources, or
the public trust in these resources, if there is a feasible and prudent
alternative consistent with reasonable requirements of the public
health, safety and welfare. 88
1. Standing to Sue
MEPA permits litigants to reach the merits of environmental
controversies with a minimum of procedural obstacles. To this end,
the statute authorizes "any person" to maintain an action to protect
the environment. This reform of the law of public nuisance elimi-
nated standing to sue as a major issue under the statute.
MEPA cases on standing and those decided under similarly
worded statutes in other states mark a significant departure from
cases decided by federal courts which have imposed pre-conditions
to standing based on the "cases and controversies" language of the
United States Constitution. 89 These conditions, most recently ar-
as they did not gauge the cumulative effect of multiple emission sources from a
single plant, therefore, the decision on whether standards are indeed deficient
required further inquiry by trial court. Id.
87. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.1704(2) (West 1997).
88. See id. § 324.1705(2).
89. Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 220 N.W.2d 416, 427-28
(Mich. 1974) (interpreting MEPA's standing provision broadly to allow plaintiffs to
initiate actions without their having to first meet traditional tests for standing that
courts normally impose on environmental litigants); see also Ray v. Mason County
Drain Comm'r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Mich. 1975) (holding that MEPA affords
individuals standing to maintain environmental actions); Eyde v. State, 225 N.W.2d
1, 2 (Mich. 1975) (holding that MEPA creates independent cause of action and
grants standing to private individuals to maintain actions for declaratory and other
equitable relief against anyone for protection of Michigan's environment); Trout
Unlimited, Muskegon White River Chapter v. City of White Cloud, 489 N.W.2d 188
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that plaintiffs could rely on MEPA as independent
basis for their assertion of standing to maintain action challenging legality of con-
struction of new dam); Freeborn County by Tuveson v. Bryson, 219 N.W.2d 290,
295 (Minn. 1973) (interpreting MERA as authorizing any person to maintain ac-
tion for declaratory or equitable relief for protection of air, water, land or other
natural resources of state); Manchester Envtl. Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68,
73 (Conn. 1981) (interpreting Connecticut's statute as conferring standing on any
person to raise environmental issues under statute). See also David P. Gionfriddo,
Comment, Sealing Pandora's Box:Judicial Doctrines Restricting Public Trust Citizen Envi-
ronmental Suits, 13 B.C. AFF. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 444-47 (1986) (discussing liberal
standing requirements resulting from distrust of government's ability to guard en-
vironment); Andrew J. Piela, Comment, A Tale of Two Statutes: Twenty Year Judicial
Interpretation of the Citizen Suit Provision in the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act
and the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 21 B.C. AFF. ENVrL. L. REv. 401, 406-10,
417-19 (1994) (noting Connecticut's grant of automatic standing regardless of ac-
tual injury in environmental cases). The United States Constitution limits the juris-
diction of the federal courts to "cases and controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
[Vol. IX: p. 349
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ticulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,90 require that the plaintiff suffer an injury in
fact, that there exist a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct, and that the injury be redressable by a favorable deci-
sion. 91 The application of these conditions has sometimes deterred
courts from granting standing to plaintiffs bringing actions to pro-
tect the environment under federal citizen suit legislation. 92 Under
state statutes like MEPA, however, state courts have no such pre-
conditions.
By permitting most plaintiffs to bring actions to resolve the
merits of environmental disputes, MEPA jurisprudence appears to
have largely swept aside standing as a procedural obstacle. Stand-
ing remains an issue, however, where litigants propose to use MEPA
for reasons that are inconsistent with the statute's purposes, such as
to protect the right to develop natural resources. In such circum-
stances, Michigan courts have not hesitated to deny standing to
plaintiffs.9 3 To the extent that OEBR permits Ontario residents to
act as private attorneys general in the same way as MEPA, one may
anticipate that plaintiffs in Ontario courts will likewise more readily
have standing to sue.
2. Establishing a Prima Facie Case
In order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case under
MEPA, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct of a defend-
90. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
91. Id. at 560-61. The Supreme Court explains injury in fact to encompass
injuries which are invasions of concrete, particularized legal interests rather than
conjectural or hypothetical. See id. To prove causal connection, the plaintiff must
show that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant
and is not a result of the independent action of some third party not before the
court. See id. Finally, it must be likely, and not merely speculative that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision. See id.
92. See id. at 561-78 (holding that environmental group lacked standing to
seek judicial review of rule promulgated by Secretary of Interior under Endan-
gered Species Act, because of failure to show both injury in fact and redressability,
notwithstanding existence of citizen suit provision which authorized any person to
commence action).
93. See, e.g., Whittaker Gooding Co, v. Scio Township Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
323 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that gravel pit owner lacked
standing to bring action under MEPA because statute was designed to protect nat-
ural resources, "rather than an exploiter's mining of the resources"). This ap-
proach has been followed by courts in other states with MEPA-type laws. See, e.g.,
Water Pollution Control Auth. of Town of Stonington v. Keeney, 662 A.2d 124, 129
(Conn. 1995) (holding that sewage treatment plant operator did not have stand-
ing under Connecticut's statute, CEPA, to contest permit decision of Environmen-
tal Protection Commissioner, as CEPA standing provision was not intended for
persons who seek to use natural resources or opponents of those who seek to pro-
tect environment).
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ant "has ... or is likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water,
or other natural resources or the public trust in these resources."9 4
Courts must consider three key elements in determining whether a
plaintiff has established a prima facie case. First, the environmental
damage need only be "likely," not actual, thus making the require-
ment preventive in nature.95 Second, the court must ascertain the
scope of what constitutes "pollution, impairment or destruction. '96
Third, the court must find that there is a "natural resource" entitled
94. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1703(1) (West 1997).
95. See Slone, supra note 67, at 278 (concerning first factor and discussing that
provision permitting prima facie case to be made by showing "likely" pollution
permits plaintiffs to dispense with need to demonstrate actual harm). As a result,
early court decisions interpreting MEPA suggested that a low threshold of harm
sufficiently met the prima facie test. See id. Slone suggests that a low threshold
requirement is consistent with the legislative history of MEPA, which indicates that
legislators wanted to encourage public access to the courts by both limiting what
citizens must prove initially, as well as by shifting burden of proof to defendants
who were presumed to be in possession of superior information about the conduct
and impact of their operations on the environment. See id.
96. Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Anthony, 280 N.W.2d 883, 887
(Mich Ct. App. 1979) (holding that word "impair," in context of conduct which is
likely to pollute, impair, or destroy air, water or other natural resources, means
conduct that tends to weaken, to make worse, to lessen in power, diminish, or
relax, or otherwise affect in injurious manner). The second element in establish-
ing a prima facie case has been left to the courts since MEPA does not define
actions constituting environmental pollution, impairment or destruction. See id.
The key debate in this area has been whether "impairment" should be defined on
the basis of a substantial harm requirement, which is a standard not dissimilar to
OEBR's "significant harm" test. MEPA's legislative history supports the view that
the purpose of the statute was to make it relatively easy for plaintiffs to make out a
prima facie case so litigants would not be thwarted by a high threshold of harm
requirement. See Slone, supra note 67, at 281-82; Lynch, supra note 68, at 64-65 &
nn. 66-67. Early cases were consistent with this view, suggesting that a showing of
mild or de minimis levels of harm was sufficient for a plaintiff to meet the prima
facie case requirement. Beginning in the 1980s, however, partly due to developing
judicial concern about protecting resources from trivial impacts, a second line of
authority developed which suggested that plaintiffs must meet a much higher
threshold of harm standard based on a statewide perspective on pollution, impair-
ment or destruction. See Lynch, supra note 68, at 57, 71-74, 88-89 (criticizing state-
wide approach); Slone, supra note 67, at 281-82 (same). As a result of criticism,
two other discernable judicial approaches have developed. These approaches in-
clude a local perspective and a general perspective on the appropriate threshold of
harm. Overall, no single theory appears to dominate the developing case law on
this issue. What seems apparent is that the Michigan judiciary has moved away
from the extremes of either a high or de minimis threshold of harm, and moved
toward seeking middle ground on this issue.
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to public protection.9 7 All three factors are similar to those identi-
fied by courts in jurisdictions with MEPA-type laws. 98
a. Likelihood of Environmental Damage
Early court decisions interpreting MEPA suggested that a low
threshold of harm sufficiently met the prima facie test. For exam-
ple, in Ray v. Mason County Drain Commissioner, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that to meet the prima facie case requirement
"a showing is not restricted to actual environmental degradation
but also encompasses probable damage to the environment as
97. See Stevens v. Creek, 328 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claim under MEPA without permit-
ting her to introduce environmental study and expert testimony of ecologist). A
plaintiff may show the third factor by establishing existing or probable future pol-
lution, impairment or destruction of natural resources or of the public trust in
those resources. See id.
Unlike the environmental rights laws of some other states, MEPA does not
provide a definition of natural resources. See, e.g., MERA, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 116B.02 (West 1997); Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. White Bear
Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 768 (holding that MERA's definition of natural
resources "is presumed to be broad"). A variety of court decisions have fleshed out
the scope of the definition of natural resources on a case-by-case basis. See People
for Envtl. Enlightenment & Responsibility, Inc. v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Coun-
cil, 266 N.W.2d 858, 867 (Minn. 1978) (including trees in definition of natural
resources); Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 257 N.W.2d at 769-70 (including
birds in definition of natural resources); County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210
N.W.2d 290, 297 (Minn. 1973) (including marsh and wildlife supported by marsh
in definition of natural resources); State ex rel. Wacouta Township v. Brunkow
Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (including bald eagles
and trees in which bald eagles roost in definition of natural resources).
The Michigan courts have likewise identified the scope of the phrase natural
resources on a case-by-case basis. Rather than develop a comprehensive definition,
the courts have established categories of resources. Besides air and water, which
were expressly identified in MEPA, the courts have identified trees, fish and wild-
life, but have excluded the social, cultural and aesthetic environment from MEPA's
ambit. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459
(Mich. 1981) (holding that social and cultural environments are matters not en-
compassed within term "natural resources" and therefore, are not within MEPA's
purview); West Mich. Envtl. Action Council v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 275
N.W.2d 538, 542 (Mich. 1979) (elk); Portage v. Kalamazoo County Rd. Comm'n,
355 N.W.2d 913 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that aesthetic considerations
alone are not determinative of significant environmental impact which would al-
low judicial intervention under MEPA); Stevens, 328 N.W.2d at 675 (including
trees); Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Anthony, 280 N.W.2d 883, 887
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (including fish); Eyde v. State, 267 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1978) (including trees).
98. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wacouta Township v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510
N.W.2d 27, 29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that there are two prongs to prima
facie case under MERA). MERA reads: "First, there must be a protectible natural
resource . . . [and s]econd the defendant's conduct must cause or be likely to
cause 'pollution, impairment or destruction of that resource."' MERA, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 116B.04 (West 1997).
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well."99 The Ray court indicated that "the evidence necessary to
constitute a prima facie showing will vary with the nature of the
alleged environmental degradation involved."'100 Accordingly, the
court held that MEPA provides a trial judge with guidelines for
making such a determination.°10 The Ray court further explained
that MEPA authorizes application of the generally applicable bur-
den of proof and weight of evidence rules with an exception for
MEPA affirmative defenses. Under the MEPA affirmative defense
exception, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the bur-
den shifts to the defendant to show that there is no feasible and
prudent alternative to defendant's conduct.10 2
Subsequent cases decided under MEPA made it clear that the
courts were prepared to require a low threshold of harm before
holding that a prima facie case had been established. For example,
several cases decided in the 1970s held that MEPA does not require
a plaintiff to develop elaborate scientific evidence or demonstrate
adverse effects with certainty in order to make a prima facie show-
ing.'03 As a result, the low threshold test characterized the court's
99. 224 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Mich. 1975) (suggesting implicit low threshold in
MEPA). The Michigan Supreme Court's finding arises from the statute's use of
the phrase "has ... or is likely to pollute." Id. (quoting MEPA, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 324.1703(1) (West 1997)) (emphasis added). A finding of probable dam-
age that is more likely than not to occur is similar to a common law nuisance
standard.
100. Ray, 224 N.W.2d at 889 (suggesting that demonstrating less than prob-
able damage may be sufficient in circumstances where magnitude of environmen-
tal consequences are high).
101. See id.
102. See id. (explaining that prima facie case in Michigan is one that is suffi-
cient to withstand directed verdict motion, or one that establishes when plaintiffs
evidence is sufficiently strong so as to call defendant to answer it). According to
the Ray court, evidence adduced at trial by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case had not been adverted to by the trial judge. See id.; see also id. at 890 & n.ll
(noting defendant's concession on appeal that prima facie case had been made
out by plaintiffs); Slone, supra note 67, at 278 & n.47 (suggesting that examination
of evidence by Ray court is consistent with view that less than conclusive evidence
may be adequate to establish prima facie case).
103. See, e.g., Wayne County Dep't of Health v. Olsonite Corp., 263 N.W.2d
778, 792-94 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that scientific or medical evidence of
health impairment unnecessary to establish prima facie case where numerous citi-
zens complain over lengthy period that foul odors recurrently emitted from de-
fendant's plant, penetrate their homes and cause such adverse physical reactions
as nausea, burning eyes, headaches, loss of sleep and reduction of appetite); Dwyer
v. City of Ann Arbor, 261 N.W.2d 231, 235-36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that
violations by city of effluent limitations under its discharge permit established
prima facie case that city's conduct violated MEPA, and that it was not necessary
that evidence also established some injury or threat of injury to environment);
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Anthony, 280 N.W.2d 883, 887-89 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1979) (holding that MEPA prima facie standard was one of "probable
rather than guaranteed harm").
30
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss2/2
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS STATUTES
approach until the early 1980s.
Notwithstanding the early MEPA cases, judicial decisions of the
1980s began to reverse the trend. For example, in Kimberly Hills
Neighborhood Association v. Dion,104 area residents sought to enjoin
the development of an eighteen-acre subdivision in order to protect
wildlife habitat.10 5 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's injunction and held that a prima facie case required
the following dual inquiry: (1) whether a natural resource was in-
volved; and (2) whether the impact of the activity on the environ-
ment rose to the level of impairment justifying injunctive relief.10 6
The decision turned as much on the size of the area as the unique-
ness of the resource values.107
Subsequent cases relying on the Kimberly Hills two part test ap-
pear to have additionally required inquiry into whether the chal-
lenged action constituted an environmental risk. 10 8 To the extent
that risk is a product of both probability and magnitude of conse-
quences, this third requirement constituted a greater obligation on
plaintiffs than that required by early MEPA cases or the statute it-
self. Arguably, Ray may have directed the court's holding in
Kimberly Hills by suggesting that the evidence necessary to constitute
a prima facie case varies with the nature of alleged environmental
harm. 09
Recent cases have continued to affirm the trend to a higher
threshold of harm. In Wortelboer v. Benzie County,'10 the Michigan
Court of Appeals upheld a county resolution establishing two sea-
104. 320 N.W.2d 673, 673-74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
105. Id.
106. See id. This decision has been followed in several subsequent cases. See,
e.g., Kent County Rd. Comm'n v. Hunting, 428 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988) (following Kimberly Hills decision). The second inquiry appears to give a
court considerable discretion, similar to a general equitable balancing approach.
107. See Kimberly Hills, 320 N.W.2d at 673-74.
108. See City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Rd. Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d 913,
915-16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding "a court is not empowered to enjoin any
conduct which does not rise to the level of an environmental risk"); Attorney Gen-
eral ex rel. Natural Resources Comm'n v. Balkema, 477 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that in determining whether prima facie case under MEPA
has been established, court must not weigh environmental risk with good to be
accomplished by action, but rather court must determine whether action rises to
level of impairment or destruction of natural resource so as to constitute environ-
mental risk).
109. See Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Mich. 1975);
but see Lynch, supra note 68, at 64-65 & nn. 66-67 (suggesting that trend of cases
raising threshold of harm for prima facie case is inconsistent with MEPA's legisla-
tive history, which emphasized removal of barriers to citizen access to courts).
110. 537 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
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sonal lake levels for recreational and other purposes. The Wortelboer
court held that the resolution did not constitute an environmental
risk to property owners abutting a connecting stream, and it did not
justify judicial intervention.111 Since OEBR does not have a MEPA-
type prima facie case requirement, it is not possible to directly com-
pare the two statutes on this point. OEBR, however, does require a
plaintiff to demonstrate significant harm to a public resource aris-
ing from violation of an environmental statute. As the Michigan
judiciary raises the threshold of harm in order for a plaintiff to es-
tablish a prima facie case, both statutes may produce comparable
results.
b. Pollution, Impairment or Destruction
The courts in the 1970s did not require large-scale or statewide
environmental impact to satisfy MEPA's prima facie case require-
ment.112 Instead, the courts interpreted MEPA's prima facie case to
require only a showing of small-scale, local environmental impact.
Professor Sax suggested that the courts used a de minimis stan-
dard.11 3 Commentators noted that the early cases involving hous-
ing developments, road and sewer projects in environmentally-
sensitive areas demonstrated the types of activities which were not
necessarily significant per se, but which cumulatively caused envi-
ronmental degradation. 114 Professor Sax characterized this type of
111. See id. (holding that in deciding "whether a plaintiff has established a
prima facie claim under MEPA, the court must determine whether the challenged
action by the defendant" constitutes environmental risk justifying judicial interven-
tion, and availability of subsequent administrative proceedings before harm to nat-
ural resource could occur, also providing later opportunity to invoke MEPA).
112. See Eyde v. State, 225 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Mich. 1975) (holding that construc-
tion of sewer across plaintiffs property was sufficient to constitute pollution, im-
pairment or destruction of downstream waters and thus trigger application of
MEPA); Wayne County Dep't of Health v. Olsonite Corp., 263 N.W.2d 792, 792-93
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that air pollution from single factory was sufficient
to establish liability under MEPA); Oakwood Homeowners Assoc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 258 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that air pollution from four
corporations in eight-block neighborhood area less than square mile in size was
sufficient to base action under MEPA).
113. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 68, at 68-69 (referring to amicus brief of Pro-
fessor Sax filed in Kent County Rd. Comm'n v. Hunting, 428 N.W.2d 353 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988)).
114. See Lynch, supra note 68, at 69. See also Irish v. Green, 4 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1402 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 15, 1972), reprinted as appendix to Ray v. Mason
County Drain Comm'r, 224 N.W.2d 883 (Mich. 1975) (noting housing develop-
ment impacts on scenic area); Michigan State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot,
220 N.W.2d 416, 416 (Mich. 1974) (discussing road project effects on wetland);
Eyde v. State, 225 N.W.2d 1,1 (describing water pollution from sewer construction).
[Vol. IX: p. 349
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environmental impact as exhibiting the "nibbling phenomenon."1 15
By the 1980s, however, the attitude of Michigan courts on the ques-
tion of the prima facie threshold began to change.
Kimberly Hills remains the leading authority in the development
of a higher threshold of harm prima facie standard.1 16 The Michi-
gan Court of Appeals in Kimberly Hills noted the need to balance
the importance of the resources against the magnitude of the likely
harm, an approach derived from an earlier Michigan Supreme
Court decision. 1 7 According to the Kimberly Hills court, the plain-
tiff's evidence of adverse environmental effects failed to meet the
statutorily required impairment standard because the plaintiffs had
failed to show that the development would "actually interfere with
the maintenance of diversified natural areas of wildlife" under a
statewide perspective.11 8 The Kimberly Hills court noted that
changes in the character of a neighborhood are inevitably on the
borderline between urban and rural areas. Additionally, the court
suggested that if MEPA was used to prevent such changes, its appli-
cation must be on a broad enough scale "that the relief granted will
have some effect." 119 Because the relief sought might be rendered
useless by development of surrounding areas, the Kimberly Hills
court concluded that the "narrow local interests represented by the
plaintiffs ... are not interests protected by [MEPA]."120
115. See SAX, supra note 10, at 55 (explaining nibbling phenomenon as "the
process in which large resource values are gradually eroded, case-by-case, as one
development after another is allowed"). Sax further explains that this phenome-
non often results in increasing judgments for parties "with a big economic stake in
development and with powerful allies." Id.
116. Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Assoc. v. Dion, 320 N.W.2d 668, 668
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing trial court injunction and ruling that "proper
application of impairment standard as it pertains to preservation of animal and
plant life does not limit conservation only to resources that are 'biologically
unique' or 'endangered;' a statewide perspective is necessary"). The Michigan
Court of Appeals also stated that in dealing with wildlife, "adverse impact must be
evaluated, not in the context of individual animals or neighborhoods, but in the
context of populations and ecological communities." Id.
117. See West Mich. Envtl. Action Council, Inc. v. Natural Resources Comm'n,
275 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Mich. 1979) (holding defendant's conduct violates environ-
mental laws "[i]n light of the limited number of the elk, the unique nature and
location of this herd, and the apparent serious and lasting . . .damage that will
result").
118. See Kimberly Hills, 320 N.W.2d at 674.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court appeared to be concerned that MEPA litigation might fail
to bring finality to development issues in a particular geographic area. The deci-
sion never explained why MEPA could not be used to address incremental and
broad-scale development.
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The Kimberly Hills conclusion that one must view impairment
from a statewide perspective generated significant adverse com-
mentary. The Kimberly Hills court appeared to ignore MEPA's legis-
lative history which refused to impose an unreasonableness
threshold on the level of pollution, impairment or destruction.
The court also appeared to ignore the early cases which imposed
little or no threshold. 121 Furthermore, the court provided no justi-
fication for seeking to protect only statewide resources.122 Notably,
only one other Michigan Court of Appeals panel followed the
Kimberly Hills holding. 123
Several panels of the Michigan Court of Appeals have diverged
from the Kimberly Hills approach. These decisions have developed a
number of factors to be applied which could result in local impact
being sufficient to justify judicial intervention under the circum-
stances of a particular case. In City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County
Road Commission,124 the Michigan Court of Appeals had to deter-
mine whether the removal of seventy-four roadside trees consti-
tuted prima facie impairment under MEPA. The Portage court
articulated the following four determinative factors:
(1) whether the natural resource is rare, unique, endan-
gered or has historical significance; (2) whether the re-
source is easily replaceable; (3) whether the proposed
action will have any significant consequential effect on
other natural resources; and (4) whether the direct or
consequential impact on animals or vegetation will affect a
critical number, considering the nature and location of
the wildlife or vegetation affected. 125
121. See Robert H. Abrams, Thresholds of Harm in Environmental Litigation: The
Michigan Environmental Protection Act as Model of a Minimal Requirement, 7 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 107, 115 (1983) (citing Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 224
N.W.2d 883, 889-89 (Mich. 1975)).
122. See id. See also Lynch, supra note 68, at 68-69 (referring to Professor Sax's
brief). Professor Sax filed an amicus brief in Kimberly Hills in which he noted that
MEPA had been created to address small cases, and neither the statute nor de-
cided cases required a statewide perspective before courts could make a prima
facie finding. See id.
123. See Thomas Township v. John Sexton Corp. of Mich., 434 N.W.2d 644,
647 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that lower court erred in using local perspec-
tive, as opposed to statewide perspective, and draining of lake did not constitute
impairment of natural resource under MEPA).
124. 355 N.W.2d 913 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
125. Id. (holding that trial court erred in determining prima facie case was
established by weighing environmental risk of removing trees against good to be
accomplished by their removal). The short-term effect of removing the trees did
not rise to the level of impairment or destruction of natural resources within the
meaning of MEPA. See id.
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Applying these factors, the court explicitly disagreed with the
Kimberly Hills court's interpretative statewide standard and sug-
gested that a local perspective may be more appropriate. The Port-
age court, however, held that a prima facie case had not been made
out by the plaintiff whether viewed from a statewide or local per-
spective. 126 The same three-judge panel that decided Portage reaf-
firmed its refusal to follow the Kimberly Hills statewide perspective
just one year later in Rush v. Sterner.127
Several cases decided by the Michigan Court of Appeals since
1985 have applied the Portage four-part test in determining satisfac-
tion of MEPA's impairment requirement. There is no indication
whether the courts' holdings stemmed from a statewide or local
perspective. 128 As such, the Michigan Supreme Court has yet to re-
126. See id. at 914 n.2 (contrasting holding of Kimberly Hills court which stated
"[w] e do not agree that a statewide as opposed to local perspective is always neces-
sary in such cases,... [and] we find that removal of the trees in this case does not
have a significant environmental impact from either a statewide or local
viewpoint").
127. 373 N.W.2d 183, 187 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (reaffirming position
that "statewide" as opposed to "local" perspective unnecessary when addressing
alleged impairment or destruction of animal or plant life, and that under either
.statewide" or "local" perspective, level of impairment involved where downstream
landowner sought to rehabilitate dam did not justify judicial intervention).
128. See, e.g., Friends of Crystal River v. Kuras Properties, 554 N.W.2d 328, 334
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (reflecting plaintiff environmental organization failed to
demonstrate impairment of natural resource from filling 3.68 acres of wetlands to
construct resort golf course, as 6.63 acres of new wetlands would be created in
mitigation, construction and operation of golf course would not cause damage to
nearby river or neighboring wetlands, and state natural resources agency had se-
cured resort owner's continuing adherence to environmental protection plan);
Trout Unlimited, Muskegon-White River Chapter v. City of White Cloud, 532
N.W.2d 192, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (noting plaintiff conservation group failed
to establish prima facie case that dam reconstruction would impair trout habitat
where trout are not rare, project would not diminish population, and no negative
impacts would be caused to other natural resources); Attorney General ex rel. Dep't
of Natural Resources v. Huron County Rd. Comm'n, 538 N.W.2d 68, 73-74 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1995) (showing that plaintiff state agency failed to establish prima facie
case that dredging and expanding county drain would constitute impairment of
water quality, fish and wildlife, where agency did not conduct inspections and wit-
nesses testified resources were not rare, could be replaced and would benefit from
project); Dafter Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Resources, 499 N.W.2d
383, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (noting plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case
that landfill operator's actions in constructing, operating and closing landfill vio-
lated MEPA impairment standard, where allegations of statutory violation not sup-
ported by facts); Attorney General ex rel. Natural Resources Comm'n v. Balkema,
477 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (indicating Attorney General estab-
lished that draining of three lakes constituted prima facie impairment where asso-
ciated marsh contained unique vegetation, attraction for waterfowl in southwest
Michigan, and declining bird species reside on area); Kent County Rd. Comm'n v.
Hunting, 428 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (reflecting plaintiff landown-
ers failed to demonstrate that proposed removal of old trees in connection with
road-widening constituted prima facie impairment because trees are not unique,
1998] 383
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solve the uncertainty these divergent approaches have created. 129
What is clear from the current state of the law, however, is that
MEPA case law has moved away from a de minimis approach to the
level of impairment necessary to establish a prima facie case, and
towards applying the Portage four-part test without regard to
whether decisions are driven by statewide or local considerations.
c. Natural Resources and the Public Trust
The third factor in establishing a prima facie case is to show
that the affected "natural resources" are entitled to public protec-
tion. Specifically, MEPA permits a plaintiff to succeed in establish-
ing a prima facie case if a showing is made that the natural
resources or the public trust have been, or are likely to be, impaired
by defendant's conduct. 130 By incorporating the public trust doc-
trine into the definition of natural resources, MEPA explicitly at-
tempts to ensure that public uses of natural resources are protected
from actions of third parties. Because it does not define "natural
resources," MEPA has the potential of going beyond the limited no-
tion of public trust and applying a public trust to all the natural
resources in the state. This potential is exemplified by the 1982
Stevens v. Creek decision, in which the Michigan Court of Appeals
held the language of MEPA disjunctive. 31 The Stevens court noted
that nothing in MEPA's language "would limit the protections...
to natural resources affecting land in which there is a public trust or
are easily replaceable, and their removal would not have significant consequential
effect on wildlife or vegetation).
129. See Lynch, supra note 68, at 88-89 (suggesting that in order for MEPA to
be used effectively, Michigan Supreme Court or state legislature should resolve
conflicting approaches pursued by Michigan Court of Appeals).
130. MIGH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 324.1703(1) (West 1997). The concept of a
public trust is a common law development derived from Roman law which held
that the sea and other waterways, as well as the land and water interface, were to be
treated as the common property for all people. SeeJoseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 473,
475 (1970). The public trust doctrine has been part of American law for over one
hundred years. In Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, the Supreme Court
characterized the notion of a public trust as a title held in trust for the people of a
state so that they may enjoy navigation, commerce and fishing on the navigable
waters free from the obstruction or interference of private parties. 146 U.S. 387
(1892). See also Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821) (describing one of first cases
recognizing existence of public trust doctrine in United States). Under the public
trust doctrine, a state is a trustee of the public rights in its navigable waters and can
only alienate that trust where no substantial diminishment in trust resources would
occur. See Fred R. Jensen, Developing the Future of Michigan Environmental Law: Ex-
panding and Blending MEPA with the Public Trust Doctrine, 1989 DET. C.L. REv. 65, 67-
69 (1989) (noting that public rights in navigable waters include navigation, com-
merce and fishing).
131. 328 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
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a right to public access." 132 As a result of the court's conclusions, it
is clear that MEPA takes into account a more extensive list of re-
sources than just the common law public trust doctrine. 13 3
3. Shifting the Burden of Proof: The Rebuttal and the Affirmative
Defense
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the defend-
ant is confronted with two options. The defendant may either re-
but the prima facie showing by submission of evidence to the
contrary, or assert an affirmative defense.1 34 An affirmative defense
connotes that there is no "feasible and prudent alternative" to de-
fendant's conduct, and that the conduct "is consistent with the pro-
motion of the public health, safety and welfare in light of the state's
paramount concern for the protection of its natural resources from
pollution, impairment or destruction."1 3 5 This shift in the burden
of proof is one of the most significant and controversial reforms in
MEPA and the laws of several other states that have adopted similar
provisions. Opponents of the shift point to the inconsistency with
regard to usual evidentiary rules about who bears the burden of
proof in a lawsuit and the hardship MEPA places on defendants.1 3 6
Courts, however, have decided few cases addressing this issue. This
is due, in part, to the correspondingly few instances in which de-
fendants are called upon to respond since courts have raised the
prima facie threshold for plaintiffs.
The leading case on the scope of defendant's rebuttal defense
is Ray v. Mason County Drain Commissioner.13 7 According to the Ray
132. Id. (examining section 2 of MEPA and finding that it provides that party
may bring action for declaratory and equitable relief against other party "for the
protection of the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust
therein from pollution, impairment or destruction"). Under section 3 of MEPA,
in order to obtain relief, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the
defendant's conduct "has or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water and
other natural resources or the public trust therein." Id.
133. See id. See a/soJensen, supra note 130, at 86 (considering public trust as
separate item in list and not additional element of natural resources that may be
protected by MEPA). Although OEBR does not incorporate the public trust doc-
trine into its provisions, it does, however, contain mechanisms for government ac-
countability which may be viewed as an attempt at indirect incorporation of public
trust concepts.
134. See MICH. CoMP LAWS ANN. § 324.1703(1) (West 1997).
135. Id.
136. See Gionfriddo, supra note 89, at 451-53 (suggesting that MEPA burdens
defendants with necessity to refute prima facie showing).
137. 224 N.W.2d 883 (Mich. 1975) (holding that action must be remanded
for full and specific findings of fact where trial court failed to meet requirements
for findings of fact necessary to insure that MEPA fulfilled goals for which it was
enacted).
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court, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the
defendant once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. If the
defendant successfully rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie showing,
the burden shifts and the plaintiff must then prove environmental
pollution, impairment or destruction.1 38 The Ray court indicated
that the nature of the evidence necessary to rebut a prima facie
showing will vary according to both the type of environmental pol-
lution alleged as well as the nature and extent of plaintiffs evi-
dence. For example, testimony by expert witnesses may be
sufficient to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie showing in some cases.
The defendant may, however, find it necessary to bring forward
field studies, actual tests and analyses to establish that the environ-
ment has not or will not be damaged by its conduct. The Ray court
acknowledged that such evidence would be necessary when the im-
pact upon the environment resulting from defendant's actions can-
not be ascertained with any degree of reasonable certainty without
empirical studies or tests.1 39 Thus, in the event the plaintiff makes
a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant even if
the environmental effects of its activities are uncertain.
The Ray court's burden on the defendant is a significantly
higher burden than that initially placed on the plaintiff to prove a
prima facie case. 140 The obligation, however, is consistent with a
statute designed to place the burden on the party presumably in
possession of better information about the environmental impact of
its activities. The Michigan Court of Appeals endorsed this theory
in Wayne County Department of Health v. Olsonite Corp.141 The Olsonite
court upheld a trial court denouncement of defendant manufac-
turer's odor tests conducted after institution of lawsuit, because the
tests were conducted by employees untrained in odor detection.1 42
138. See id. at 890 (finding that standard of proof for plaintiff was preponder-
ance of evidence). To clarify, the burden of proof never shifts, but the burden of
proceeding shifts to the defendants after the plaintiff makes a prima facie case. See
id. Thus, while the burden of proving environmental pollution or impairment
remains with the plaintiff, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to
the defendant once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. See id. If the de-
fendant successfully rebuts, the burden of going forward with the evidence would
then shift back to the plaintiff. See id.
139. See id. at 891 (noting that one of defendant's witnesses conceded that
without detailed study of configurations in areas, he could not say how wetlands
were dependent upon watertable and whether they were subject to drying up if
watertables were lowered).
140. See Lynch, supra note 68, at 60.
141. 263 N.W.2d 778 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (endorsing Ray court's placement
of burden on party presumably in possession of information about environmental
impact).
142. See id. (holding that manufacturer's tests didn't meet empirical studies).
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The court characterized such tests as self-serving and not measuring
up to the empirical studies espoused by the Ray court.
If a defendant is unable to rebut the plaintiffs case with evi-
dence to the contrary, MEPA permits a defendant to plead an af-
firmative defense. This requires a defendant to show that there is
no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct and that
the defendant's conduct is consistent with the promotion of the
public health, safety and welfare. 143 Establishing an affirmative de-
fense has proved difficult for defendants under MEPA and similar
MEPA-type laws.14 4 In Olsonite, the Michigan Court of Appeals held
that the normally applicable rules requiring a plaintiff to carry the
burden of proving its case by a preponderance of the evidence do
not apply to the affirmative defense under MEPA. Instead, the de-
fendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to its
activities. 145 The court stressed the concern that if private citizens
are to have a sizable share of the initiative for environmental law
enforcement, the only reasonable construction of MEPA is to place
the burden of proof "not on a citizenry largely unschooled in the
intricacies of environmental technology, but on a defendant who
has the underlying data and documentation upon which his choice
of a given course of action is based."'146 The Olsonite decision re-
143. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.1703(1) (West 1997) (viewing defend-
ant's affirmative defense in light of state's paramount concern for protection of its
natural resources from pollution, impairment or destruction).
144. See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 67, at 599; Abrams, supra note 121, at 117;
Gionfriddo, supra note 89, at 451. See also State ex rel. Wacouta Township v.
Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
under MERA, once plaintiff has established prima facie case, defendant must
either rebut or affirmatively defend by demonstrating that no feasible or prudent
alternative exists and that its actions will promote public health, safety or welfare,
other than economically). A defendant must shoulder an extremely high burden
in order to establish an affirmative defense. See id.
145. See Olsonite, 263 N.W.2d at 781-82 (leading case under MEPA on scope of
defendant's obligation).
146. Id. (citing Joseph L. Sax, Responses to "Thoughts on H.B. 3055" 4
(March 20, 1970) (unpublished manuscript, Professor Sax, University of Michigan
Law School), quoted in Note, Michigan Environmental Protection Act: Political Back-
ground, 4 U. MIcH.J.L. RrrORm 358, 367 n.36 (1970)). The Olsonite court also held
that: (1) to maintain its affirmative defense, a defendant must demonstrate that it
is keeping its emissions to a practical minimum; (2) an alternative may be econom-
ically feasible even if it would substantially increase production costs, burden fi-
nances and affect profit margins adversely; (3) the concept of economic feasibility
does not guarantee the continued existence of individual employers if they have
lagged behind the rest of the industry and, for financial reasons, are unable to
comply with new standards as quickly as other employers; (4) the concept of pru-
dent alternative does not require that there be a comprehensive balancing of com-
peting interests; and (5) a defendant must show technical, economic infeasibility
1998]
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flects the influence of several trends in federal environmental legis-
lation and jurisprudence relating to the obligation to consider
alternatives and the extent to which compliance is expected even if
it may mean the demise of individual companies. 147 The strength
of the affirmative defense under MEPA is tempered by the fact that
if the plaintiff does not make out a prima facie case of impairment,
the defendant has no obligation to take alternatives into account. 148
The overall effect of the Michigan cases on MEPA's affirmative de-
fense provision demonstrates that, where applicable, MEPA poses a
high hurdle for defendants and forces them to choose environmen-
tally sound approaches to conducting their operations.
4. Standards of Environmental Quality
MEPA addresses the question of judicial deference to adminis-
trative agency action in a fundamentally different manner than
United States federal law. Under federal law, the principle of defer-
ence to administrative interpretations and decisions is firmly en-
and imprudence of alternatives to succeed. Id. at 703-06, 796-98. Olsonite was re-
cently distinguished by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Friends of Crystal River v.
Kuras Properties, 554 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to apply
principles of Olsonite to wetlands statute with requirement similar to MEPA to con-
sider "feasible and prudent alternatives," because, unlike MEPA, wetlands statute
contained neither affirmative defenses nor burden shifting obligations, and be-
cause Olsonite had expressly rejected notion that phrase "prudent alternative" in
MEPA required comprehensive balancing of competing interests while wetlands
statute specifically embraced obligation to balance burdens and benefits of
activity).
147. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411
(1971) (holding that phrase "prudent alternative" in several pieces of federal trans-
portation legislation did not mandate comprehensive balancing of competing in-
terests, and destruction of parkland was not to be approved unless alternative
routes present unique problems); Olsonite, 263 N.W.2d at 796-97 (endorsing inter-
pretation of "prudent" advanced in Overton Park decision); Environmental Protec-
tion Agency v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 79 (1980) (holding that
EPA was not required to include economic ability as factor in granting variances
from 1977 Best Practicable Control Technology (BPT) effluent limitations under
Clean Water Act, as Congress foresaw and accepted economic hardship that efflu-
ent limitations would cause, including closing of some plants).
148. See Oscoda Chapter of PBB Action Comm., Inc. v. Department of Natural
Resources, 268 N.W.2d 240 (Mich. 1978) (holding where alternative chosen by
defendant does not violate MEPA's impairment standard, court has no authority to
order defendant to choose different option); Friends of Crystal River, 554 N.W.2d at
334 (making plain that where plaintiff failed to make prima facie showing that
proposed golf course would impair wetland area, court will not reach question of
whether feasible and prudent alternatives exist to defendant's conduct). OEBR
imposes no comparable requirement on defendants. As a result, in cases under
OEBR, the plaintiff retains the burden of proof throughout the case as in any
other civil proceeding.
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trenched, based in part on notions of agency expertise. 149 The
legislative sponsors of MEPA supported a different approach to ju-
dicial interpretation of environmental rights. They wanted the
Michigan courts to inquire directly into the merits of environmen-
tal controversies rather than invalidate only arbitrary and capricious
administrative conduct.150
MEPA supplements existing administrative and regulatory pro-
cedures. Specifically, it authorizes courts to determine the validity,
applicability and reasonableness of any standard for pollution and
to specify a new or different pollution control standard in the event
an agency's standard falls short of MEPA's substantive require-
ments.1 5 1 As a result, courts have consistently held that trial courts
may not defer to the expertise of the agency when reviewing admin-
istrative agency action in a MEPA suit.15 2 The court must exercise
its independent judgment as to whether the agency activity prevents
the likelihood of the pollution, impairment or destruction claimed
by the plaintiff.153 According to the Michigan Supreme Court, the
statute would not accomplish its purpose if the courts were to ex-
empt administrative agencies "from the strict scrutiny which envi-
ronmental protection demands." 154  Thus, MEPA authorizes
Michigan courts to enforce standards and to establish new stan-
149. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(holding that EPA regulation allowing states to treat all pollution-emitting devices
within same industrial grouping as though they were encased within single "bub-
ble" was based on permissible construction of term "statutory source" in Clean Air
Act amendments). The United States Supreme Court held that a court's review of
an agency's construction of a statute must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress if the intent is clear. See id. However, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the precise question at issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is a reasonable interpretation of the stat-
ute. In the latter circumstance, a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the agency. See id. at
842-43.
150. See generally West Mich. Envtl. Action Council v. Natural Resources
Comm'n, 275 N.W.2d 538 (Mich. 1979); see also Ray v. Mason County Drain
Comm'r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 895 (Mich. 1975) (holding that by establishing environ-
mental rights in MEPA, legislature set parameters for standard of environmental
quality but did not attempt to set forth elaborate definitional scheme to cover
every conceivable type of environmental harm). The Ray court noted that MEPA
left to the courts the task of giving substance to the standard by developing a com-
mon law of environmental quality. See id.
151. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.1706 (West 1997); Haynes, supra note
67, at 602-03 (suggesting that MEPA, in effect, amends other statutes by filling
gaps in existing statutory schemes).
152. See West Mich. Envtl. Action Council, 405 N.W.2d at 754.
153. See id.; Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1989).
154. West Mich. Envtl. Action Council 405 N.W.2d at 754.
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dards where existing ones are inadequate.15 5 By making the courts
responsible in the final analysis for the adequacy of environmental
standards, MEPA constitutes a dramatic shift away from decision-
making by administrative agencies and traditional administrative
law principles.
5. Remedies
Under MEPA, courts may grant declaratory and equitable re-
lief to a plaintiff on a temporary or a permanent basis. 156 Further-
more, a court may impose conditions on the defendant that are
required to protect the air, water and other natural resources, or
the public trust in these resources, from pollution, impairment or
destruction. 157 Courts can examine a standard to determine if it is
consistent with the statute's requirements and direct the agency to
revise it if necessary. Departing from traditional administrative law
principles, Michigan courts have refused to require plaintiffs to ex-
haust all other administrative remedies before invoking MEPA's
remedy provisions. 158
MEPA, however, does not authorize courts to award damages.
Legislators excluded damages from MEPA because they sought to
avoid frivolous suits and judicial gridlock. Statistics have indicated
that the number of actions brought under MEPA are a small frac-
tion of those initiated annually in the Michigan courts. 159 The ab-
155. See Ontario, 874 F.2d at 343. OEBR has no comparable provision grant-
ing courts the authority to second-guess the actions of administrative agencies.
Like the United States, the Ontario approach deliberately withholds authority
from the courts to reassess agency rules. However, the concern Ontario legislators
expressed about the adequacy of administrative standards of environmental quality
led to the establishment in OEBR of an elaborate administrative process of public
participation in the evaluation of existing regulations and development of new
environmental regulations.
156. See MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 324.1701 (1) (West 1997).
157. See id. § 324.1704(1).
158. See West Mich. Envtl. Action Council, 405 N.W.2d at 751-54. The Michigan
courts have been creative in fashioning remedies to achieve MEPA's objectives. See
Stevens v. Creek, 328 N.W.2d 672, 672 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that where
plaintiff maintained property as wildlife preserve, attempted to perpetuate it in its
natural state, and sought reforestation of damaged area, restoration of natural
habitat was proper remedy under MEPA). But see Slone, supra note 67, at 316
(noting that although MEPA does not authorize courts to award damages, it does
expressly provide for equitable or declaratory relief).
159. See Haynes, supra note 67, at 593 n.13 (noting that MEPA cases consti-
tuted less than .02 of 1% of all civil cases initiated in Michigan circuit courts from
October 1970 to July 1975). Suits joining equitable relief under MEPA and dam-
ages under nuisance occur particularly where plaintiffs have proceeded by way of a
class action. See id. at 650 (noting that of nine air pollution class actions involving
MEPA, two settled with damages awards, one was dismissed and six were pending
as of March 1976).
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sence of a remedy in damages, as well as the high costs of civil
litigation, would'appear to account for the small number of cases
under MEPA.
6. Other Procedural Matters
Two additional procedural matters that are important in con-
sidering the effect of MEPA on environmental litigation are security
for costs and attorney's fees. The imposition of a high security
bond on plaintiffs and the refusal to award them attorney's fees can
be significant deterrents to initiating citizen suits. Although judi-
cial opinion is split on imposition of attorney's fees, MEPA explic-
itly addresses security bonds. Courts may order plaintiffs to post
either a surety bond or cash in an amount not exceeding $500
when a court has reasonable grounds to doubt the plaintiff's sol-
vency.160 This MEPA provision strikes an uneasy balance between
compensating defendants unfairly restrained by erroneous injunc-
tions and not discouraging citizen suits by saddling them with pro-
hibitive expenditures. 161 Other courts applying MEPA-type laws
have also limited the security bond requirement in order to foster
citizen environmental protection initiatives.162
With regard to attorney's fees, MEPA simply states that "[c]osts
may be apportioned to the parties if the interests of justice re-
quire."1 63 Until recently, Michigan Court of Appeals panels sharply
divided on the question of whether the term "costs" includes attor-
ney's fees. 164 Although the Michigan Supreme Court has yet to rule
OEBR authorizes injunctive remedies, declaratory relief and restoration or-
ders, but like MEPA, it does not authorize damage claims. Plaintiffs may be ex-
pected to use the class proceeding provisions of other Ontario statutes in
conjunction with the declaratory and equitable remedies available under OEBR
and the common law cause of action in public nuisance, in order to fashion appro-
priate relief in a manner similar to MEPA.
160. See MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.1702 (West 1997) (applying to cases in
which court eventually holds that preliminary injunction was erroneously granted
in action brought under MEPA).
161. See Sax & Connor, supra note 20, at 1076-77.
162. See, e.g., State of Minnesota v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 897-98 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that while MERA defines temporary injunction bond as op-
tional, temporary injunction shall not be granted except upon giving of security in
amount court deems proper for payment of costs and damages as may be incurred
or suffered by party who was wrongfully enjoined). The Martz court held that the
trial court was within its discretion in requiring only a $1,000 bond in temporarily
enjoining construction of radio tower pending trial action under MERA. See id.
163. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1703(3) (West 1997).
164. See Taxpayers & Citizens in the Public Interest v. Department of State
Highways, 245 N.W.2d 761, 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that term "costs"
includes attorney's fees); Superior Public Rights, Inc. v. Department of Natural
Resources, 263 N.W.2d 290, 297-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (same); Three Lakes
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on this issue, recent decisions by the Michigan Court of Appeals
support the view that MEPA does not allow an award of attorney's
fees unless authorized by statute or court rule.1 65 In Platte Lake Im-
provement Ass'n v. Department of Natural Resources,166 the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that although the Ray court recognized that
the legislature left to the courts the important task of giving sub-
stance to the MEPA standard of environmental "pollution or im-
pairment" by developing a common law of environmental quality, it
did not authorize the courts to disregard the meaning of well-de-
fined legal terms such as costs. 16 7 Accordingly, costs do not include
attorney's fees under Michigan law unless provided for by
legislation.168
IV. ONTARIO ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS: ADMINISTRATIVE-
PROCEDURAL-SUBSTANTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REFORM
MEPA's enactment in 1970 had a profound influence on the
reform of Ontario environmental law. In the early 1970s, a constit-
uency called for what was termed an "Environmental Bill of Rights."
Ontario legislators began drafting bills to meet this demand. As the
government committed itself to enacting environmental rights leg-
islation in the 1990s, political and legislative compromise brought
about a rough consensus with business and industrial interests. If
Ass'n v. Kessler, 300 N.W.2d 485, 487-88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (same); Dafter
Township v. Reid, 354 N.W.2d 689, 691-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (same). But see
Oscoda Chapter of PBB Action Comm. v. Department of Natural Resources, 320
N.W.2d 376 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that term "costs" does not include at-
torney's fees).
165. See Model Laundries & Dry Cleaners v. Amoco Corp., 548 N.W.2d 242,
243 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that attorney's fees are not covered by MEPA
unless court rule or statute specifically authorizes); Buckeye Marketers, Inc. v. Fin-
ishing Services. Inc., 540 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Attorney General
v. Pillar, 514 N.W.2d 210, 212-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
166. 554 N.W.2d 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that MEPA provision
authorizing apportionment of "costs," but not expressly including attorney's fees,
did not authorize award of attorney's fees in MEPA actions).
167. Id.
168. See id. at 344-45 (concluding that "[w]hile the statute permits apportion-
ment of costs, it does not purport to alter the ordinary definition of 'costs' or to
allow taxation of costs for items which may not be taxed as costs in ordinary civil
actions"); Oscoda, 320 N.W.2d at 378-79. The legislature's implicit public policy in
providing a vehicle for individuals to initiate environmental litigation without wait-
ing for government action suggests that MEPA favors an award of attorney's fees to
prevailing plaintiffs. Under this interpretation, citizens are empowered to initiate
and carry through to completion complex and expensive environmental litigation
without the necessary financial means. See Platte Lake, 554 N.W.2d at 343-45 (hold-
ing that legislature should resolve attorney's fees issues as policy matter). The
Michigan Court of Appeals has sent a clear message that only the Michigan
Supreme Court or state legislature can reverse.
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MEPA is primarily a substantive rights statute, OEBR may be de-
scribed as primarily an administrative rights regime. This change in
approach may profoundly impact OEBR's efficacy for ensuring en-
vironmental protection. Whether the statute can achieve its pur-
poses of encouraging the public's right to participate in
environmental decisions, holding governments environmentally ac-
countable and allowing citizens access to the courts, remains to be
seen.
A. Early Bills on Environmental Rights
The Ontario Environmental Rights Act (OERA), introduced in
1979 as a private member's bill by Stuart Smith, the leader of the
Liberal Party, was the first environmental rights bill to appear in the
Ontario legislature.1 69 The bill contained many provisions derived
from MEPA principles.1 70 Because it was introduced by the leader
of the official opposition, the bill received greater public scrutiny
than private members' bills usually receive.171 As a result, the 1979
bill is used in this Article as the primary means for summarizing the
169. See An Act Respecting Environmental Rights in Ontario, Bill 185, 31st Leg.
Ont. 28 Eliz. II (1979) [hereinafter Bill 185] (Mr. Smith-first reading Nov. 20,
1979, Ont. Leg.) (introducing Ontario Environmental Rights Act (OERA)). A pri-
vate member's bill is a non-governmental bill. In 1979, the governing party was the
Progressive Conservatives. The official opposition was the Liberal Party. The third
party in the legislature was the New Democratic Party.
170. See An Act to Establish an Environmental Magna Carta for Ontario, Bill 91,
31st Leg. Ont. 29 Eliz. I (1980) (Ms. Bryden-first readingJune 3, 1980, Ont. Leg.)
(private member's bill based largely upon Bill 185); An Act Respecting Environmental
Rights in Ontario, Bill 134, 32d Leg. Ont. 31 Eliz. 11 (1981) (Mr. Smith-first reading
June 29, 1981, Ont. Leg.) (same); An Act Respecting Environmental Rights in Ontario,
Bill 96, 32d Leg. Ont. 31 Eliz. 11 (1982) (Mr. Elston-first reading Apr. 29, 1982,
Ont. Leg.) (same); An Act Respecting Environmental Rights in Ontario, Bill 9, 33d Leg.
Ont. 36 Eliz. II (1987) (Mrs. Grier-first reading Apr. 29, 1987, Ont. Leg.) (same);
An Act Respecting Environmental Rights in Ontario, Bill 13, 34th Leg. Ont. 36 Eliz. II
(1987) (Mrs. Grier-first reading Nov. 9, 1987, Ont. Leg.) (same); An Act Respecting
Environmental Rights in Ontario, Bill 12, 34th Leg. Ont. 38 Eliz. II (1989) (Mrs.
Grier-first reading May 15, 1989, Ont. Leg.) (same); An Act Respecting Environmental
Rights in Ontario, Bill 23, 35th Leg. Ont. 39 Eliz. 11 (1990) (Mrs. Sullivan-first read-
ing Dec. 13, 1990, Ont. Leg.) (same). For a discussion of the influence of MEPA
on Bill 185, see infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text. Numerous other bills
based on Bill 185 and MEPA-type principles were introduced during the period
1980-1990. For a discussion of the fate of some of these other bills, see infra note
185 and accompanying text.
171. See Bill to Protect Nature Offered, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 21, 1979, at A20
(noting that Ontario Liberal Leader had introduced environmental rights bill that
would permit citizens to go to court to protect environment without first having to
prove they have been personally damaged or injured; Hugh Winsor, Society's Values
on the Line, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 11, 1979, at 7 (noting that "[t] he fact
that a private bill of the kind that usually rears its title for an hour on Thursday
afternoon and is never heard of again can have caused such a fuss is in itself evi-
dence that we are dealing with a seminal issue").
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provisions of the great bulk of the private members' bills later
introduced.
The first part of OERA set forth certain key definitions as well
as the bill's purpose. Three definitions were of particular interest,
namely, public trust,172 contamination, 173 and degrade. t 74 Other
important provisions in the first part of OERA concerned the grant
of environmental rights, the trusteeship of public land and the
availability of citizen remedies. 175 The concepts found in the first
part of OERA were derived from MEPA, notwithstanding the fact
that the latter neither defined terms nor declared rights. Like
MEPA, 176 OERA would have remedied impairment or destruction
172. See Bill 185, supra note 169, § I (g) (defining term "public trust" as "col-
lective interest of residents of the Province of Ontario in the quality of the environ-
ment and the protection thereof and the heritage therein for future generations").
173. See id. § 1(b) (defining term "contamination" as impairment of "quality
of the environment or the public trust therein for any use that can be made of it").
OERA provided in pertinent part:
"[C]ontaminant" means any solid, liquid, gas, odour, heat, sound, vibra-
tion, radiation or combination of any of them resulting directly or indi-
rectly from the activities of man which may:
(i) impair the quality of the environment or the public trust therein
for any use that can be made of it,
(ii) cause injury or damage to property or to plant or animal life,
(iii) cause harm or material discomfort to any person,
(iv) adversely affect the health or impair the safety of any person, or
(v) render any property or plant or animal life unfit for use by man.
Id.
174. See id. § 1(d) (providing that "'degradation' refers to any destruction or
significant decrease in the quality of the environment or the public trust therein
other than a change resulting from contamination and 'degrade' has a corre-
sponding meaning").
175. See id. §§ 2(1)-(2) (providing that " [t]he people of Ontario have a right
to clean air, pure water and the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and
aesthetic values of the environment," and that "Ontario's public lands, waters, and
natural resources are the common property of all the people," and imposing obli-
gation upon Ontario Government as trustee to "conserve and maintain [natural
resources] for benefit of present and future generations"). OERA further de-
clared that "it is in the public interest to provide every person with an adequate
remedy to protect and conserve the environment and the public trust therein from
contamination and degradation." Id. § 2(3).
176. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.1701 to 324.1706 (West 1997). The sec-
ond part of OERA was also modeled on MEPA. See id. Like MEPA, OERA allowed
any person to sue without having to establish special damage. See id.
§ 324.1701 (1). OERA thus proposed to reform the law of standing in relation to
public nuisance in Ontario. Furthermore, OERA, like MEPA, authorized a court
to establish a standard where none existed to govern a defendant's conduct. See id.
§ 324.1701(2). OERA, however, did not give Ontario courts the ability to revise an
existing standard in the same way MEPA empowered the Michigan courts. MEPA
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to demonstrate there was no feasible
and prudent alternative to its activity where there is no governing statute, and
OERA followed suit. See id. § 324.1703(1). This burden shift would not have ap-
plied where there was an established standard. In contrast to MEPA, in circum-
46
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss2/2
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS STATUTES
of the environment or public trust.1 7 7 The particular need to de-
fine "public trust" and to set out the fiduciary obligation of the gov-
ernment in OERA arose partly because Canadian common law
narrowly defined the term and severely restricted actions against
the Crown as trustee. 178
The second part of OERA granted a right of action in the
Supreme Court of Ontario against any person contaminating or de-
grading the environment. 179 Where the activity complained of was
not governed by a legally established standard, OERA authorized
the court to establish a standard with which the defendant need
comply.180 Like MEPA, the bill also shifted the burden of proof
from the plaintiff to the defendant to show "no feasible and pru-
dent alternative to the defendant's activity."'18 The bill also recog-
stances involving an established standard, a defendant under OERA would prevail
unless the plaintiff established on a balance of probabilities that the activity was
causing severe environmental damage. See id. Although MEPA and OERA both
authorized injunctions and limited security bonds to $500, OERA alone permitted
actions in damages. Id. §§ 324.1704(1) (injunctions), 324.1702 (security bond).
MEPA and OERA further differed in that OERA lacked a prima facie test requiring
plaintiffs to provide a minimum evidentiary showing to shift the burden of proof to
defendants.
177. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.1701 (1) (West 1997) (authorizing any
person to maintain action to protect "air, water, and other natural resources and
the public trust in these resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction");
see also Bill 185, supra note 169, §§ 1 (b) (including impairment in statutory defini-
tion of contamination), 1 (d) (including destruction in statutory definition of deg-
radation), 2(3) (stating that it is in public interest "to provide every person with an
adequate remedy to protect and conserve the environment and the public trust
therein from contamination and degradation), 3(1) (granting cause of action
where activity has contaminated or degraded environment or threatens to contam-
inate or degrade environment), 6 (setting forth remedies for protection of public
trust).
178. See Constance D. Hunt, The Public Trust Doctrine in Canada, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL RIGHTS IN CANADA 151, 177-78 (John Swaigen ed., 1981).
179. See Bill 185, supra note 169, §§ 3(1)-(2) (establishing that one could initi-
ate action without showing of "any greater or different right, harm or interest than
that of other members of the public").
180. See id. § 3(3). In establishing any standard, Bill 185 required courts to
take into consideration the following:
(a) [T]he right of the people of Ontario to protection of the environ-
ment and the public trust therein against contamination or degradation;
(b) the fulfillment of the widest range of beneficial uses of the environ-
ment without contamination or degradation; and
(c) the achievement of a balance between population and resource use
that would permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's
amenities.
Id.
181. See id. §§ 5(1)-(2) (dealing with allocation of burden of proof), 7-8 (au-
thorizing court to refer technical and scientific matters to administrative tribunal
or referee for review pending final judicial determination); 4(2)-(3) (limiting obli-
gation to post security for costs or damages to $500 where court satisfied plaintiff
1998]
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nized as a defense, the defendant's compliance with a standard,
and permitted the plaintiff to rebut the defendant's showing by
proving that the defendant's activity caused or is likely to cause se-
vere or irreparable contamination or degradation to the
environment.
Similar in many respects to MEPA, OERA fashioned a major
role for the courts in Ontario environmental matters. Accordingly,
OERA generated much public debate. Some commentators argued
that the bill's fatal flaw was that it placed primary responsibility for
protecting the environment in judicial hands. 182 Because formula-
tion of effective environmental policy requires a balancing of the
benefits of a cleaner environment against the economic cost of re-
duced industrial activity and lost jobs, commentators felt that such
political decisions should only be made by politicians directly ac-
countable to the electorate for their parliamentary actions. 183 The
had prima facie case to bring before court), 6 (setting forth injunctions, restora-
tion orders and damages to protect environment).
The remaining parts of OERA dealt with such matters as access to information
and attempts to open up both the licensing and regulation-making process to pub-
lic scrutiny. See id. §§ 12 (regarding access to information), 10-11 (regarding li-
censing and regulation-making process). These latter initiatives established a
notice and comment procedure in relation to new instruments and a review proce-
dure in relation to existing instruments to be supervised by an appropriate admin-
istrative tribunal. See id. § 10 (defining term instrument to include "any licence,
permit, approval .. .or order made under an Act listed in the Schedule" to bill
"that would permit a person to contaminate or degrade the environment in con-
travention of such Act or the regulations"). OERA also authorized periodic re-
views of all environmental regulations by an administrative tribunal in order to
ensure their "adequacy to protect the environment and the public trust therein
from contamination and degradation, especially in the light of technological ad-
vances that can be applied in the Province of Ontario." Id. § 11(1) (stating that
there should be review every five years by Environmental Assessment Board).
MEPA inspired these latter initiatives. Notwithstanding that OERA did not author-
ize judicial scrutiny of existing standards, the Act recognized a need to keep ap-
provals and regulations current. This initiative grew into subsequent versions of
private members' bills and, eventually, into OEBR itself. See An Act Respecting Envi-
ronmental Rights in Ontario, Bill 12, 34th Leg. Ont. 38 Eliz. II §§ 14-16 (1989) (pro-
viding greater opportunity for review of both existing and new instruments and
regulations by public).
182. See Pat Crowe, Who Will Control Court That Acts as Government?, TORONTO
STAR, Dec. 4, 1979, at A1O (arguing that environmental review should not be in
hands of judiciary); Editorial, Smith's Idea Fatally Flawed, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 6,
1979, at A8 (same); Editorial, Out of Court, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 5,
1979, at 4 (noting that Ontario's Environmental Minister, Hon. Dr. Harry Parrott
of Progressive Conservative Party, disagreed philosophically with intention of bill
believing that enforcement of environmental laws should be handled by elected
officials, and that environmental standards were never meant to be in hands of
courts).
183. See Crowe, supra note 182, at A10. In effect, Bill 185's detractors were
making two separate arguments. First, they argued that the government was more
representative of the people than courts and thus should be making environmen-
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environmental community and the provincial bar association ex-
pressed the contrary view. 184 Specifically, they argued that thejudi-
ciary's independence could serve as an important check on the
environmental decision-making of the more political branches of
government. Over the next decade, opposition members intro-
duced numerous other private members' bills on environmental
tal decisions. Second, they argued that courts are not capable of objectively bal-
ancing environmental considerations.
184. See Harry Poch, Smith Environmental Rights Bill Praised by Bar Official
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 12, 1979, at 7 (arguing that environmental deci-
sions should be in hands of judiciary); Joseph F. Castrilli, Environmental Bill Called
"Best News" of Decade, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 27, 1979, at A9 (same); Joseph F. Cas-
trilli, Environmental Bill Supplements Law He Argues, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 13, 1979, at
A9 (same). Commentators made the following responses to opponents of OERA:
(1) the bill was meant to supplement, not displace, the regulatory process, espe-
cially where there are no standards in place; (2) making environmental protection
an enforceable legal right in the courts where prompted by citizens would merely
place such rights on an equal footing with private property rights; (3) citizen envi-
ronmental actions in other jurisdictions with laws similar to OERA did not result in
dire economic consequences for industry; and (4) the often irreversible nature of
environmental damage required more proactive and preventive mechanisms than
that provided by an election once every four years. See Poch, supra, at 7.
OERA's legislative sponsor, Dr. Stuart Smith, noted that there was nothing
new in granting courts the authority to make law as courts frequently set standards
in many complex financial, technical and social areas as securities fraud, price fix-
ing, patents and obscenity laws. See Ont. Leg. Debates, 31st Leg. Ont., 3d Sess., 28
Eliz. II 5482 (Dec. 13, 1979) (argument by Smith that judges be allowed to set
standards in environmental law arena). Smith also noted that because environ-
mental legislation provided the government with power but not the duty to act,
Ontario had experienced many serious pollution episodes which demonstrated
the need for citizen suit legislation to improve environmental conditions between
elections when the government does not act. See id. (referring to mercury contam-
ination in St. Clair River, sulphur dioxide emissions in Sudbury, and lead emis-
sions from Toronto lead smelters). Smith and other legislative supporters made
frequent reference to MEPA for the principles found in OERA and for refuting
suggestions that such laws lead to clogging of judicial system with frivolous suits.
See id. at 5481-83 (Smith and Bryden supporting decision-making in hands of
judges).
Legislators who did not support Bill 185 argued that its inherent assumption,
that judges will always take effective anti-pollution measures, was not necessarily
accurate. The judiciary might instead issue rulings that would frustrate effective
legal action in the future. See id. at 5485 (testimony of Mr. McCaffrey against
passage of bill). Despite broad public support, the bill died on the Order Paper at
the close of the 1979 legislative session. See id. at 5481; Kirk Makin, Environmental
Rights Bill Supported, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 12, 1979, at 52 (noting sup-
port for bill from various national and provincial environmental and conservation
organizations, provincial bar association, consumers' associations and church
groups); Joseph F. Castrilli, Broad Public Coalition Supports Citizens' Suit Bill, Though
Measure Is Defeated in Ontario Legislature, CAN. ENVTL. L. ASS'N NEWSL., Dec. 14,
1979, at 5 (noting that members of governing Progressive Conservative party voted
to prevent bill from proceeding to committee, thus killing bill at end of legislative
session).
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rights, none of which became law.18 5
B. Ontario Task Force on OEBR: Search for Consensus
In the September 1990 Ontario election, environmental issues
played a prominent role, and the newly elected New Democratic
Party provincial government promised to introduce environmental
rights legislation. The new Environmental Minister, the Honorable
Ruth Grier, appointed a twenty-six person advisory committee for
the purpose of reviewing and making suggestions regarding the en-
vironmental rights legislation. 186 Through its environmental rights
initiative, the new government intended to provide the public with
the right to a healthy environment, as well as access to the judiciary
and administrative decision-making process.187 The advisory com-
mittee engaged in wide-ranging deliberations for several months,
during which time it surveyed the experiences of MEPA-type juris-
dictions and hundreds of public comments. 188 Most of the public
185. See Environmental Rights "Snowed Again" in Ontario, CAN. ENVTL. L. ASS'N
NEWSL., Dec. 1980, at 99-100 (noting defeat of second environmental rights bill
introduced in 1980 by Ms. Bryden, environmental critic and member of New Dem-
ocratic Party); Joseph F. Castrilli, Control of Toxic Chemicals in Canada: An Analysis of
Law and Policy, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 322, 384 & nn.329-32 (1982) (noting history
of environmental rights bills to 1981); Muldoon, supra note 55, at 39 (noting his-
tory of environmental bills to 1987).
Several of the later Ontario environmental rights bills were introduced by a
future provincial environmental minister. For further discussion, see supra note
170 (referring to Bills 9, 12 and 13 which were introduced by Mrs. Grier in 1987
and 1989 while she was a member of Opposition New Democratic Party).
Mrs. Grier became Ontario Environment Minister in the Fall of 1990. Next to
Liberal Leader Stuart Smith's Bill 185, Mrs. Grier's Bill 12 was the most com-
mented upon environmental rights initiative. See Andrew McNaught, Citizen Partic-
ipation in the Protection of the Environment: Recent Proposals for Legislative Change, ONT.
LEG. RES. SERV. 1, 11-13 (1990); Roger Cotton & NancyJohnson, Avenues for Citizen
Participation in the Environmental Arena: Some Thoughts on the Road Ahead, 41 U.N.B.
L.J. 131, 136-53 (1992) (noting that Bill 12 would have entrenched statutory guar-
antee of basic environmental rights, and given citizens increased access to courts
and decision-making process giving effect to environmental rights).
186. See Ont. Leg. Debates, 35th Ont., 1st Sess., 39 Eliz. II 2710 (Dec. 13,
1990) (statement of Hon. Ruth Grier, Ontario Minister of the Environment).
Among the sectors represented on the advisory committee were the fields of labor,
business, industry, environment, aboriginal, health, legal, municipal and provin-
cial governments. See id.
187. See id. (identifying environmental rights intentions of new government).
The government specifically expected the bill to address the public's right to a
healthy environment, the enforcement of this right through improved access to
the courts and tribunals, increased public participation in the environmental deci-
sion-making process and increased government responsibility and accountability
for the environment. See id. (addressing also greater protection for employees
blowing whistle orf their polluting employers).
188. See ONTRto MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE
ENVqRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS 1 (1992) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
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comment supported the environmental rights concept. 18 9
Subsequent to the advisory committee's initiatives, Minister
Grier announced the creation of a small task force of multi-stake-
holders from business, industry, government and environment
groups. 190 The task force was assembled to draft the environmental
rights legislation. After extensive examination and consultation,
the task force achieved consensus, crafted the bill's provisions and
released an accompanying report in 1992. The report advocated
reform for three major aspects of Ontario's environmental law,
namely, public participation, government accountability and public
access to the courts. 191 Specifically, the task force proposed the cre-
ation of an environmental registry to give the public notice of gov-
ernment proposals potentially affecting the environment. 192 The
189. See Dianne Saxe, Environmental Rights Bill Will Open Pandora's Box, FIN.
POST (Toronto), Apr. 11, 1991, at 13 (noting that, in principle, environmental
rights bill was desirable, but questioning whether giving unelected and unaccount-
able judiciary power to make fundamental decisions was good idea).
190. See Ont. Leg. Debates, 35th Leg. Ont., 1st Sess., 40 Eliz. II 2623 (Oct. 1,
1991) (statement of Hon. Ruth Grier, Ontario Minister of Environment). The
legislation's goal was to "give the citizens of Ontario the right to act to protect the
environment." Id. The task force was also charged with the responsibility of deter-
mining whether this goal could be achieved on a consensual basis. See TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 188, at 1. The task force's terms of reference in drafting the
bill were similar to the policy objectives and principles established for the advisory
committee. See id. at 2. Minister Grier's terms of reference also included a list of
initiatives that could be incorporated into a bill of rights. See id. at 3. The list of
initiatives included the following: (1) a clearly articulated definition of the term
"environment;" (2) creation of a duty on government to protect public resources;
(3) a citizen's right to request an investigation and report which would be shared
with the person who requested the investigation and the person investigated; (4)
an expanded civil cause of action for environmental harm; (5) a right of standing
for environmental claims; (6) a private right to compel government instruments
and regulations related to the environment to be made, enforced or set aside; (7)
expanded provisions for judicial review of government action; (8) a public right to
participation in the issuance of instruments and the making of regulations, includ-
ing the right to notice, comment and hearing; (9) improved public access to infor-
mation upon which environmental decisions are based; (10) encouragement of
non-litigious methods of dispute resolution, such as mediation; and (11) exemp-
tion of certain types of environmental harm from short limitation periods. See id.
191. See Ont. Leg. Debates, 35th Leg. Ont., 2d Sess., 41 Eliz. II 1905 (July 8,
1992) (statement of Hon. Ruth Grier, Ontario Minister of Environment) (noting
that task force draft bill reflected consensus of business and environmental
groups); see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 9-14, 23.
192. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 9 (noting that "public does
not have a consistent clear right to participate in significant environmental deci-
sions by government"); id. at 10-13 (noting that "person may stand in the Attorney
General's shoes and sue for widespread public harm only where the Attorney Gen-
eral consents to the action, or where the person can prove . .. a loss which is
different in kind or degree from that of other members of the public"); id. at 28 &
151-52 (noting that "environmental registry system . . . would provide a uniform,
predictable and certain system for providing notice of pending significant environ-
19981
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task force also recommended that the public have the opportunity
to request governmental review of existing policies. 193 Finally, the
task force proposed limited opportunities for public appeal to an
mental decisions, an opportunity to comment, notice of the decision once made
and, in some cases, appeal rights").
The task force proposed a public right to apply to the Environmental Com-
missioner for an investigation into violations of environmental law requirements,
the creation of a new cause of action for violation of an environmental law causing
significant harm to a public resource and removal of impediments to members of
the public suing in public nuisance. See id. at 70-76 (noting that under task force's
proposed reform, application to Environmental Commissioner for investigation of
alleged contravention by appropriate minister is prerequisite step resident must
take before commencing action under bill where government has elected not to
protect public resource); id. at 83-84 (recommending that any Ontario resident
should be able to commence action where significant harm to public resource is
occurring as result of non-compliance with prescribed statute, regulation or instru-
ment; pre-condition to such action must be resident's request for investigation of
alleged contravention and unreasonable or untimely response by government); id.
at 95-98 (recommending that "no person who has suffered or may suffer a direct
economic loss or direct personal injury as a result of a public nuisance that caused
harm to the environment should be barred from bringing an action in respect of
the loss only because the person has suffered or may suffer a direct economic loss
or direct personal injury of the same kind or to the same degree as other persons;"
and that permission of Attorney General no longer be required before person may
bring public nuisance action).
193. See id. at 76-83. Because the task force determined that there was a need
for greater government accountability to the public, it proposed that provincial
ministries prepare statements of environmental values to explain how the purposes
of the proposed bill would be incorporated into the particular ministry's environ-
mental decision-making. See id. at 13-15 (noting that "at present, there is no legal
mechanism in place to oversee government's administration of environmental laws
and to provide an independent assessment of government's success or failure in
achieving the goal of a sustainable, healthful environment for Ontarians"); i d. at
23-25 (noting that statements of environmental values would be similar to each
ministry's mission statement or strategic plan, except that it would be devoted to
environmental matters and would outline what purposes of bill mean to environ-
mental decision-making within that ministry, and how bill's purposes will be inte-
grated into that ministry's existing decision-making). While this proposal bore a
resemblance to the requirement to produce an environmental assessment or im-
pact statement for ministry activities, the task force did not refer to that process or
how it would interact with environmental rights. See id. The task force also pro-
posed the appointment of an Environmental Commissioner to monitor and report
to the legislature regarding compliance with the bill provisions. See id. at 65-70
(noting that Office of Environmental Commissioner would address need for objec-
tive oversight and measurement of implementation of OEBR and use of statements
of environmental values by various ministries). The task force expected that objec-
tive, non-partisan analysis would lead to the political accountability implicit in
OEBR. See id. The task force considered and specifically rejected the concept of
judicial review of the application or non-application of the statements of environ-
mental values as being less effective than an Office of the Environmental Commis-
sioner, because resort to courts on this issue would undermine certainty,
predictability and uniformity sought by the task force for the overall OEBR pro-
cess. See id. at 68.
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administrative tribunal.19 4
To achieve consensus, the reform mechanisms departed signif-
icantly from previous private members' bills. While private mem-
bers' bills of the 1970s and 1980s focused on effectuating
environmental accountability through the courts, the approach of
the task force was to establish environmental responsibility through
the political process and the administrative process, while leaving
the courts as the forum of last resort. 195 For example, the issue of
the public trust doctrine illustrated the degree of departure from
the approach of the earlier private members' bills. The principal
means of encouraging government accountability in the private
members' bills was statutory enshrinement of a public trust doc-
trine which would recognize a governmental fiduciary duty to pro-
tect the environment for present and future generations. 196 The
public trust doctrine, however, polarized industry and environmen-
talists on the task force, as the former suggested that the ballot box
should vindicate this concept, while the latter argued for the
courts.1 9 7 To resolve the impasse, the task force created several new
institutional mechanisms to instill an environmental ethic in the
government and limited access to the courts without reference to
the public trust doctrine. 198 Political accountability mechanisms do
194. See id. at 46-48, 54-56, 63 (identifying certain classes of instruments,
known as Class I and II, as having potential for significant environmental impact).
Under existing law, Class I and II instruments are subject to appeal by the instru-
ment holder or the person whose activity is the subject matter of the instrument,
but not by an ordinary member of the public. See id. The task force proposed that
these two classes of instruments be subject to leave to appeal applications by mem-
bers of the public. See id.
195. See id. at 17-18. Among the reasons articulated by the task force for the
sharp departure from prior court-oriented approaches to environmental rights re-
form was that "while public and government share responsibility for environmen-
tal protection.., the government, by virtue of the role it plays ... and by virtue of
our democratic traditions, must have primary responsibility for protection of the
environment and . . . public resources." Id. at ii. A second reason was that a
regime that was too court-driven in controlling government conduct would create
too much uncertainty for the public, business and government. See id. at 17. Fi-
nally, courts were not independently effective enough to protect the environment
because of the expense, delay, scientific and technical complexity, risk and conse-
quence of failure associated with litigation. See Cochrane, supra note 21, at 6. The
unstated reason for the task force's departure from prior court-oriented ap-
proaches was that, without business and industrial support, the government would
not have proceeded with any reform initiative. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
188, at 17 (noting that task force was charged with responsibility of determining
whether environmental rights legislation could be achieved on a consensual basis).
196. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 17-18 (summarizing public
trust provisions of Bill 12).
197. See id.
198. See id. at 84-85.
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not have an analogue in MEPA or earlier Ontario private members'
bills.
Following public and legislative committee hearings, the legis-
lature passed OEBR in virtually its original form. Some of the issues
the task force excluded from OEBR which had been prominent in
previous bills are noteworthy and include the following: (1) court
establishment of new standards controlling the conduct of a de-
fendant where none exist;1 99 (2) defendant's obligation to establish
the absence of any feasible and prudent alternative to his con-
duct;20 0 (3) a limitation on a plaintiff's obligation to post security
bonds;20' and (4) the availability of a remedy in the form of dam-
ages.20 2 Without these provisions, the overall effect of the task
force proposal was a significant departure from MEPA and the early
MEPA-inspired private members' bills. It was clear that the task
force was recommending that the province embark on a completely
new framework for environmental decision-making in Ontario. 20 3
199. See id. at 59-60, 76-81, 168. The task force did not discuss why this private
members' bill reform was excluded from its report and draft bill. What the task
force did recommend was that any two Ontario residents who believe that a new
policy, Act, regulation or instrument should be adopted in order to protect the
environment should be able to apply to the Environmental Commissioner for a
review of the need. See id. The task force recommended that no judicial review of
this process be authorized, but did not explain why it made this recommendation.
200. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 98. The task force made no
reference in its report to shifting the burden of proof to a defendant at any stage
of litigation involving its proposed new statutory cause of action. Instead, it recom-
mended that the new cause of action be used in the Ontario courts "as much as
possible like ordinary civil litigation." Id. The defenses recommended by the task
force did not include any obligation on a defendant to demonstrate at any stage
that there was a feasible or prudent alternative to its conduct. See id. at 100-01.
The task force did not explain why this approach was omitted.
201. See id. at 105. The task force recognized that a resident who undertakes
environmental litigation faces certain financial risks. However, the task force did
not want to create any "special inducement to plaintiffs to commence litigation of
this sort." Id. It articulated, however, that Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
56 in particular, would still apply with respect to security for costs. See id. Rule 56
states that a court, on a motion by the defendant, may make such order for security
for costs where it appears that "there is good reason to believe that the plaintiff has
insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the defendant" or "there is good
reason to believe that the action or application is frivolous and vexatious." See
ONT. R. Civ. P. 56.01(1) (d)-(e). It was this type of rule that MEPA explicitly sought
to change in order to encourage environmental litigation where necessary.
202. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 103. The task force was of the
opinion that the focus of a judgment in cases involving the new cause of action
should be on restoration rather than on calculation of damage awards. See id. Be-
cause no personal loss would have occurred for the plaintiff and damages could be
difficult to quantify, the task force recommended that damage awards not be avail-
able as part of a court's judgment. See id. Damage awards were also not part of
MEPA. See id.
203. See Cochrane, supra note 21, at 3.
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C. Legislative Consideration of OEBR
After the release of the task force draft bill in 1992, an exten-
sive period of public consultation preceded the introduction of the
government OEBR in the legislature. 20 4 The purpose of the public
consultation program was to build upon the consensus that busi-
ness and environmental groups on the task force had achieved. 20 5
To a remarkable degree, consensus continued and received ac-
knowledgment by the new Minister of the Environment, the Honor-
able Bud Wildman, when he introduced the new government bill in
the Ontario legislature in May 1993.206 The legislative standing
committee held hearings on the bill at which opposing views were
heard.20 7 Notwithstanding widespread support for the bill's princi-
ples, business and environmental groups and opposition legislators
continued to express concerns regarding certain details of
OEBR.20 8 Despite these concerns, most witnesses appearing before
204. See ONrARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE
ONTARIO ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS: SUPPLEMENTAL RECOMMENDATIONS 1
(1992) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL TASK FORCE REPORT].
205. See id.
206. See Ont. Leg. Debates, 35th Leg. Ont., 3d Sess., 42 Eliz. 11 1000 (May 31,
1993) (statement of Hon. Bud Wildman) (noting that government bill continued
to reflect consensus of business and environmental representatives).
207. See Ont. Leg. Debates, 35th Leg. Ont., 3d Sess., 42 Eliz. II 3045 (Sept. 27,
1993) (testimony of Mr. Steven Offer, Liberal environment critic, and Mr. David
Tilson, Progressive Conservative environment critic) (noting support, in principle,
for legislation); see also Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993: Hearings on Bill 26
Before the Standing Committee on General Government, 35th Leg. Ont., 3d Sess., 42 Eliz.
II 505, 507 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Mr. Frank Pazner, Vice
President, Laidlaw Waste Systems, Ltd.) (noting support for principle of bill); id. at
553 (testimony of Ms. Marie Rauter, President, Ontario Forest Industries Associa-
tion); id. at 515 (testimony of Ms. Rhonda Hustler, Chair, Rural Action on Garbage
and the Environment); id. at 490-94 (testimony of Ms. Marcia Valiante, Professor,
Environmental Law, University of Windsor, and Professor Paul Emond, Professor,
Environmental Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University) (noting favor with
shift from emphasis on "substantive right to a healthy environment" which charac-
terized early versions of environmental rights proposals in Ontario based on
MEPA, to OEBR's emphasis on right to participate in administrative decision-mak-
ing process).
208. See Hearings, supra note 207, at 505-07 (testimony of Mr. Frank Pazner,
Vice President, Laidlaw Waste Systems, Ltd.) (noting business community's con-
cern that litigation created by new cause of action could lead to backlog of cases
and increased costs of doing business); id. at 536-38 (testimony of Leonard J. Grif-
fiths, Environmental Counsel, Ontario Mining Association) (same); id. at 545-48
(testimony of Mr. Carl Lorusso, President, Ontario Waste Management Associa-
tion) (noting business community's concern that delay in approval of instruments
due to opportunities for public review or appeals could lead to discouragement of
investment and act as barrier to new job creation); id. at 53-54 (testimony of Ms.
Marie Rauter, President, Ontario Forest Industries Association) (noting business
community's concern that new registry system for giving notice of environmental
decision-making on Acts, regulations, policies and instruments would be too costily,
too slow and would encourage more bureaucracy); id. at 492 (testimony of Ms.
1998]
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the legislative committee and most legislators commenting on the
bill were prepared to work with the OEBR process. As a result, the
bill received legislative approval in December 1993, and became law
on February 1, 1994.209
D. Key Provisions of OEBR
OEBR is a complex statute that addresses environmental rights
from administrative, procedural and substantive perspectives. Con-
taining approximately twenty times as many sections as MEPA,
OEBR is divided into eight main parts. Part I proclaims OEBR's
purpose. 210 Part II establishes minimum levels of public participa-
tion that must be met before the Ontario government makes deci-
sions on certain kinds of environmentally significant proposals for
policies, Acts, regulations and instruments. 2 11 Part III provides for
the appointment of an environmental commissioner responsible
for reviewing compliance with OEBR's requirements as well as re-
course to the rights provided. 212 Part IV authorizes Ontario resi-
dents' applications to the provincial government for review of
Marsha Valiante, Professor of Environmental Law, University of Windsor) (noting
environmental community concern that excessive ministerial and administrative
discretion all but precludes judicial review); id. at 500-01 (testimony of Dr. Mark
Winfield, Research Director, Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy,
and Mr. Chris Winter, Executive Director, Conservation Council of Ontario) (not-
ing expressed environmental community concern that vagueness and limited man-
date and authority of new institutional mechanisms for ensuring government or
political accountability cast doubt on effectiveness of these tools as substitutes for
public trust doctrine); id. at 481-85 (testimony of Ms. Marcia Valiante) (noting
environmental community concern that requirement in new cause of action to
show both violation of law and significant harm to public resource would result in
limited use of citizen suit provision); id. at 482 (testimony of Dr. Mark Winfield)
(noting environmental community concern that leave to appeal provision in con-
nection with government-approved instruments was too onerous and thus made it
virtually impossible for citizens to achieve success on leave applications); id. at 492
(testimony of Ms. Marcia Valiante) (noting environmental community concern
that failure to change existing court rules on costs or to provide funding mecha-
nism for involvement in administrative process made citizens' ability to afford to
bring such actions or participate extensively in administrative reform under bill
unlikely, and noting concern that declaration in bill of right to healthy environ-
ment was too tentative and circumscribed to lead to effective remedies); id. at 573
(statement of Mr. David Tilson, Progressive Conservative environment critic) (ex-
pressing concern about OEBR duplication of public participation processes in ex-
isting environmental legislation); id. at 664 (statement of Mr. Steven Offer)
(expressing concern about strengthening new Office of Environmental Commis-
sioner's mandate beyond that of reporting to legislature).
209. See Ont. Leg. Debates, 35th Leg. Ont., 3d Sess., 42 Eliz. II 4987, 5026
(Dec. 14, 1993).
210. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, §§ 1-2 (1993) (Can.).
211. See id. §§ 3-48.
212. See id. §§ 49-60.
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Ontario policies, Acts, regulations or instruments when residents
believe that such review should be undertaken to protect the envi-
ronment.21 3 Part V provides Ontario residents' application for in-
vestigation to the provincial government when they believe that a
prescribed Act, regulation or instrument has been contravened.21 4
Part VI permits Ontario residents to bring an action in the courts
when a person has violated, or will imminently violate, a prescribed
Act, regulation or instrument and the actual, or imminent, viola-
tion has caused or will imminently cause, significant harm to a pub-
lic resource of Ontario. 215 This part also removes certain barriers
to bringing a court action regarding either direct economic loss or
personal injury resulting from a public nuisance which has caused
environmental harm to the environment.21 6 Part VII provides for
protection of employees who use the provisions of OEBR to protect
from reprisals by employers. 217 Part VIII addresses general matters,
including judicial review.218 The first six parts of OEBR and the
judicial review portions of Part VIII are most directly influenced by
MEPA, even though they now depart significantly from the particu-
lars and approach of the Michigan law.
1. Preamble and Purposes
Examination of the preamble provisions illustrates the extent
to which OEBR is meant to both commit government to the goal of
environmental protection and to encourage public involvement in
the environmental decision-making process.2 19 First, the preamble
states that the people of Ontario recognize the inherent value of
the natural environment. Second it proclaims that the people of
213. See id. §§ 61-73.
214. See id. §§ 74-81.
215. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, §§ 82-102.
216. See id. § 103.
217. See id. §§ 104-116.
218. See id. §§ 117-124.
219. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 18 (explaining decision to
include both preamble and purpose sections). According to the task force, the
preamble's purpose is to capture OEBR's philosophical approach and explain its
object. See id. The purpose section was included to establish goals and influence
the interpretation of portions of the legislation. See id. One unspoken reason for
including both sections may be that Ontario, unlike Michigan, does not have a
written constitution that commits the province to preserving and protecting its
natural resources. Compare MicH. CONST. art. IV, § 52 (describing conservation
and development of state resources as "of paramount public concern"). The task
force may have, therefore, wanted to underscore, as much as possible, Ontario's
obligations to both protect the environment and encourage public involvement in
the process, in order to facilitate public, administrative and judicial review of
OEBR's provisions.
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Ontario have a right to a healthy environment. Third, the pream-
ble announces that the people of Ontario possess a common goal
of protecting, conserving and restoring the natural environment
for the benefit of present and future generations. Fourth, the pre-
amble notes that, " [w] hile the government has the primary respon-
sibility for achieving this goal, the people should have the means to
ensure that it is achieved in an effective, timely, open, and fair
manner."220
Three broad goals are established in the purpose section of
OEBR, namely, (1) to protect, conserve, and where possible, re-
store the integrity of the environment; (2) to provide for the sus-
tainability of the environment; and (3) to protect the right to a
healthful environment.221 The final part of the purpose section
stipulates the following mechanisms to achieve the above purposes:
(1) public participation in the environmental decision-making pro-
cess; (2) increased government accountability; and (3) increased
public access to the courts in respect of environmental harm. 222
These three mechanisms are the cores of OEBR. They constitute
the culmination of Ontario's efforts to reform environmental law,
which began as an attempt to adopt a MEPA-type law but ended
with a significantly different legislative initiative.
2. Public Participation
OEBR's public participation regime has been described as the
"heart" of the statute. 223 According to the Ontario legislature, pub-
lic participation necessitates notice and comment opportunities in
relation to new statutes, regulations, policies and instruments. Pub-
lic participation also makes available limited opportunities for seek-
ing leave to appeal to an administrative tribunal, the decisions of
ministries to issue instruments. 224 Furthermore, public participa-
tion includes opportunities to request governmental review of ex-
220. OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, preamble.
221. See id. §§ 2(1) (a)-(c). These three goals are supplemented and clarified
by additional purposes relating to the following: (1) protection of environment
from hazardous pollutants; (2) protection of bio-diversity; and (3) conservation
and wise management of ecologically sensitive systems, processes and areas. See id.
§2(2).
222. See id. §§ 2(3)(a)-(c).
223. See MULDOON & LINDGREN, supra note 19, at 46 (discussing public partici-
pation in environmental decisions); Hearings, supra note 207, at 512 (testimony of
Mr. John Jackson, Representative, Citizen Network on Waste Management) (call-
ing public participation scheme heart of OEBR because of expectation that most
members of public will invoke OEBR's simple, easy, cost-effective procedures).
224. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, §§ 15-48.
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isting statutes, regulations, policies or instruments or to request
development of new statutes, regulations, or policies where none
exist.2 25 These initiatives largely pertain to reform of the public's
role in the administrative process of environmental protection.
Although they were to some extent inspired by MEPA because of its
environmental improvement provisions, there is no parallel MEPA
provision. 226
a. Notice and Comment
i. Threshold Determinations
A government proposal is subject to OEBR's notice and com-
ment requirements unless the proposal lacks significant environ-
mental effects or is exempt under the terms of OEBR.22 7 Likewise,
a proposal is not subject to notice and comment if an OEBR regula-
tion does not classify it into a particular category where it is an in-
strument.228 Proposals for statutes, regulations and policies of
fourteen ministries, and proposals for instruments of five ministries
were scheduled to become subject to OEBR notice and require-
ment over a period of several years.229 Recent government deci-
sions to further cost-cutting measures, however, have begun to
remove some ministry proposals, if not whole ministries, from the
duty to comply with OEBR.230 These recent decisions have been
the subject of adverse reports to the Ontario legislature by the Envi-
ronmental Commissioner, which outlined the potential for severe
reduction in the nature and scope of government proposals and for
abuse in the exercise of government discretion in avoiding the stat-
ute's notice and comment requirement. 231
More specifically, OEBR requires that if a minister believes that
a proposal under consideration could have a significant environ-
225. See id. §§ 61-73.
226. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 324.1701(2) (West 1997) (stating in an
action under MEPA, "if there is a standard for pollution or for an antipollution
device or procedure.., the court may (a) determine the validity, applicability and
reasonableness of the standard; (b) if the court finds a standard to be deficient,
direct the adoption of a standard approved and specified by the court").
227. For further discussion of significant harm and OEBR exemption, see in-
fta notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
228. For a discussion of OEBR classification processes, see infra notes 239-42
and accompanying text.
229. 0. Reg. 73/94 §§ 1-4 (Can.).
230. For a discussion of the effects of recent government decisions to further
cost-cutting measures, see infra note 235 and accompanying text.
231. See EVA LIGETI, ONTARIO REGULATION 482/95 AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL
BILL OF RIGHTS 3-11 (1996) (special report prepared for the Legislative Assembly
of Ontario) (on file with author) [hereinafter LIGETI I].
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mental effect, the minister must do everything in his or her power
to give a thirty-day notice before implementation of the propo-
sal.23 2 This time frame may be extended under certain circum-
stances. In determining whether a proposal could have a
significant effect on the environment, a minister must consider the
following factors: (1) the extent and nature of the measures that
might be required to mitigate against or prevent harm to the envi-
ronment; (2) the geographic extent of any harm to the environ-
ment; (3) the nature of private and public interests including
governmental interests involved in the decision whether or not to
implement the proposal; and (4) any other matters the minister
considers relevant.233
The Environmental Commissioner is authorized to review and
report to the legislature on how this discretion is being exercised
under the Act.23 4 To date, provincial ministers have frequently ex-
ercised ministerial discretion contrary to the purposes of OEBR,
reaching decisions that have unnecessarily curtailed the public's
role in the process. 235 What has become clear is OEBR's limited
recourse with respect to redressing unwarranted conduct, specifi-
cally the ineffectiveness of adverse comment by the Environmental
Commissioner in a report to the legislature. 23 6 There is little incen-
232. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, §§ 15, 16, 22 (1993) (Can.).
233. See id. § 14.
234. See id. § 57(g).
235. See LIGETI I, supra note 231, at 3, 8-11 (noting that exemption from
OEBR notice and comment provisions occurred at precise time when numerous
changes were under way in province's environmental policy and regulatory frame-
work). In January of 1996, the Environmental Commissioner issued her first spe-
cial report to the Ontario legislature in which she criticized a provincial
government decision to suspend for ten months OEBR public notice and com-
ment requirements dealing with environmentally significant proposals linked to
government cost-cutting initiatives. See id. In October 1996, the Environmental
Commissioner issued a second special report to the legislature in which she again
criticized certain provincial government ministries for failing to give notice to the
public on environmentally significant proposals relating to changes in the manage-
ment of certain natural resources and public lands, establishment of regimes for
the self-regulation of petroleum industries, and the delegation of certain environ-
mental monitoring responsibilities for underground fuel storage tanks to a private
sector agent. See EVA LIGETI, KEEP THE DOOR TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
OPEN 3 (1996) (special report prepared for the Legislative Assembly of Ontario)
(on file with author) [hereinafter LIGETI II] (noting that these and other restric-
tions on Ontarians' right to comment on environmentally significant proposals
deprives government of valuable information and perspectives it needs to ade-
quately protect environment).
236. See id. The two special reports issued by the Environmental Commis-
sioner not only did not result in correction of the problems identified but also
indicated that the abuses had increased. Neither report resulted in a reversal by
the government of its decisions not to give notice in the circumstances of the cases
identified by the Environmental Commissioner.
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five for the government to change its conduct or even to concede
there is a problem because in a parlimentary democracy, the gov-
ernment is the majority party in the legislature. 23 7 Moreover, re-
cent events suggest the problems may be getting worse, not
better.238
Instruments are among the many types of proposals covered by
OEBR. The OEBR process of classifying instruments by regulation
is subject to notice and comment and can enormously influence
the scope of OEBR's effect on environmental decision-making.
Generally, OEBR classifies instruments as either environmentally
insignificant or environmentally significant. OEBR classifies envi-
ronmentally significant instruments into three classes. Class I in-
struments require minimum notice and comment. Class II
instruments require enhanced notice and comment. Finally, Class
III instruments require a public hearing.23 9 The first classification
regulation the Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Energy
(MOEE) filed with the registrar of regulation classified less than ten
percent of MOEE's instruments in Classes 1-111. It identified the
remaining instruments as environmentally insignificant.2 40 Thus,
237. See Martin Mittelstaedt, Tories Rebuked Over Pollution, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), Oct. 11, 1996, at A6 (noting that Ontario Minister of Environment and
Energy, Hon. Norman Sterling, had trouble coming to same conclusions as Envi-
ronmental Commissioner did with respect to failure to give notice).
238. See Martin Mittelstaedt, Firms Get First Say on Levels of Toxics, GLOBE AND
MAIL (TORoNTO), Dec. 17, 1996, at Al (noting that dozens of major polluters in
Ontario are being given a chance to review and influence new emission standards
covering 19 harmful substances from their plants before proposals are issued for
public comment under OEBR); Martin Mittelstaedt, Preview of Pollution Standards
Defended, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 18, 1996, at A3 (discussing Progressive
Conservative government's defense of its actions as common practice in Ontario).
239. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, §§ 19 (establishing requirement to develop classi-
fication regulation for instruments), 20 (listing steps to be taken in classifying in-
struments), 24 (defining enhanced notice and comment as including oral
representation opportunities, public meetings, mediation and other processes to
facilitate more informed public participation in decision-making).
240. See 0. Reg. 681/94 (Can.) (dealing with classification proposals for in-
struments); ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO, 1994-95 ANNUAL REPORT:
OPENING THE DOORS TO BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 60 (1996)
[hereinafter EC ANNuAL REPORT I] (discussing MOEE's classification of instru-
ments). In her first annual report, the Environmental Commissioner found that
of 33,000 of MOEE's annually issued instruments approximately 2700 were classi-
fied as environmentally significant. See id.
In addition to minimal classification of instruments as environmentally signifi-
cant, public notice and comment obligations under OEBR may be further limited
by ministries refusing to classify instruments. In December 1996, an environmen-
tal group brought an application for judicial review against the Ontario Ministry of
Natural Resources, alleging that the agency failed to meet its duty to promulgate a
regulation classifying its instruments into different categories by the April 1996
deadline. See Canadian Envtl. L. Ass'n v. Chris Hodgson, No. 732-96 (Ont. Div. Ct.
filed Dec. 20, 1996); Eco-Challenge Launched, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 21,
1998] 409
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ninety percent of the instruments issued annually by MOEE are not
subject to even minimal notice and comment procedures under
OEBR. For example, subsequent OEBR classification amendment
regulations issued by MOEE expanded the scope of OEBR Part II
exemptions and then contracted it without providing opportunity
for public notice and comment.241 Likewise other recent govern-
ment initiatives, proposing the introduction of "permit-by-rule" sys-
tems for approvals of certain environmental activities whose effects
are minor, predictable and controllable by existing technology, may
result in still fewer opportunities for public notice and comment on
instruments. 242
Although there is a general obligation to subject proposals to
notice requirements, several exceptions exist. In particular, notice
need not be given for a proposal in the following instances: (1) the
proposal is predominantly financial or administrative in nature;243
(2) delay associated with compliance with the notice and comment
provisions would result in damage to human health or safety, harm
or serious risk thereof to the environment, or injury or damage or
1996, at A8. A failure to produce the classification regulation means that none of
the instruments issued by the ministry under the mining, logging, public land,
endangered species, fisheries or other resource statutes are subject to notice and
comment. This would constitute a gaping loophole in OEBR in that it would effec-
tively remove both the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and the industries
that it regulates from compliance with key parts of OEBR designed to encourage
public participation in the management of Ontario natural resources.
241. See EC ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 240, at 33-34. As of November 15,
1994, the Ministry of the Environment and Energy (MOEE) had to provide public
notice on the environmental registry of proposed environmentally significant in-
struments. See id. On November 18, the Ontario government issued Regulation
719/94, exempting any application for proposed instruments received by MOEE
earlier than November 15, 1994 from the registry posting requirements. See id.
This was done to reduce the number of instruments MOEE would have to post
during the start-up period. See id. This exempted over 280 approvals applications,
including permits for over 180 waste disposal sites and other environmentally sig-
nificant facilities. See id. Notice of this exemption was not posted on the registry.
See id. In an attempt to undo the damage, the MOEE issued Regulation 108/95,
which reinstated the registry posting requirements for those proposed instruments
that were previously exempted. See id. However, MOEE again failed to give notice
of the regulation on the registry. See id. The Environmental Minister acknowl-
edged that both regulations significantly affected the environment, that both
should have been posted on the registry and that efforts would be made to avoid
such errors in the future. See id.
242. See ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY, RESPONSIVE EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 33 (1996) (Report prepared for citizens of Ontario) (on
file with author) (noting that changes resulting from approvals reform may reduce
number of proposals to be placed on environmental registry); An Act Respecting
Environmental Improvement, Bill 57, 36th Leg. Ont. 45 Eliz. 11 (1996) (Mrs. Elliott-
first reading June 3, 1996, Ont. Leg.).
243. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, §§ 15(2) (excepting acts and policies), 16(2) (ex-
cepting regulations).
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serious risk thereof to property;244 (3) there is a public participa-
tion process with respect to the proposal that is "substantially
equivalent" to that under OEBR;245 or (4) the proposal would form
part of or give effect to a budget or economic statement presented
to the Ontario legislature. 246 Determining applicability of the ex-
ception is subject to the broad ministerial discretion of provincial
ministers and is subject to examination and reporting to the legisla-
ture by the Environmental Commissioner.
247
ii. Notice
Once the minister determines that a proposal is subject to Part
II, the public must receive notice on the environmental registry es-
tablished under OEBR. 248 Although notice on the registry consti-
tutes the minimum level of acceptable notice under OEBR, a
minister does have discretion to give notice by other methods.249
The contents of the notice registry must include: (1) a brief descrip-
tion of the proposal; (2) a statement of the manner and time within
which the public may participate; (3) a statement of where and
when the public may review the written information about the pro-
posal; (4) an address to which written comments and questions may
be sent; and (5) other prescribed information.2 50 The failure of
several ministries of the Ontario government to use the environ-
mental registry as a minimal source of notice was criticized severely
by the Environmental Commissioner in both her first and second
special reports to the legislature. 251
244. See id. § 29 (excepting emergencies).
245. See id. § 30.
246. See id. § 33.
247. See LIGETI I, supra note 231, at 4-7 (examining and reporting critically on
exemption determinations made by ministers). In January 1996, the Environmen-
tal Commissioner, in her first special report to the Ontario legislature, was highly
critical of a government regulation issued under OEBR which permanently ex-
empted the Ministry of Finance from OEBR despite clear environmental signifi-
cance of that ministry's decision-making. See id. (noting that principal functions of
Ministry of Finance have potential to produce environmentally-significant effects).
248. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, §5 (discussing establishment of environmental
registry). The registry is a government electronic database accessible to any mem-
ber of the public through computer hookup.
249. See id. § 27(1) (discussing constraints of notice procedures). Other
forms of notice accepted under a minister's discretion include news releases, news
media, door to door flyers and direct mailings to individuals or groups. See id.
§ 28(1) (listing methods of notice for Class II instruments).
250. See id. § 27(2).
251. See LIGETI I, supra note 231, at 11-14 (noting MOEE failure to post Regu-
lation 482/95 on environmental registry constituted non-compliance with public
notice requirements of OEBR). For a discussion of the Environmental Commis-
1998]
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Under OEBR, a minister must also include a regulatory impact
statement (RIS) in a notice on a proposed regulation if he consid-
ers it necessary to allow for more informed public consultation. 252
The RIS must include a brief statement of the proposed regula-
tion's objectives, a preliminary assessment of the consequences of
implementing the regulation and an explanation of how the regula-
tion's environmental objectives would be appropriately achieved.253
Experience reveals that a RIS is rarely issued by ministries and min-
istries are failing to assess or report on significant environmental
effects of proposed regulatory changes.254
iii. Comment
Every notice of a proposal must include a description of the
environmental rights accompanying public participation in deci-
sion-making.25 5 Although cast as "environmental rights," such pub-
lic opportunities are highly dependent upon the exercise of broad
ministerial discretion. The minimum public comment period for
proposals under OEBR is thirty days. 25 6 "In order to permit in-
sioner's two special reports to the legislature, see supra note 235 and accompany-
ing text.
The task force did not believe that a failure to place a notice of a policy or
regulation on the environmental registry was the type of non-compliance that
should be subject to judicial review. According to the task force, only a failure to
place a notice of a proposed instrument on the registry should be subject tojudi-
cial review. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 59-60. The task force did
not give reasons for this distinction. See id. The distinction was incorporated into
OEBR. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 118(1)(2) (1993) (Can.).
252. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 27(4) (1993) (Can.).
253. See id. § 27(5).
254. See LIGETI II, supra note 235, at 6-7 (noting that each of four prepared
RIS's were two sentences long). The Environmental Commissioner in her second
special report to the Ontario legislature noted that only four of forty-two proposals
posted by MOEE as of August 1996 were accompanied by a RIS. See id. These four
contained little meaningful information about environment, social or economic
effects of the proposed regulatory changes. See id. (noting that MOEE did not
assess effects of its cutbacks in air quality monitoring, its shut-down of drinking
water laboratories and its layoffs of scientists, nor did Ontario Ministry of Natural
Resources assess regulatory compliance or enforcement issues surrounding its de-
cision to introduce self-regulation for sand, gravel and quarry industries while sig-
nificantly reducing ministry staff).
255. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 27(3) (listing environmental rights of public
participation in decision-making). Such rights include: (1) the right to submit
written comments in the manner and time specified in the notice; (2) any addi-
tional rights of public participation, such as oral representations, public meetings,
mediation and other processes that would facilitate more informed participation
on the proposal; (3) any additional rights of public participation prescribed by
regulation under OEBR; and (4) any additional rights of public participation that
the minister giving the notice deems appropriate. See id.
256. See id. §§ 15 (policies and Acts), 16 (regulations), 22 (instruments).
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formed public consultation" on the proposal, a minister must con-
sider extending the comment period for more than thirty days.
257
Since the minister has discretionary ability, he must consider a vari-
ety of factors before limiting the period of public comment.258
Such factors make it clear that the more technically complex or
controversial the proposal, the more likely a longer comment pe-
riod will be necessary. Experience to date has shown that ministries
are failing to consider additional comment opportunities for the
public. 259
A minister who gives notice of a proposal must take every rea-
sonable step to ensure that all comments are considered by the
ministry.260 The minister must give notice to the public as soon as
reasonably possible after the proposal is implemented. 261 Further,
the minister must include in the notice a brief explanation of the
effect of public participation on decision-making and any other in-
formation that the minister considers appropriate. 262 The effect of
public comment on the final content of government proposals has
been mixed and cannot be easily generalized. The Environmental
Commissioner noted in her annual report that some proposals
were made as a result of election promises, and, therefore, public
comment had little impact on the government's policy decision to
proceed with the proposal. 263 In other cases, public consultation
257. See id. §§ 17(1) (policies, Acts and regulations), 23(1) (instruments).
258. See id. §§ 17(2), 23(2). The factors contemplated by the minister in-
clude: (1) the complexity of the matters; (2) the level of public interest; (3) the
period of time the public may require to make informed comment; (4) any private
or public interest in resolving the matters in a timely manner; and (5) other mat-
ters that the minister considers relevant. See id.
259. See LIGETI II, supra note 235, at 6 (noting that MOEE did not provide any
comment forums to discuss its proposed reforms of 80 regulations under Ontario's
environmental statutes, nor did MOEE provide any comment opportunity before
allowing Ontario's intervenor funding law to sunset). In her second special report
to the legislature, the Environmental Commissioner found that, even where the
potential environmental effects of the proposal were clearly significant, comment
periods either had not been provided or had been unreasonably short. See id. at 4-
5 (noting that MOEE gave public only 38 days to comment on proposal to exempt
development of pits and quarries from approval by Niagara Escarpment Commis-
sion, even though proposal had potentially significant environmental effects on
United Nations designated ecological reserve, and constituted abrupt reversal of
MOEE position taken only nine days before notice of proposal was given to
public).
260. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 35(1) (1993) (Can).
261. See id. § 36(1).
262. See id. § 36(4).
263. See EC ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 240, at 35 (discussing MOEE deci-
sions to remove ban on establishment of new municipal waste incinerators).
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on proposals appeared to result in more significant changes. 264 In
more controversial proposals, however, sometimes even significant
changes arising from the public comment process have been insuf-
ficient to prevent a member of the public from seeking leave to
appeal the matter to an administrative appeal tribunal. 265
b. Appeals of Instruments
Historically, under Ontario enviromental law, only the appli-
cant for a Class I or II instrument, which respectively requires mini-
mum or enhanced notice and comment, had a right to appeal a
government refusal to issue an instrument or the imposition of
terms and conditions on the instrument. A person under a govern-
ment order to undertake a certain action could similarly appeal the
imposition of that order or its terms and conditions. 266 Prior to
OEBR's enactment, no one else could seek leave to appeal the
granting by the government of an instrument, or the imposition of
inadequate terms and conditions before the province's environ-
mental appeals tribunal. 267 Members of the public were effectively
locked out of the process.
OEBR changed the law regarding appeals of environmental in-
struments in two key respects. First, it gave any member of the pub-
lic the right to seek leave to appeal in certain circumstances.
Second, it established the threshold standards an applicant must
meet for a tribunal to grant leave to appeal. The experience to
date with these provisions has demonstrated that, while it is by no
means easy for an ordinary member of the public to succeed in a
leave to appeal application, it is not an insurmountable task.
264. See id. at 40 (noting how waste disposal site changes successfully medi-
ated between operator and community).
265. See id. at 37-38 (discussing proposed changes to existing air emission and
sewage works by petro-chemical plant operator located near several residential ar-
eas generating over 1000 public comments both for and against proposal and
granting of approval resulting in third party leave to appeal application).
266. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 54-55 (discussing policies and
regulations regarding appeals). The task force recommended that the law be
changed to allow a member of the public to seek leave to appeal instruments to an
appeals tribunal. See id. at 55 (commenting "where applicants or orderees have a
present right of appeal, interested or affected members of the public should have a
right to seek leave to appeal"). The grounds for such leave application would be
the applicant's participation in the consultation process, and the instrument's un-
reasonableness in light of the particular statutory requirements governing its issu-
ance. See id. (discussing requirements for leave application).
267. See Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O., ch. E.19, §§ 13940 (1990)
(Can.) (noting applicant's right to appeal to Ontario Environmental Appeal Board
(OEAB) after MOEE's refusal to issue instrument and right of appeal to OEAB by
person subject of MOEE imposed order).
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In order for an Ontario resident to be able to seek leave to
appeal from a decision with respect to a Class I or II instrument,
two conditions must be met. First, the person seeking leave to ap-
peal must have an interest in the decision. Although OEBR does
not define the term "interest," the task force argued that "standing"
in this context meant that the appellate body should accept a per-
son as having sufficient interest if the person is acting in good faith
and has a "demonstrable interest" in the issuance of the instru-
ment. Second, the applicant for the instrument or instrument-
holder must have a right to appeal arising from the underlying stat-
ute.268 This means that if the applicant or instrument-holder does
not have the statutory authority to appeal, neither does any mem-
ber of the public.269 The Ontario Environmental Appeal Board's
(OEAB) 270 first leave to appeal decisions have demonstrated that it
is possible for individuals and groups to satisfy the standing require-
ments for leave to appeal.271 OEAB, however, may apply additional
tests in deciding when it will grant leave to appeal a MOEE order
beyond those suggested by the task force.
The threshold test for leave to appeal to an administrative tri-
bunal is far more difficult for members of the public to meet than
the test for standing. Leave to appeal is granted only if the appel-
late body finds the following: (1) there is good reason to believe
that no reasonable person, considering relevant law and govern-
ment policies, could have made the decision, and (2) the decision
for which the appeal is sought could result in significant harm to
268. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 38(1) (1993) (Can.).
269. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 55 (outlining as requirement
for standing person's good faith and reasonableness). The task force perceived
the public's entitlement to standing to arise from a person's participation in the
public consultation on the instrument through the environmental registry or other
means. See id. OEBR itself states that "the fact that a person has exercised a right
given by [OEBR] to comment on a proposal is evidence that the person has an
interest in the decision on the proposal." See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 38(3).
270. See R.S.O., ch. E.19, part XIII. OEAB is an administrative tribunal estab-
lished under the Environmental Protection Act in the 1970s to hear appeals of
MOEE refusals to issue instruments and the imposition of orders. Under OEBR,
the body hearing leave to appeal applications by members of the public would be
the OEAB.
271. See, e.g., In reHunter [1995] 18 C.E.L.R. 22 (Can.) (concluding that indi-
vidual met interest test where he was neighbor who might potentially suffer ad-
verse effects from air emissions from wood product plant approved by MOEE); In
re Barker [1996] 20 C.E.L.R. 72 (Can.) (holding that appellants had demonstrated
sufficient proof of intent in matter to have standing to seek leave to appeal due to
a documented record of on-going concern and involvement and their close prox-
imity to site); In re Grand River Bio-Region Ass'n [1996] 19 C.E.L.R. 244 (Can.)
(suggesting that where group seeks leave to appeal under OEBR, it must demon-
strate that it is "person in law").
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the environment.2 72 The task force suggested that for a member of
the public seeking leave to appeal, it will be necessary to satisfy the
tribunal that the appeal has "preliminary merit."2 73 Some commen-
tators have remarked that the tests for leave as set out in OEBR are
extremely strict.274 They are clearly more stringent than the prima
facie test plaintiffs must satisfy under MEPA.
Early experience with OEAB treatment of these requirements
suggested that the tests for leave would frustrate the overall intent
of OEBR.2 75 Subsequent decisions have not adopted the approach
of the early cases, but have instead enunciated a less stringent test
similar to the one advocated by the task force. 2 76 As a whole, the
272. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 41 (1993) (Can.).
273. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 55 (noting that preliminary
merit means prima facie case that the instrument is unreasonable as issued and
requires review).
274. See DIANNE SAXE, ONT. ENVrL. PROTEcrION Acr ANN., EBR. 40-41 (sug-
gesting that appeals by members of public are intended to be exceptional remedy
for those few cases where regulators have failed to act). The OEBR unreasonable-
ness standard is essentially the same as the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1994). Under
the arbitrary and capricious standard, a court "must consider whether the decision
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error ofjudgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one." Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (noting that court is not empow-
ered to substitute its judgment for that of agency). The difference between the
two standards is that the latter determination is made after a full briefing and
consideration of the case, whereas the former occurs at a very early stage of the
proceeding.
275. See, e.g., In re Hunter [1995] 18 C.E.L.R. 22, 28 (Can.) (holding that re-
quired demonstration of unreasonableness of decision and potential of decision to
cause significant environmental effects can seldom be met by general statements of
concern from public, particularly in face of expert technical and scientific evi-
dence to contrary). According to the tribunal, submission by the leave applicant
of general statements about the harmful properties of chemicals to be emitted
from the facility was not sufficient to show that MOEE had acted unreasonably in
approving emission of those chemicals or that it had failed to properly evaluate the
risks to the environment. See id. at 28 (holding further that standard of proof that
leave applicant must meet is balance of probabilities, not lower standard of estab-
lishing prima facie case, as suggested by task force). The balance of probabilities
test is comparable to the American standard of preponderance of the evidence.
For a discussion of the task force's findings, see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
188, at 55.
276. See In re Barker [1996] 20 C.E.L.R. 72, 79-81 (Can.) (noting that leave
applicants sufficiently demonstrated that MOEE decision to amend certificate to
allow deposition of waste at previously closed site was unreasonable because based
on uncorrected inaccurate description of site location in approval documents that
could result in significant harm). The Barker OEAB panel refused to follow the
Hunter balance of probabilities requirement. Instead, the panel held that a lesser
standard of proof than a "likelihood of potential harm materializing" is more ap-
propriate at the leave to appeal stage than at the hearing of the appeal itself. The
panel decided that at the leave stage, the proof must only be sufficient to show that
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decisions suggest that OEAB considers the leave to appeal provi-
sions as requiring a balance between the general public's interest in
greater participation in the environmental decision-making process
and the instrument-holders' interests in avoiding undue delay and
cost in obtaining approval of projects that may contribute to the
economic well-being of the community. Moreover, while OEBR's
leave to appeal standards cannot be directly compared to MEPA's
prima facie case test, they are not being interpreted by OEAB to
require a showing of probable harm. As such, there is at least the
suggestion of a parallel approach to MEPA.
c. Reviews
Part IV of OEBR permits any two Ontario residents to request
either a review of an existing policy, Act, regulation or instrument,
or the development of a new policy, Act or regulation in order to
protect the environment.277 The task force's rationale behind
these recommendations was that the public required a standardized
procedure for bringing to the government's attention out of date,
ineffectual laws and potentially harmful unregulated activities. In
addition, the public had a right to a timely governmental response
explaining actions taken or reasons for failing to act. The task
the "concerns have a real foundation" sufficient to give the applicants "the right to
pursue them through the appeal process." Id. Subsequently, the same panel con-
cluded that the Barker lower standard was preferable. In re Residents Against Co.
Pollution Inc. [1996] 20 C.E.L.R. 97 (Can.) (stating that proof of actual unreason-
ableness or likelihood of potential harm materializing is unnecessary at leave
stage). In Residents, the panel granted leave to appeal a MOEE air approval for
sulphur dioxide emissions in connection with expansion of a petro-chemical facil-
ity. The evidence showed that MOEE's issuance of approvals for equipment, pro-
cess and production rates for which no application had been made and no notice
given under OEBR was unreasonable under the circumstances. The evidence also
showed that the facility's compliance with Ontario's sulphur dioxide standards
would be marginal under worst case scenarios, potentially posing significant harm
to apartment residents near the plant. See id. at 126-34, 163-64.
Of 13 applications for leave to appeal heard by OEAB to the end of Septem-
ber 1996, two have been granted, seven rejected, three withdrawn, and one pend-
ing. See David McRobert, The Nuts and Bolts of Ontario's Environmental Bill of Rights:
An Update, Address Before the Canadian Institute, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, REGULA-
TION AND MANAGEMENT 29 (1996). No reported OEAB decisions since Barker and
Residents have interpreted § 41 of OEBR. See In re APT Environment [1996] 18
C.E.L.R. 180, 186-88 (Can.) (holding that approval issued was not in relation to
Class I or II instrument, and, therefore was not subject to third party appeal provi-
sions of OEBR); Wetlands Preservation Group of Carleton v. Ontario [1996] 20
C.E.L.R. 65, 69 (Can.) (holding that water taking permit issued to control water
quantity is inappropriate instrument to address third party appellant concerns
about impacts of chemical runoff on water quality, and therefore, not subject to
leave to appeal provisions).
277. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, §§ 61(1) (dealing with review requests), 61(2)
(dealing with development of new policies, Acts or regulations).
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force anticipated that, over time, the government's environmental
agenda would be supplemented by the public. 278 Commentators
have characterized the regime as a "gap-filler."279 Experience to
date does not suggest that the government will readily adopt the
environmental agendas suggested by the public.280 Moreover, the
Environmental Commissioner's lack of authority to require or un-
dertake review is a critical limitation in the structure of OEBR.
The principal exemption from application of Part IV is if a law
or policy is less than five years old prior to the date of the review
request. In such circumstances, a minister cannot determine that a
review is warranted unless there is social, economic, scientific or
other evidence that failure to review the law or policy could signifi-
cantly harm the environment. Likewise, the minister cannot deter-
mine that review is warranted if the evidence was not taken into
account upon creation of the law or policy sought to be
reviewed.281
To employ the review procedure for an existing or proposed
law or policy, at least two residents of Ontario must apply to the
Environmental Commissioner. 28 2 Their application must provide,
among other things, the following: (1) an explanation of their be-
lief that protection of the environment requires undertaking of the
review for which they applied; (2) a summary of the evidence sup-
porting their beliefs; and (3) identification of the law or policy to
be reviewed. 283 A prudent applicant should provide the Environ-
mental Commissioner with as much information as possible in sup-
port of his request. Where a complex or highly technical proposal
is contemplated, the lack of any funding to assist applicants in the
preparation of their material may be a significant factor impeding
the ultimate success of the review requested and Part IV itself.
Moreover, the task given the Environmental Commissioner of
merely passing review requests from the public on to the appropri-
ate minister and reporting to the legislature on how the govern-
ment eventually handles such requests is procedurally confusing
278. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 77-81.
279. See MULDOON & LINDGREN, supra note 19, at 108. Apart from MOEE,
which became subject to Part IV in early 1995, most ministries did not become
subject to part TV until April 1996. See 0. Reg 73/94 § 5 (Can.).
280. See infra note 285.
281. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 68(1)(2); see also MULDOON & LINDGREN, supra
note 19, at 110.
282. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 61(1)(2). Residency is not otherwise defined
in OEBR or the regulations.
283. See id. § 61 (2) (4). A perfected application is sent to the relevant ministry
by the Environmental Commissioner.
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and highlights the weakness and limited scope of the Environmen-
tal Commissioner's responsibilities.
Once the minister receives a request under Part IV, the minis-
ter may consider a lengthy list of matters in addition to the time
frame the statute imposes in determining whether the public inter-
est warrants a review.284 These factors illustrate the minister's
broad discretion. The Environmental Commissioner's oversight is
the only constraint on this exercise of his discretion. 28 5 The Envi-
ronmental Commissioner's inability to require or undertake reviews
in the absence of government action is a critical limitation in
OEBR's structure.
d. Overall Impact of Public Participation Requirements:
Summary
The promise of notice, comment, appeals and reviews raised
public expectations concerning OEBR's contribution to increased
public participation in the environmental decision-making process.
Apart from some occasional successes in the leave to appeal pro-
cess, however, broad ministerial discretion has greatly diminished
the anticipated value of notice and comment opportunities and the
public's ability to help establish Ontario's environmental agenda
through requests to review laws and policies. The absence of a
funding requirement permitting members of the public to become
involved who could not otherwise, has compounded these con-
cerns.286 In its short existence, the Office of Environmental Com-
missioner has released several hard-hitting critiques of the
284. See id. § 67(2)(3).
285. See id. § 57 (g). Section 57 (g) permits the Environmental Commissioner
to review the exercise of ministerial discretion. See id. In practice, this means that
the Environmental Commissioner may report ministerial exercises of discretion to
the legislature. For the period 1994-1995, the Environmental Commissioner for-
warded over 300 requests for review to MOEE covering 16 different topics. Over
200 of these requests dealt with just two topics, namely, drinking water objectives
for tritium and regulations relating to refillable beverage containers. These two
topics were the only ones MOEE accepted for review. See EC ANNUAL REPORT I,
supra note 240, at 45-47. In examining the basis for MOEE's rejection of reviews in
other areas, the Environmental Commissioner concluded that rejections occurred
even though many requests had merit and raised important public policy issues,
including drinking water standards for other contaminants, air pollution controls,
groundwater protection, landfill site management, and packaging waste. See id. at
47.
286. See Eva Ligeti, Overview of the Environmental Bill of Rights, Address Before the
Canadian Bar Association-Ontario, in NEW RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS 15-16 (Dec. 1994). The Environmental Commissioner
has stated that funding of local public involvement in OEBR public participation
process examining a proposal should be considered by the legislature as a way to
avoid costly confrontations after a decision is made. See id.
1998]
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government's performance in these areas, thus raising public
awareness of existing problems. The limitations of a post hoc report
as primary weapon in the arsenal of the Environmental Commis-
sioner, however, cannot be overemphasized. In practice, few of the
instances the Environmental Commissioner identified as problems
have been subsequently corrected, as the government proposals
were usually implemented by the time of the report to the legisla-
ture. Indeed, sometimes the conduct of concern was repeated in
connection with a subsequent government initiative.287 All of these
difficulties raise larger questions about the benefits of OEBR's polit-
ical accountability approach to environmental rights in comparison
to MEPA.
3. Government Accountability
There are several ways in which governments can be made ac-
countable to the public regarding management and protection of
the environment. In Michigan, 288 other states,289 and the Yukon
territories, 290 government accountability has evolved through the
concept of the public trust doctrine, whereby governments are held
to what is effectively a fiduciary standard of conduct with respect to
protecting public resources. This duty is enforceable by the judici-
ary, a concept which was long included in many private members'
bills on environmental rights introduced in Ontario but not incor-
287. For further discussion of this issue, see supra note 235 and accompanying
text.
288. For a discussion on MEPA's approach to government accountability, see
supra notes 73-93, 130-33 and accompanying text.
289. In the United States, the development of public trust concepts has oc-
curred not only as a result of judicial doctrine or statutory initiative, but also as a
result of state constitutional entrenchment. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. Penn-
sylvania's constitution states that "[t] he people have a right to clean air, pure water
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of
all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources,
the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people." Id. This provision is identical to the public trust provision incorporated
into various environmental rights bills introduced in Ontario between 1979 and
1990. The Pennsylvania constitutional provision has been read narrowly by the
courts. See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa. 1976) (holding that state
transportation department may not be enjoined from widening street and taking
some of river common, because state had complied with all statutory requirements
and therefore had not violated its duty as trustee).
290. See Yukon Territories Environmental Act, S.Y.T., ch. 5, §§ 2, 38 (1991)
(Can.) (defining term "public trust" as "collective interest of the people of the
Yukon in the quality of the natural environment and the protection of the natural
environment for the benefit of present and future generations," and declaring
Yukon government to be "trustee of the public trust [and requiring it] . . . to
conserve the natural environment in accordance with the public trust").
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porated into OEBR.29 1 Instead, OEBR primarily addressed the no-
tion of government accountability inherent in the public trust
doctrine through two political mechanisms, namely, ministry state-
ments of environmental values and the Office of the Environmental
Commissioner. Limited experience with these mechanisms sug-
gests that they do not provide appropriate governmental accounta-
bility and cannot substitute for resort to the courts because ministry
statements have been reduced to vague statements of philosophy,
and the Office of the Environmental Commissioner cannot impose
sanctions on recalcitrant ministries.
a. Statements of Environmental Values
Each ministry subject to OEBR must produce a statement of
environmental values (SEV) that addresses how the purpose of
OEBR will affect its environmental decisions and how the ministry
will ensure that OEBR's purpose will be integrated with social, eco-
nomic and scientific considerations. Under OEBR, each ministry's
SEV must be prepared in consultation with the public, and the SEV
cannot be implemented without public notice and comment. Once
a SEV is implemented, OEBR requires that each minister take every
reasonable step to ensure public comment is considered whenever
the minister makes decisions that might significantly affect the
environment.
Experience with the development and content of the SEVs for
the fourteen ministries originally subject to the process has been
very disappointing. The task force intended the SEV to be a state-
ment of environmental ethic, plan, practice or mission for each
ministry that would help integrate environmental considerations
into the overall decision-making process for that particular minis-
try.292 Although the SEV process has the potential to complement
291. See, e.g.,Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (holding
that state under public trust doctrine has duty to eradicate present pollution and
prevent future pollution in its navigable waterways, and that land owners do not
have absolute and unlimited right to change essential character of their land and
cause injury to others); Robert Hopperton, The Public Trust Doctine and Environmen-
tal Justice in Great Lakes States: A Case of Unrealized Potentia in LAKE LINKS 1, 2-3
(Legal Institute of the Great Lakes, Toledo, Ohio, ed., Fall/Winter 1996) (sug-
gesting that potential of public trust doctrine at state level as doctrine of environ-
mental protection has remained largely unrealized due to judicial rulings); John
C. Maguire, Fashioning an Equitable Vision for Public Resource Protection and Develop-
ment in Canada: The Public Trust Doctrine Revisited and Reconceptualized, 7 J. ENVTL. L.
& PRAc. 1, 2 (1996) (noting that similar situation characterizes Canadian judicial
development of public trust doctrine, bidt situation may improve as provincial legis-
latures seek to entrench concept in statutes).
292. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 23-24.
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the older environmental impact assessment process which has ex-
isted under Ontario law for over two decades, problems have
plagued the SEV process from its inception.293 The ministries have
produced primarily vague statements of philosophy which lack both
detail and impact on their existing programs. 294 Likewise, public
293. The province's environmental assessment law requires proponents of
public and designated private-sector undertakings to prepare environmental as-
sessments, outlining the rationale for the undertaking. The document must con-
sider alternatives to, and methods of carrying out the undertaking, the affected
environment, potential environmental effects and mitigation measures. For
projects subject to the Act because they are a certain size, category, cost, or because
they are controversial, approvals are preceded by quasi-judicial hearings before a
provincial tribunal which adjudicates both the adequacy of the environmental as-
sessment and whether approval to proceed with the undertaking should be
granted. See Environmental Assessment Act (EAA), R.S.O., ch. E-18 (1990) (Can.).
EAA is a prescribed statute for the purposes of OEBR. See 0. Reg. 73/94 (Can.).
As a result, MOEE must consider its SEV when it makes decisions under the envi-
ronmental assessment law that are environmentally significant, and it must demon-
strate that the purposes of OEBR have been integrated into the ministry's decision-
making process.
To the extent that both the province's environmental assessment law and
OEBR attempt to integrate environmental considerations into a ministry's deci-
sion-making process, they are similar to the intent of United States environmental
laws. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-35
(1994). However, overall NEPA is closer to the province's environmental assess-
ment law than to OEBR, because the former requires the production of a specific
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment every time a project
or undertaking is subject to the law, while OEBR requires only one SEV which the
ministry must thereafter consider and apply to the entire range of ministry deci-
sion-making activities. Moreover, the sanctions for failure to comply with NEPA
include judicial review. Under EAA, an undertaking subject to the Act requires a
specific environmental assessment approval, may be preceded by an administrative
hearing and judicial review and quasi-criminal prosecution is available for failure
to conduct an environmental assessment on a project that is subject to the Act. In
contrast, under OEBR, there is neither a hearing requirement nor judicial review
regarding the adequacy of a ministry SEV, nor quasi-criminal sanction for failure
to apply a SEV.
Perhaps the biggest blow to the development and implementation of SEVs by
ministries was the sudden and permanent exemption by the Ontario cabinet of the
Ministry of Finance from the requirements of OEBR in late 1995. See 0. Reg. 482/
95 §§ 1, 2 (removing finance ministry from OEBR). The Environmental Commis-
sioner regarded the removal of the finance ministry from the requirements of
OEBR, including any SEV obligations, as a blow that would weaken OEBR and
"impede Ontario's progress toward a healthy, sustainable environment." LIGETI I,
supra note 231, at 7.
294. See EC ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 240, at 11-12 (noting that Environ-
mental Commissioner had asked ministries for details regarding how programs
might significantly affect environment, for statement of environmental values and
for specific activities and goals). According to the Environmental Commissioner,
the ministries did not agree with her interpretation of the function and content of
the SEV. The ministries considered the SEV to be a "statement of philosophy
which guides management," not a policy that itself sets goals. Id. Typical of the
SEVs produced by the 14 ministries is the six-page SEV prepared by MOEE.
MOEE's SEV states that it will apply the purposes of OEBR and certain guiding
principles and integrate them with social, economic and other considerations in its
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comment on the draft and final versions of the SEVs raised many
common themes of concern. 295 The Environmental Commissioner
herself acknowledged the shortcomings of SEVs, noting that "[o]n
their own, [SEVs] will not change . . .ministries. Instead, [SEVs]
must be accompanied by strong action plans, with clear purposes
and goals." 296 The call for strong action plans ignores the ques-
tions of whether the legislature expected SEVs to constitute those
action plans and whether the ministries simply failed to deliver on
the legislative and public expectations. 29
7
-Overall, the SEV requirements have been an abject failure as a
key element in justifying OEBR's political approach to government
accountability. Absent from earlier private members' bills, the
SEVs were meant to partially substitute forjudicial accountability, if
not the public trust doctrine. The practical application of the SEV
process, however, does not support the case for political accounta-
bility as a substitute for environmental rights redressable through
the courts.
b. Environmental Commissioner
The other component of government accountability OEBR
created is the Office of Environmental Commissioner. The Envi-
ronmental Commissioner is appointed by, reviews, monitors, and
reports to the Legislative Assembly with respect to governmental
decision-making process. See MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY, STATE-
MENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 2-3 (1994) (on file with author). The Environ-
mental Commissioner, in reviewing MOEE's SEV, found the document generally
disappointing. The Environmental Commissioner found it "particularly troubling
that environmentally significant programs go unmentioned." EC ANNUAL REPORT
I, supra note 240, at 17.
295. See RicHARD D. LINDGREN, CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
SUBMISSION TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSIONER RE: EBR STATEMENT OFENvi-
RONMENTAL VALUES 4-5 (1995) (on file with author); Letter from Richard D. Lin-
dgren, Counsel, Canadian Environmental Law Association, to Eva Ligeti,
Environmental Commissioner 4-5 (Oct. 13, 1995) (on file with author). Com-
plaints concerning the SEVs included: (1) their failure to explain adequately how
OEBR's purposes will be applied in ministry decision-making; (2) their lack of
measurable benchmarks to assess progress, or lack thereof, in meeting the Act's
purposes; (3) their failure to require environmental monitoring or reporting; (4)
their failure to ensure meaningful public participation when environmentally sig-
nificant decisions are made; and (5) their provision of insufficient information
about the relationship between SEVs and other ministry policies. See LINDGREN,
supra.
296. EC ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 240, at 13.
297. See id. (analogizing strong action plans to environmental management
systems). The Environmental Commissioner defined the term environmental
management systems as "the part of the overall management system of an organi-
zation which sets out practices and procedures to develop and implement the envi-
ronmental policies, objectives and targets of the organization." Id. at 72.
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compliance with OEBR.2 98 The Office of the Environmental Com-
missioner is the task force's answer to the need for objective over-
sight and measurement of OEBR's implementation and the use of
SEVs. Because ministry compliance with SEVs is not judicially re-
viewable, the task force recognized the need for sufficient deterrent
consequences for a ministry that ignores its SEVs. The task force,
therefore, felt that periodic reports by an Environmental Commis-
sioner, ministry-by-ministry, in an objective, non-partisan manner,
would lead to the political accountability implicit in OEBR's frame-
work.299 In reaching this conclusion, the task force considered and
specifically rejected judicial review of the application or non-appli-
cation of SEVs as being less effective than creating an Environmen-
tal Commissioner's office. Judicial intervention, according to the
task force, could "undermine the certainty, predictability and uni-
formity of the public participation system contemplated [in
OEBR]."3°°
The SEV and Environmental Commissioner's initiatives were
meant to substitute for the government accountability MEPA cre-
ated through the public trust doctrine. Experience to date casts
298. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 57 (1993) (Can.). The Environmental Com-
missioner's particular responsibilities include: (1) reviewing OEBR's implementa-
tion and ministries' compliance with OEBR; (2) guiding any ministry that requests
assistance with respect to SEV development and application; (3) providing assist-
ance to any ministry requesting help in providing education programs about
OEBR; (4) providing public educational programs about OEBR; (5) giving advice
and assistance to members of the public who wish to participate in decision-mak-
ing about a proposal; (6) reviewing the use of the environmental registry; (7) re-
viewing the exercise of ministerial discretion under OEBR; (8) reviewing recourse
to the appeal rights for instruments; (9) reviewing the receipt, handling and dispo-
sition of requests for reviews under Part IV and requests for investigations under
Part V; (10) reviewing ministry plans and priorities for conducting reviews under
Part VI; and (11) reviewing the use of the right of action, the defenses, and reli-
ance on the public nuisance reforms under Part VI. See id. The Environmental
Commissioner is authorized to issue annual and special reports with respect to all
of the above matters. See id. § 58. She may also conduct public inquiries on her
own motion and compel any person to either give sworn testimony or produce any
document related to the performance of the Environmental Commissioner's du-
ties under OEBR. See id. § 60.
299. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 65-68. The Environmental
Commissioner is appointed for a five year term by the provincial cabinet on the
address of the legislative assembly. The Environmental Commissioner is an officer
of the legislative assembly and reports directly to the assembly, not through a min-
ister of the Crown. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 49 (1993) (Can.). The first Environ-
mental Commissioner was appointed in June 1994 following hearings by a
standing committee of the legislative assembly.
300. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 68 (indicating that instead of
judicial intervention to ensure government accountability, OEBR, through Envi-
ronmental Commissioner, relies on "shame factor" to prompt appropriate govern-
ment action); see also Hearings, supra note 207, at 491 (testimony of Ms. Marcia
Valiante).
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doubt on the argument that OEBR's political accountability ap-
proach produces more environmentally sound decisions than
would judicial review. In effect, the current approach merely cata-
logues instances of governmental non-compliance for public con-
sumption, an action which further reduces public confidence in
government. It is doubtful whether a little bad publicity is a suffi-
cient consequence for governmental inaction or misconduct. The
task force might have had a much more limited goal of raising pub-
lic awareness in mind for the Environmental Commissioner's office.
However, adverse comments by the Environmental Commissioner
in the first two years of OEBR regarding the disappointing SEV pro-
cess, the frequent improper exercises of governmental discretion
and inadequate public consultation on key government initiatives
have not produced corrections in the identified problems. Indeed,
members of the environmental community have expressed their
concern that the Environmental Commissioner understated the
gravity of the environmental problems and the overall conduct of
the government in restricting the role of the public in the decision-
making process. 30 1 Combined with almost complete non-use of
•OEBR's access to the courts reforms, serious questions must be
raised about whether Ontario opted for an environmental rights
regime in name only.
If Ontario retains a complex administrative structure as an in-
tegral part of its approach to environmental rights, the legislature
should consider strengthening the Environmental Commissioner's
role in ensuring government accountability. Currently, the Envi-
ronmental Commissioner has only a limited oversight and report-
ing function. It might be more appropriate for the Environmental
Commissioner to be a combination of auditor general,
ombudsman, and public advocate. The auditor general function,
which the Environmental Commissioner's activities most closely re-
semble now, would allow her continued reports to the legislature
regarding the effectiveness of government programs in meeting en-
vironmental responsibilities under OEBR. The ombudsman func-
tion would allow the Environmental Commissioner to directly
undertake investigations of environmental complaints, rather than
simply report on government handling of public complaints, as is
currently the case under OEBR. Finally, the public advocate role
would allow the Environmental Commissioner to go to court to
seek redress for environmental violations arising from investigated
301. See Cathy Taylor, Environmental Commissioner's First Annual Report Released,
in ONT. ENV'T NETWORK NEWS 6 (July, 1996).
1998]
77
Castrilli: Environmental Rights Statutes in the United States and Canada: Co
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
426 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. IX: p. 349
public complaints in which a particular minister refused to act on
the Environmental Commissioner's findings. Although precedents
for these three roles exist in Canadian law,30 2 no institution com-
bines the three roles into one officer's position. Considering the
Environmental Commissioner's importance in promoting govern-
ment accountability under OEBR, this modification would be effec-
tive in enhancing the Environmental Commissioner's ability to
achieve the statute's objectives.
4. Investigations and Access to the Courts
The right to request a government ministry's investigation of
an alleged violation of environmental law under Part V and in-
creased access to the courts under Part VI are closely linked under
OEBR. Without first seeking a minister's undertaking of an investi-
gation, the public may be barred from invoking a new cause of ac-
tion for acts violating the law and significantly harming a public
resource. Two other aspects of court access under OEBR are re-
form of the law of standing in relation to public nuisance and lim-
ited opportunities for judicial review. Most of the experience to
date, however, has related to MOEE's treatment of investigations.
Even in those situations, however, the public has requested few in-
vestigations, and MOEE has granted even fewer. Reasons for the
minimal use of court access reforms might include the prerequisite
of requiring a request for an investigation as well as the new cause
of action's stringent criteria of a violation of law and significant
harm to a public resource.
302. See, e.g., Auditor General Act, R.S.C., ch. A-17, § 7(2) (e) (1985) (Can.);
Audit Act, R.S.O., ch. A.35, § 12(2) (f) (v) (1990) (Can.). Under Canadian federal
and provincial law, an auditor general must report to Parliament or to the legisla-
ture on whether satisfactory procedures have been established and used by minis-
tries to measure and report on the effectiveness of government programs. Recent
amendments authorize the Auditor General's office to appoint a special Environ-
mental Commissioner with the responsibility to monitor and report to Parliament
on the progress of federal departments in achieving sustainable development
objectives. See AUDITOR GENERAL ACT, Bill C-83, cl. 15.1, 21 (1995) (Can.).
Under Ontario law, the ombudsman is authorized to investigate public com-
plaints regarding decisions, acts, or omissions by governmental authorities that ad-
versely affect the complainant, and to report the results to the governmental
authority, the Premier of Ontario, the legislature, and the complainant, where
such decisions, acts or omissions are contrary to law, or are unreasonable, wrong,
or based on a mistake of law or fact. See Ombudsman Act, R.S.O., ch. 0.6,
§§ (1990) (Can.). Under federal access to information law, the information com-
missioner of Canada, following an investigation of government refusal to disclose
information requested by a member of the public, is authorized to apply to federal
court for judicial review of such government refusal. See Access to Information
Act, R.S.C., ch. A-1, § 42 (1985) (Can.).
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a. Preliminaries to the New Cause of Action: Requests for
Investigation
Although Ontario has always maintained an informal process
of public complaints regarding alleged incidents of environmental
harm, the task force argued that the public did not know whether
complaints had been received, acted upon, or how they were de-
cided.303 Consequently, it is now possible under Part V of OEBR
for any two Ontario residents who believe that a prescribed law has
been violated to apply to the Environmental Commissioner for the
appropriate minister's investigation of the alleged violation.30 4 Sim-
ilar procedural steps to those applicable to requests for reviews
under Part IV apply to requests for investigations under Part V.305
Different time frames apply to the Environmental Commissioner's
forwarding of the application to the appropriate minister, the min-
ister's consideration of the application and the minister's notifica-
tion of the outcome.3 0 6
This principal value of Part V has proven to be the Environ-
mental Commissioner's abilities to oversee the situation and report
to the public about less than satisfactory MOEE responses. These
efforts, while of limited effect in the short term, may spur future
reforms. What is surprising is that, despite the high percentage of
ministerial rejections of apparently meritorious requests, the appli-
cation for investigation process has not caused the public to make
303. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 70-71 (noting MOEE report-
edly receives thousands of public complaints each year).
304. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 74(1) (1993) (Can.).
305. See id. § 74(3) (4). Applicants for investigations must also swear an affi-
davit attesting to the truthfulness of the facts their application alleges. See id.
306. See id. §§ 75-81. The process may be analogized to the regime that exists
in the United States under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) where citizens may
petition the Secretary of the Interior to list as threatened or endangered particular
species of fish, wildlife or plants. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (1994) (authorizing
citizen petitions to force listing determinations and requiring Secretary to make
finding as to whether petition presents substantial scientific or commercial infor-
mation indicating petition action may be warranted). Key differences between the
two statutes, however, are that under ESA the petition is directed to the Secretary
and the decision to list or not is subject to judicial review, whereas there is no
judicial review from a minister's decision under OEBR. See id.
A critical issue involving a request for investigation is the minister's exercise of
discretion in the determination of whether to conduct an investigation. A minister
is not required to conduct an investigation if he considers: (1) the application to
be frivolous and vexatious; (2) the alleged violation to not be serious enough to
warrant an investigation; (3) the alleged contravention to not likely harm the envi-
ronment; or (4) the requested investigation to duplicate either an on-going or
completed investigation. See id. § 77(2) (3). Because the receipt, handling and dis-
position of requests for investigation under Part V are subject to the Environmen-
tal Commissioner's review, monitoring and reporting to the legislature, there
exists some experience of MOEE's performance regarding this issue.
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many requests nor has it encouraged use of the new cause of action
under Part VI. It is likely that the public is not invoking the request
for investigation process because of its greater formality in compari-
son to the older, informal process of filing public complaints.
b. Access to the Courts
In addition to OEBR's public participation and government ac-
countability mechanisms, the task force recognized that govern-
ment accountability may be insufficient to ensure appropriate
government action in certain circumstances. 30 7 Therefore, the task
force allowed for limited access to the courts in certain situations.
OEBR speaks to three areas relating to access to the courts, namely,
(1) the new cause of action for violation of a law which significantly
harms a public resource; (2) reform of the law of standing as it
relates to public nuisance; and (3) judicial review of proposals for
instruments. The first two of these areas are the closest analogue to
MEPA found in OEBR. There has, however, been little experience
with any of these three authorities to date.
i. New Cause of Action: Contravention of Law and
Significant Harm to a Public Resource
Under Part VI of OEBR, any Ontario resident may bring an
action against a person who has "contravened or will imminently
contravene an Act, regulation or instrument prescribed for the pur-
poses of Part V, and the actual or imminent contravention has
caused or will imminently cause significant harm to a public re-
source in Ontario."30 8 However, a plaintiff cannot bring an action
for actual contravention unless the minister fails to respond to
plaintiffs application for an investigation within a reasonable time
or the minister responds unreasonably.30 9 This step may be
avoided where ministerial delay would result in significant harm or
serious risk of significant harm to a public resource. 310 These
OEBR provisions may be compared to United States federal citizen
suit legislation and judicial interpretation of constitutional require-
ments.3 11 Comparatively, OEBR's pre-condition of requesting an
307. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 83-84, 97.
308. OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 84(1).
309. See id. § 84(2).
310. See id. § 84(6).
311. Citizens may only sue if the following exist: (1) they have standing; (2)
they give notice before they sue; (3) they allege an on-going violation; and (4) a
prior governmental lawsuit does not bar them from proceeding.
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investigation prior to using the new cause of action appears
reasonable.
To mitigate the effects of OEBR's new cause of action, the stat-
ute provides numerous exemptions. For example, OEBR exempts
from liability farm practices resulting in odor, noise or dust
problems.3 12 Other defenses to the new cause of action include:
(1) defendant's exercise of due diligence in complying with the
Act, regulation or instrument;3 13 (2) the alleged contravention is in
Under most federal citizen suit legislation, a citizen may not commence an
action until 60 days after having notified EPA, the state in which the alleged viola-
tion occurs, and the alleged violator. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b) (1) (A) (1994). Compliance with the sixty day notice requirement is a
mandatory precondition to commencing the action, and failure to meet the re-
quirement necessitates dismissal of the action. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
493 U.S. 20, 25-33 (1989) (interpreting citizen suit provision notice requirement
accordingly); see also Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,
484 U.S. 49, 56-64 (1987) (holding that provision authorizing citizen suits for in-
junctive relief or penalties did not allow citizen suits for wholly past violations, and
that jurisdiction to bring citizen suit exists only where citizen makes good faith
allegation of continuing, intermittent, or on-going violation).
Federal citizen suit legislation also prevents the bringing of such actions
where EPA or the state "has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or
criminal action in a court." See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1) (B).
A further provision unique to the Clean Water Act precludes the bringing of citi-
zen suits where the federal government or a state under a comparable law has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an administrative civil penalty order not
subject to further review and the violator has paid the penalty. For a state law to be
deemed comparable to the Clean Water Act provision, it must provide citizens with
rights to notice, to be heard, to present evidence, to participate in hearings and to
seek judicial review. See id. § 1319(g) (4)-(6). The courts have diverged on what
constitutes a comparable state law capable of precluding citizen suits under the
Clean Water Act. See North & South Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d
552, 555-58 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that Massachusetts administrative order issued
that did not include civil penalties does not alter comparability of state law's
scheme to Clean Water Act; it is enough that state statutory scheme, under which
state is diligently prosecuting, contains penalty assessment of provisions compara-
ble to federal statute, that state is authorized to assess those penalties and that
overall scheme of two laws is aimed at correcting same violations and thus achiev-
ing same goals); but see Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Universal Tool, 735 F. Supp.
1404, 1414-17 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding Indiana law not comparable because it
does not provide for public notice and participation, penalty assessment, judicial
review and other matters required by Clean Water Act).
312. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 84(4). Ontario law has long provided the farm
community with protection for these particular nuisances. For example, since
1988, neighbors cannot sue farmers in nuisance for any odor, noise, or dust arising
from normal farm practices. See Farm Practices Protection Act, R.S.O., ch. F-16,
§§ 1-2 (1990) (Can.).
313. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 85(1). The defense of due diligence or reason-
able care has a long history at common law and in numerous statutes, including
environmental statutes in Canada. Generally, due diligence is defined as "taking
all reasonable steps in the circumstances to prevent the occurrence of the prohib-
ited conduct." See R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 1326 (S.C.C.). In
the context of OEBR, even if a defendant caused significant harm to a public re-
19981 429
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fact authorized by the Act, regulation or instrument;314 or (3) the
defendant complied with an interpretation of the instrument a
court considers most reasonable. 315 Remedies include injunctions,
negotiation of a restoration plan, declaratory relief, or other meas-
ures. 316 Under special circumstances, a court may dispense with a
plaintiff's pre-trial undertaking to pay damages.3 17
The task force designed the new cause of action to permit the
public's use of the judicial system to protect a public resource in
the absence of the government's attempts to do so. 31 8 The new
cause of action contains, however, several significant limitations.
First, there must be both a violation of prescribed law and signifi-
cant harm to a public resource. This combination is more stringent
than citizen suit requirements under environmental legislation in
the United States,3 19 and more stringent than those required by
most nuisance laws. 320 Second, the definition of "public resource"
source, he might be able to avoid liability by satisfying a court that all due care was
taken in the circumstances.
314. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 85(2).
315. See id. § 85(3). Ironically, this section may allow courts to overrule ad-
ministrative permits, licenses, approvals, authorizations, directions, or orders in
favor of defendants. In contrast, MEPA allows courts to second-guess administra-
tors in favor of plaintiffs by setting new, stricter standards.
316. See id. § 93(1).
317. See id. § 92. Such circumstances include when the action is a test case or
raises a novel point of law. The same special circumstances test applies to the
court's exercise of discretion in considering the issue of costs at the close of pro-
ceedings. See id. § 100. The Environmental Commissioner maintains a reporting
function with respect to the use of the new cause of action and the defenses. See id.
§ 57(k).
318. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 95-96.
319. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994) (permitting
commencement of citizen suit actions against any person who is alleged to be in
violation of effluent standards, limitations or orders). There is no requirement
under the Clean Water Act to show that there is also significant harm. See id. In
fact, the theory behind the federal pollution control statutes was to avoid having
the courts make such a determination. The purpose of the substantive standards
under statutes like the Clean Water Act is to avoid having to prove environmental
harm from pollution on a case-by-case basis. Where state environmental rights
laws have required that citizens not be able to sue unless there is both a violation of
environmental statute and resulting significant environmental damage, judicial in-
terpretation has been restrictive of the broader remedial purposes of the legisla-
tion. See Lerner, supra note 14, at 10 (commenting on citizen suit law in
Massachusetts); see also Diane K. Danielson, Comment, Environmental Regulation in
Michigan and Massachusetts: Two States with Two Different Solutions to the Same Problem,
20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 99, 112 (1993).
320. See, e.g., Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich.
1992) (stating that "gist of a private nuisance is an interference with the occupa-
tion or use of land"). According to the Restatement of Torts, a private nuisance is
a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D, 822 (1979). One is subject to
liability for a private nuisance if her conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of
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considerably narrows OEBR's ambit because it includes only public
land.32 1 Third, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the contra-
vention or imminent contravention on a balance of probabilities.322
OEBR has no provision such as that found in MEPA which shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant once the plaintiff has established
a prima facie case. Fourth, OEBR authorizes compliance with an
interpretation of an instrument the court considers reasonable. 323
This defense appears to allow for mistake of law or reasonable but
erroneous interpretation of the law, even though courts have not
historically accepted such a defense.324 Fifth, damages are an ex-
cluded remedy, thus providing less incentive for the provision to be
invoked by many ordinary members of the public.3 25 Sixth, OEBR
permits a court to dispense with a plaintiffs undertaking to pay
damages to obtain an interlocutory injunction only where the court
finds special circumstances, such as with test cases or novel points
of law.3 26 Seventh, OEBR litigation may impose high costs on plain-
tiffs for legal and technical expertise in attempting to demonstrate
that harm to a public resource is significant. Furthermore, where
plaintiffs are unsuccessful, they also face the possibility of adverse
cost awards. 327 These various limitations constitute a formidable set
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land and the invasion is
either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and otherwise actionable.
See id. The essence of public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public. See id. § 821B. Neither the definition for private
or public nuisance requires showing a statutory violation.
321. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 82. "Public resource" is defined under OEBR
as air, water, "unimproved public land, any parcel of public land that is larger than
five hectares and is used for recreation, conservation, resource extraction, [or re-
lated activities], and any plant or animal life or ecological system associated with
the above." Id. Public land is defined as "land that belongs to the Crown in right
of Ontario, a municipality, or a conservation authority," but not land leased from
the above three categories that is used for agricultural purposes. Id.
322. See id. § 84(8).
323. See id. § 85(3).
324. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 100-01 (recommending de-
fense of reasonable interpretation and arguing that, in some circumstances, instru-
ment under which defendant operates may be technical or vague; if defendant's
interpretation is reasonable and he has complied with instrument according to
that interpretation, he should not be held liable for environmental harm to public
resource).
325. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 93(2).
326. See id. § 92. This provision largely codifies existing law as the courts have
always had this discretion. See Attorney General for Ontario v. Harry, [1982] 35
O.R.2d 248, 250 (Ont. H.C.) (noting that court retains discretion to refuse to en-
force undertaking given upon interim injunction if special circumstances exist).
327. See Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O., ch. C.43, § 131 (1990) (Can.) (stating
that costs are in court's discretion and, unless otherwise ordered, unsuccessful liti-
gant pays successful litigant's costs). The discretion authorized by OEBR largely
codifies existing judicial practice. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 105
1998].
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of impediments to its public use, and do not provide comfort to
plaintiffs contemplating bringing an OEBR action. Although the
task force intended that the provision be used only as a last resort,
these obstacles suggest little deterrent effect on the regulated
community.328
ii. Public Nuisance Law Reform
Public nuisance is defined as an unreasonable interference
with a right common to all members of the general public. Histori-
cally, only the Attorney General was entitled to bring a public nui-
sance action, either on his own or through a private person to
whom permission to bring the lawsuit had been granted. Private
individuals wishing to sue in public nuisance were required to
either obtain a particular attorney general's consent or, in the ab-
sence of such consent, demonstrate having suffered a harm both
different in kind and greater than that of the rest of the public.329
In practice, the public nuisance rule often resulted in numerous
individuals within a single community suffering either inconven-
ience or interference through denied access to the courts.330 The
rule had been the subject of concern in Ontario before being ex-
amined by the task force.331
As a result of the reforms proposed by the task force, OEBR
permits any person to bring an action who has suffered, or who may
suffer, a direct economic loss or direct personal injury as a result of
a public nuisance caused by environmental harm. OEBR permits
such actions without the consent of the Attorney General and re-
gardless of whether other persons had been similarly injured.3 32
The OEBR-reformed public nuisance rule may prove to be a more
frequently used provision than the new cause of action because it
allows damage awards, class actions and is not contingent on prior
(noting that courts now have discretion to depart from normal costs rules where
litigation raises special circumstances such as novel point of law or test cases).
328. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 97. The new cause of action
was not invoked during 1994 and 1995. See EC ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 240,
at 64.
329. See, e.g., Hickey v. Electric Reduction Co. [1971], 21 D.L.R.3d 368, 369
(Nfld. S.C.).
330. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 188, at 92.
331. See ONT. LAw REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE LAw OF STANDING 2
(1989) (on file with author) (concluding that public nuisance standing rule is "of-
fensive and not compatible with our notions of who ought to have access to the
judicial process in the face of widespread harm caused to all, or a significant seg-
ment, of the community").
332. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 103.
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requests for investigation.3 3 3 Nonetheless, the reformed public nui-
sance provision went unused during the 1994, 1995 and 1996
reporting periods.3 34
iii. Judicial Review
OEBR authorizes few opportunities for judicial review. Gov-
ernment failure to comply with Part II of OEBR regarding public
participation in environmental decision-making does not affect the
validity of any policy, Act, regulation or instrument.335 Moreover,
judicial review is not available for any action, decision, failure to
take action or failure to make a decision by a minister or his or her
delegate under OEBR.3 3 6 Although there is limited authority for
any Ontario resident to seek judicial review on the grounds that a
minister or his delegate "failed in a fundamental way to comply with
the requirements of Part II respecting a proposal for an instru-
ment," OEBR provides no guidance regarding what might consti-
tute "fundamental" non-compliance.33 7
Now that the public can also seek leave to appeal in relation to
certain instruments, greater public involvement and judicial scru-
tiny in the development and approval of some instruments issued to
the regulated community may be expected when the leave to ap-
peal and judicial review provisions are interpreted together. This is
possible for two reasons. First, judicial review may be available to
compel a minister to introduce a regulation classifying instruments
which should be subject to notice and comment. Second, a mem-
ber of the public might later invoke the leave to appeal provisions
to seek a hearing before OEAB on the appropriateness of ministry
approval of those instruments that had been subject to notice and
comment. Apart from authorizing greater public and judicial roles
333. See id. The new cause of action provision contains each of these impedi-
ments, while the public nuisance provision is silent on these matters.
334. See EC ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 240, at 64; ENVIRONMENTAL COMMIS-
SIONER OF ONTARIO, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT: KEEP THE DooRs OPEN TO BETrER ENVI-
RONMENTAL DECISION MAKING 54 (1997) [hereinafter EC ANNUAL REPORT II].
335. See OEBR, S.O., ch. 28, § 37.
336. See id. § 118(1).
337. See id. § 118(2). The task force, however, suggested that a minister's fail-
ure to place a notice regarding an instrument on the environmental registry or to
properly exercise discretion in relation to emergency powers should result in the
instrument being considered voidable by a court. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 188, at 59-60. A further example of fundamental non-compliance may be a
minister's failure to introduce a regulation OEBR requires which classifies the stat-
utes it administers. Such non-compliance prevents the application of OEBR notice
and comment and other requirements in relation to instruments the ministry
issues.
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in the development of instruments, however, OEBRjudicial review
provisions exclude both the public and the courts from the environ-
mental decision-making process.
V. CONCLUSION: A FINAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MEPA
AND OEBR
The origins of environmental rights legislation in both Michi-
gan and Ontario emerged from similar experiences, including: (1)
a myriad of environmental problems that could no longer be ig-
nored; (2) existing administrative and regulatory regimes that
largely locked the public out of law enforcement; and (3) a devel-
oping citizens' movement actively seeking long-term legal and insti-
tutional solutions. The response of each jurisdiction to the
question of what constitutes environmental rights, however, has
been sharply divergent. In its 1970 law, MEPA, Michigan focused
on the courts as the engine of reform, while Ontario concentrated
OEBR, its 1993 law, on institutional changes in government, the
role of public participation and limited access to the courts.
The Michigan approach to the problem focused on the courts
as the more independent and appropriate forum for resolving envi-
ronmental conflicts by allowing citizens to sue to vindicate broad
entitlements to environmental quality. Over twenty-five years of ex-
perience with MEPA's substantive and procedural reforms have
demonstrated both successes and failures with use of the courts to
protect environmental values. Reforms that have opened up the
courts to hearing environmental disputes brought by ordinary
members of the public include: (1) standing to sue; (2) imposition
of public trust obligations on government to protect the en-
viromnent; (3) shifting of the burden of proof to defendants to
demonstrate lack of feasible and prudent alternatives to their con-
duct following plaintiff establishment of a prima facie case of im-
pairment; (4) judicial ability to inquire into the adequacy of, and if
necessary to change, environmental standards; and (5) minimal
surety bond requirements for obtaining preliminary injunctions.
The Michigan courts' gradual development of a high threshold of
harm for plaintiffs' establishment of a prima facie case of environ-
mental impairment has increasingly prevented the burden from be-
ing shifted to defendants, thus lifting the obligation to address
alternatives to their conduct. Lack ofjudicial support for awards of
attorney's fees also makes MEPA potentially less accessible to mem-
bers of the public seeking environmental protection. However, the
essence of MEPA remains, that is, access to the courts is both an
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efficient and integral part of public participation. Experience to
date has on the whole largely vindicated that perception.
The Ontario approach to the question of establishing environ-
mental rights has had a much longer and more convoluted history.
In the 1970s, groups that embraced the notion of establishing envi-
ronmental rights envisioned a law similar to MEPA, and early legis-
lative versions of such a bill adopted a MEPA-type approach to the
problem. Eventually, through a wide-ranging attempt by the New
Democratic Party government to achieve consensus with business,
industrial, and environmental interests on the content of such a
law, a quite different approach emerged as Ontario's environmen-
tal rights statute. At its core, OEBR rejects the fundamental "access
to the courts" right that is the cornerstone of MEPA.
By creating rights of participation in the administrative and
regulatory process of developing and approving regulations, poli-
cies and instruments, and creating new institutional mechanisms to
act in an oversight capacity on government, OEBR is a statute much
more fully dedicated to reforming the governmental decision-mak-
ing process on environmental matters. 338 Access to the courts
under OEBR, instead, is an exercise of limited last resort. The ex-
perience with OEBR is admittedly not of similar duration as MEPA.
As such, it is more difficult to draw final views as to the comparative
performance and effectiveness of both laws. However, based on the
experience thus far under OEBR, it is fair to say that the Ontario
law is largely a "rights law" in name only. This is because the ad-
ministrative rights regime established under OEBR to increase op-
portunities for notice and comment on government or citizen-
initiated reforms depends highly on the government's exercise of
discretion. In practice, government discretion frequently has been
exercised to limit or remove opportunities for public involvement
in environmental decision-making. The lone bright spot in the ad-
ministrative rights reforms, the exercise of leave to appeal by mem-
bers of the public concerning instruments, has occasionally
resulted in being able to examine these decisions. On the other
hand, the institutional mechanisms created to monitor government
compliance have mainly functioned to catalogue, not reverse, gov-
ernment decisions, and have essentially locked the public out of the
process. At the same time, the substantive right to resort to the
338. To the extent that OEBR focuses on integrating the public and environ-
mental considerations into the administrative decision-making process through
such mechanisms as the SEV process, the law has much in common with other
process statutes, such as Ontario's environmental assessment law and NEPA in the
United States.
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courts established by OEBR is hedged with so many limitations that
it has not been invoked at all during the statute's first three years.
As more jurisdictions consider enacting environmental rights
legislation, legislators will need to consider where they want to posi-
tion themselves on the continuum of polar extremes reflected in
the Michigan and Ontario approaches. Indeed, legislators in juris-
dictions that already possess environmental rights laws, including
Michigan and Ontario, may want to consider possible reform to
their own laws. For example, if legislators view access to the courts
as a critical element in environmental protection, they will want the
legislature to provide greater guidance on the need to impose mini-
mal prima facie case obligations on plaintiffs. By permitting plain-
tiffs to make this prima facie showing more easily, environmental
justification will then lie with the defendant to demonstrate that no
superior alternatives to its conduct are available. The failure of the
Michigan legislature to address this issue could increasingly result
in judicial findings that correspond to OEBR's significant harm
test. Such a high threshold test is inconsistent with the legislative
history surrounding the enactment of MEPA.3 39 The Michigan leg-
islature, or other jurisdictions considering enacting such legisla-
tion, will also have to grapple with making citizen suit litigation
more affordable through clearer guidance on the availability of at-
torney's fees.
When legislators review the Ontario experience, they will likely
determine that complex administrative and institutional reforms es-
tablished in an environmental rights law, like OEBR, must be sub-
ject to greater judicial scrutiny and less government discretion if
they are to avoid the problems catalogued in the first three years of
OEBR's operation. Legislators will also need to consider whether
to make a violation of a statute or significant harm to the environ-
ment, but not both, as the standard for invoking plaintiff's cause of
action. Similarly, legislators will have to consider the applicability
of the earlier reforms rejected by the task force and excluded from
OEBR. Two key rejected reforms that should be considered in-
clude shifting the onus to a defendant to establish lack of feasible
and prudent alternatives, and requiring a minimal surety bond
from a plaintiff to obtain a preliminary injunction. Finally, for
those jurisdictions considering establishing a more complex admin-
339. See Lynch, supra note 68, at 64-65 (noting that Michigan legislators
wanted to ensure that MEPA could address small-scale, incremental, and cumula-
tive environmental problems, which, if ignored, could gradually erode larger re-
source and environmental values).
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istrative rights and a government accountability regime like that
found in OEBR, the Office of Environmental Commissioner needs
to be redeveloped. Certainly, if Ontario is itself determined to re-
tain such a complex administrative and institutional structure as an
integral approach to environmental rights, the province should
strengthen the role of the office by giving the Environmental Com-
missioner the powers of auditor general, ombudsman and public
advocate, so that oversight, reporting and redress to the courts may
be undertaken directly by that office where appropriate. Whether
one chooses the Michigan or Ontario environmental rights ap-
proach, enacting the above reforms would appear to be minimum
conditions to strive for in the continuing search for environmen-
tally sound decision-making.
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